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5Recommendation
I am fortunate enough to know the author of this book who was on duty in Western 
Sahara when I was serving as the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces 
(HDF). Even back then I considered it as a priority not just to send our soldiers 
to foreign countries but to process and channel their experiences to anyone who 
might benefit from them.
For peacekeeping and the involvement of the HDF in missions outside 
Hungarian borders are not just military or governmental interests, but important 
contributions to uphold peace and stability worldwide. We simply cannot forget 
that the concepts of security and the world itself have changed gravely and 
rapidly, therefore, we are no longer an independent island with an outside view 
on the more and more bloody conflicts of other countries and continents. The 
Republic of Hungary—due to its NATO and EU commitments—participates in 
a growing number of armed and unarmed peacekeeping and peace-managing 
operations. Therefore, I consider it as of great importance that a vast number of 
studies deals with such operations in order to help us gain a better knowledge of 
the outside world and to support us with credible information about the activity 
of our peacekeeping forces.    
This volume gives a thorough overview of a still operating UN mission in 
Western Sahara. Also, this work fills in a niche, since this area—apart from a 
few minor articles—has not been covered yet. Since the Republic of Hungary has 
been deploying a small contingent for years—who has been tasked with classic 
peacekeeping duties—, this fact is rather surprising. Considering that one of the 
main duties of the Council on Geopolitics is to monitor the different crisis areas 
of the world, the timeliness of this study is completely verified.
The author includes his own experiences to give a thorough overview on the 
activities of the MINURSO.  The book is based on those experiences and on a 
wide-range analysis of relevant sources. Also, it soon becomes obvious that the 
author was not satisfied to be familiar only with the information deriving from 
his line of duty, but aimed to understand the roots of the conflict. One of the many 
benefits of this case study is that someone unfamiliar with this topic will also 
be able to understand the aim, essence and hardships of this mission in Western 
Sahara.
As of today, the Hungarian foreign policy does not pay enough attention to 
the African continent, even though there is a lot to do over there. The world’s 
poorest continent has to suffer under an increasingly great number of wars and 
armed conflicts. The EU’s attention towards the region is already raised and the 
NATO is being involved in strategic logistics tasks aimed to support the African 
6Union peacekeeping mission in the Sudan. Meanwhile, the experts of security policy 
can only hope that a time will come when the different international organisations act 
together to solve the problems of Africa.
I do recommend this book of János Besenyő for anyone who is interested in 
understanding the hardships of Africa in detail.
Colonel General Zoltán Szenes
Former Chief of Staff 
Hungarian Defence Forces 
7editoR’S PReface
Fortunately, interest in Africa-related issues and topics has been gradually on the rise 
in the last decades—and this is a global phenomenon. Unfortunately, not many pieces 
on Africa (books, journals, etc.) are available in Hungary, definitely, not by Hungarian 
authors. The journal Afrika Tanulmányok (Africa Studies in Hungary) and Publikon 
Publishers have the mission to change this situation and annually come out with more 
and more articles and volumes about different themes connected with the continent. 
Luckily, we find committed partners in achieving these aims.
We are delighted to be the publisher of the first English-language book of János 
Besenyő. He is that type of committed person who has been extensively writing on 
African topics, trying to channel his ground experiences into the Hungarian readers’ 
circles. One of his decisive works is formulated in this volume, in which he thoroughly 
explores the historical background and the present-day situation of the conflict in 
Western Sahara. The area itself is full of interesting stories and tales—János 
Besenyő relies on these while in a very professional way arrives at certain significant 
conclusions, for instance, as far as the UN mission in Western Sahara and its potential 
future are concerned. He does this in a sophisticated and even-tempered manner, 
which, I think is one of the strengths of the book.
The author is a good photographer at the same time—he does have sharp eyes 
to notice the very details of life in the Sahara, among the local communities of the 
territories he visited. We had a difficult task to pick only a couple of his photos; we 
would have liked to publish another book only of these great moments and descriptions 
(hopefully, next time we will have the chance to continue this collaboration).
We are proud to present János Besenyő’s monography on Western Sahara, as the 
first such book in the English language in Hungary. We hope that the readers will 
enjoy it, and wish that many more pieces on many more African countries and themes 
will follow so that people understand more about real Africa. These will surely allow 
them/us to look beyond the stereotypical images that are embedded in our everyday 
minds. Africa is much more to these; Africa deserves much more attention to discover 
its real values! Such attempts as János Besenyő’s can help us open our eyes.
Pécs, 20 April 2009 
istván tarrósy, M.Sc., M.A.
editor, executive editor of Afrika Tanulmányok
managing director of IDResearch Ltd./Publikon Publishers

9GeoGraphical features – flora and fauna
The area lies in North Africa, on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. It is 
bordered by Morocco in the north, Algeria in the east (they have 42 kms 
of common boundary) and Mauritania from the east and south. Its area 
is 266,000 square kilometres. Just like in most African countries, the 
borders were marked out by the colonial powers by ratifying different 
treaties, agreements. The borders of Western Sahara were regulated and 
marked out by the agreements signed by Spain and France in 1900, 1904 
and 1912.1
Its lowland area is plain, sandy and rocky, with a few hills in the 
southern and north-eastern parts. These hills are at an altitude of not more 
than 400 metres2. Its lowest point is Sebjet Tah, 55 metres below sea-level, 
while the highest is a 721 metre high hill, which has no official name.
Western Sahara can be divided into three main regions.
Source: MINURSO
The north-eastern zone is a rocky desert (hamadas) spreading from 
the chains of the Atlas mountain to the Zemmour mountains. Mountain 
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chains of volcanic origin of different sizes and unique hanging rocks can be 
found here. Water is scarce in the area, there are only few scattered wells.
Despite the relative lack of water, many species of plants and animals live in 
the area. For example, the screwhorn antelope or kudu (Addax nasomaculatus), 
the Dama gazelle (Gazella dama), Dorcas gazelles (Gazelle dorcas),
3
 the 
African sand fox or pale fox (Vulpes pallida), sand foxes or Rueppel’s fox 
(Vulpes rueppeli), the caracal or African Lynx  (Caracal caracal), the African 
wildcat (Felis silvestris), the golden jackal (Canis aureus), and the desert 
hedgehog (Hemiechinus aethiopicus). 
The most typical plant of the area is the acacia with large thorns, which 
can be considered the only indigenous species in the desert besides some 
variations of cacti.
Deriving tannin from this acacia, the plant is used for paint production by 
the locals. Due to its hardness, the wood can be used in a versatile way. The 
so-called Senegal Acacia (Acacia senegal) can also be found in the desert. 
Rubber arabicum is made from it by tapping. 
The animals are quite difficult to observe as they move around mostly at 
dawn or late at night. The military observers can also see their footprints or gather 
information from the Moroccan soldiers and the descriptions of the Bedouins. 
Many of the animals living here are registered in the Red Book and are strictly 
protected. Nevertheless, both Moroccan soldiers and rich foreign tourists (mainly 
from Saudi Arabia and Yemen) hunt them without feeling any remorse.4
When on patrol in the area of Mehaires and Tifariti we met Saudi Arabian 
hunters, who were escorted by members of the Polisario on their antelope 
hunt. Antelopes and addaxes are abundant, though their number decreased 
during the war. Addax is a type of antelope which has totally adapted to the 
extreme climatic conditions of the desert. As it obtains its moisture need from 
the plants it usually eats, it drinks very little water. The average weight of 
the animal is approximately 135 kgs. According to the locals its meat is very 
tasty. As both the male and the female have a horn, they are very appealing 
trophies for foreign hunters. The hunters chase the animals on fast jeeps and 
eventually shoot the exhausted animal. As the addax is not afraid of humans 
because of its size the females protecting their calves even attack hunters, so 
it is easy to capture them. 
Due to the intensive hunting, the number of addaxes in the Western Sahara 
is estimated to be 50.5 One of our patrols was lucky enough to see a small 
group of antelopes. He was notified by one of the Bedouins. 
The second zone is called the area of the river by the locals because 
temporary rivers run through it. It is bordered by the Draa valley from the 
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north, and the valley of the Jat river from the west. The water gathers in 
these valleys during the short rainy seasons in the autumn. Due to the very 
high temperatures, water evaporates very quickly, so it never reaches the 
Atlantic.6
The Saguiat el-Hamra (the Red River) can be found in the “river-zone”. 
The importance of this particular river is revealed in the fact that the region 
was named after it.7
Vegetation suitable for grazing is significant on the banks of the rivers and 
near Smara. The local inhabitants also grow barley and other crops. 
The flora and fauna are a bit more versatile here than in the rocky territory 
called hamadas. Oases of different size offer some additional colours to the 
scenery. The size of the oases can vary from a few hundred square metres 
up to the size of a smaller village. Almost 75% of the people of the Sahara 
live in oases, where mostly palm trees (date palm and gingerbread tree), 
vegetables and many different types of crops are grown. The 10-15-metre-tall 
gingerbread tree (Hyphaene thebaica) is indigenous on the territory of Egypt, 
Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania, but due to the Arabic merchants it has naturalised 
in most parts of the oases of the Sahara. The fruit of the palm is the size of an 
apple and is orange in colour, its taste resembles gingerbread. The locals use it 
as a plant to substitute bread. Buttons are made from the hardcore of the plant, 
while mattresses and other household items from its fibre. 
Date palm tree is well-known and represents the most important industrial 
plant of the desert as all of its parts can be utilised. The tree symbolises long 
life in Arabic culture even today. The tree can live even as long as 150 years. 
Apart from consuming its fruit, syrup, vinegar and alcohol are produced 
from it. 
Furniture, baskets and other articles for personal use are made from 
its leaves, while the sweet juice tapped from the tree is used as a kind of 
refreshment. 
One typical feature of the region, similarly to other parts of the Sahara, is 
that it can rain for hours over a small area but there is no sign of the rain even 
only a few hundred metres away. The desert flourishes after the rain and a lot of 
different kinds of flowers unknown to us grow from the ground. After a short 
blossoming period, however, they disappear until it starts raining again. In river 
valleys the Houbara bustard (Chlamydotis undulata) can be seen frequently. 
They are the size of a pheasant and have brown and white spots. They feed 
on small mammals and lizards. The area is certainly rich in insects: different 
species ranging from the rhinoceros beetle (Oryctes nasicornis) to the scarab 
(Scarabaeus Sacer) can be found here, which serve as food for other species.
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The Jerboa and the Fennec fox (Vulpes zerda) are two typical small 
mammals of the desert there. 
Jerboa (Jaculus) is a rodent similar to the cross-breeding of a mouse, a rat 
and a squirrel. It is the most typical representative of the 40 different types 
of rodent in the desert. To keep its temperature at an adequate level, it digs a 
tunnel system under the sand, where the temperature is 10-20 degrees cooler 
than outside. Mostly, the small animals move around and feed during the 
night. Europeans can see them when the locals try to sell them. 
The desert fox (Fennecus zerda) is the smallest type of fox on earth; its 
weight is less than even 1-1.5 kgs. It is even smaller than an ordinary cat. 
The largest part of its body is its ear (15 cms). It is of cream colour with a 
blackish tail. 
It is a nocturnal animal similarly to the majority of the animals of the 
desert. It hunts in groups, or with its family. Locals capture them by traps and 
try to sell them mostly to tourists. They can be seen frequently in the desert 
but they disappear when humans approach their territory. They are hostile 
during their mating period and also after their babies are born, and they can 
even attack humans. It is advisable not to buy these animals (jerboa, desert 
fox, lizards, etc), as they could spread diseases unknown to us.
Scorpion (Scorpionida) and Horned viper (Cerastes cerastes) are also 
widespread all over the desert. It is better to be cautious with them. 
There are 30 known species of scorpion living in the Sahara. The military 
observers mostly meet the Black scorpion (3-8 cms in size) and the almost 
completely transparent Glassy scorpion (3-5 cms in size). The black is more 
dangerous and its bite can be lethal, but in most cases it causes paralysis. 
Antidote can be found in the camps, which must be injected as quickly as 
possible after the bite. A couple of days prior to my arrival at the Mehaires 
camp, a Polisario soldier was bit by a scorpion. As the incident happened close 
to the camp, he received the antitoxin fairly quickly so there was no further 
complication and his life was saved. 
The bite of the horned viper is even more dangerous. The snake can grow 
to a length of 1.5 metres. Its bite causes paralysis, heart spasm and eventually 
death. This is why it is advisable not to reach into any holes, to wear boots all 
the time, and check the clothes and the inside of the boots after waking up. 
(One morning the commander of the Smara sector found a horned viper in his 
room.) Antidote against vipers is available in all the camps. 
Although, the areas along river banks provide better conditions (food, 
shelter, etc.) for the animals, the wall system built by the Moroccans makes 
the movement of larger animals impossible. Nevertheless, antelopes, jackals, 
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hyenas and larger mammals have been seen on the territories occupied by 
Morocco. 
The third zone is called the Rio de Oro. This is an extremely plain area, 
interspersed with sand dunes. Due to its composition, the soil is unable to hold 
and store water, so the water gathers in the sub-soil, which makes it possible 
to dig wells in such areas.8
The monotony of the area is broken by the Dakhla Peninsula (formerly: Villa 
Cisneros) and the La Guerra. The desert here includes the coastline of Western 
Sahara (1,100 kms) and Mauritania (754 kms). Rainfall is very low but due to 
the humid air arriving from the ocean, conditions are favourable for a lot of 
plant and animal species and the migratory birds arriving from Europe, which 
spend the winter here.9 Along with other organisations, the Swiss Ornithological 
Institute, in autumn 2002, organised a scientific expedition to the coast of the 
Sahara and Mauritania, where research was carried out on migratory birds. 
During the project 9,467 birds were captured, 55 of the species were 
ringed in Europe. According to the Swiss and other organisations involved in 
the observation of birds, today we have information about 209 bird species in 
Western Sahara. Most of them are migratory birds and only spend the period 
of autumn and winter on the coastline. Besides the migratory songbirds, many 
birds of prey, mostly different species of falcon live in the areas which are 
difficult to access. Recently, their number has decreased significantly, mainly 
due to nest-robbing.
The last habitats of Monk seals (Monachus monachus), which are on 
the verge of extinction can also be found in the area. Morocco has provided 
temporary protection for the known habitats of these seals (Cape Blanc 
Peninsula and the Dakhla National Park), thus, they are in relative security 
now. The fishermen of Laayoune said that they had seen seals several times 
on the coast and around the area of Tarfaya, near the coast. One even got 
entangled in their fishing net. 
The only poisonous animal of the area is the Algerian rattle snake (Coluber 
algirus). It leads a concealed lifestyle so can be seen very seldom. 
Golden jackals (Canis aureus), Desert foxes (Fennecus zerda), Sand cats 
(Felis margarita), Honey badgers (Mellivora capensis) and Dotted hyenas 
(Hyaene hyaene) must be mentioned among the animals living here. Antelopes 
also occur and a cheetah was also seen around Dakhla in 1999. The predator 
must have wandered over from the territory of Mauritania they have not been 
seen in the Western Sahara desert since the 1980s. 
Around the coastline, apart from a few minor settlements, there are no living 
habitations. The majority of the people there earn for a living as fishermen or 
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by raising camels. Their number increases with the approximately 160,000 
Moroccan fishermen, who work on the coastline temporarily in the summer 
and early autumn.10
Although I have not included it in any of the zones, there is a special desert 
environment—the area of the salty lakes (Saharan halophytics). This type of 
area is located around Bir Lahlou and the Mehaires patrol route in Mauritania. 
Places like this are called chott by the Arabs and some of the local nomads 
gain salt there which is so important for them. 
There are permanent and temporary salty lakes, which makes the salinity 
of the soil higher than in other parts of the desert. The salty lakes have no 
connection with the ocean, their water arrives from the rainfall and some 
underground sources. 
The plants that grow here have adapted to the local conditions and learnt to 
tolerate the periodically changing salinity of the water. The salinity decreases 
after the rain and increases in dry periods. Very few species of algae exist in 
the water; they serve as food for the birds migrating over the area (flamingos, 
white headed ducks, etc.). A special sub-species of Jerboa—the four-toed 
jerboa—can only be found here.11
The climate of the Sahara is continental; the winters are cold and dry, while 
the summers are extremely hot. The temperature can rise above 50 degrees in 
the shade. Due to the proximity of the ocean, the humidity is relatively high so 
the weather is humid and foggy. The average rainfall is merely 45 mms, even 
in Dakhla, which lies on the ocean shore.12
Wind is a major problem all over the territory of the Sahara as it carries 
the sand particles. It can cause skin irritation or inflammation of the eye. 
Thus, the locals always cover their head and face with a scarf. The most 
unpleasant of these winds is the windstorm called ‘Irifi’, which can cause 
a sandstorm merely by its strength. The wind arriving from the north-east 
is called ‘Sirocco’ by the Europeans. The Sirocco is extremely dry and hot 
and covers everything with sand. Visibility becomes extremely limited; it is 
reduced to 1 or 2 metres. The storms occur between October and March, but 
sometimes in the summer, though, not very frequently.
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In the north-west corner of Africa phosphate deposits were discovered in 
the 1960s by the Spanish—their exploitation was launched by the Moroccan 
Government. These reserves provide one of the best quality phosphate 
of 80% purity, therefore, mean significant revenues to Morocco, which 
had been among the first phosphate producers and sellers of the world. 
After the USA it was Morocco where the largest amount of phosphate (22 
million metric tons) was produced in 2002.1
The map below shows Moroccan and Saharan phosphate reserves:
Source: Philip A. Szczesniak:  
The Mineral Industries of Morocco and Western Sahara. 2002.
The mines in Western Sahara are important for Morocco also because 
the conveyor system between the mines and seaports makes transportation 
extremely cost-effective. Phosphate from the mines in Khourigba, 
Morocco, is transported to ports by rail making production more costly 
than that in Western Sahara.2
Mines in Morocco and Western Sahara are supervised by the OCP 
(Office Chérifien des Phosphates), which is responsible for everything 
from operating mines to market research and sale. However, 35% of the 
proprietary rights of mines still belong to Spanish companies.3
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Annual phosphate production in the Sahara region is around 2 million 
metric tons only and the reserves allow continuous and profitable mining for 
several more decades. 
According to the latest research findings, Western Sahara is extremely rich 
in minerals, particularly in iron ore, uranium, titanium, natural gas and oil.4 
Some geologists say that vanadium is also abundant in this territory—enough 
to consider its mining, which then would result in high profit.5
The Spanish found oil already in the 1960s, however, they did not attempt 
to launch offshore drilling due to the underdevelopment of the area in 
economic terms.6 
Under the seafloor of coastal waters several American and French 
companies (Kerr-McGee and Total Fina Elf) conducted oil research and their 
findings indicate rich reserves off the coasts of Western Sahara.7 However, 
oil production was impossible to launch because of the objections of the 
Polisario and several other organisations. Companies hope for settling the 
problems related to the disputed territories and plan to start oil production 
only afterwards. Nevertheless, as a result of the lobby activities of several 
Norwegian human rights organisations and because of certain economic 
factors, the Norwegian company Skagen Vest, which had been financially 
involved in Kerr-McGee company sold its shares in 2003 since it had no 
intention even to provide indirect support to Moroccan efforts aimed at oil 
production in the Sahara. The firm was the biggest Norwegian shareholder 
of the company through its 100,000 shares. In his press release one of the 
company CEOs Kristian Falnes explaned the decision with the highly risky 
policy of the American company. That is why his company sold these risky 
shares with minimum profit. The current value of the shares is over 5 million 
USD. Naturally, this did not shatter Kerr-McGee Company. Its employees 
continue working in Western Sahara in spite of the fact that exploitation 
of natural reserves in territories occupied by another state is prohibited by 
international law.8
One thing is for sure, the Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara 
(NSCWS) has threatened all companies attempting to conduct oil research or 
production in Western Sahara with Moroccan license with economic boycott 
and political measures (including negative press campaigns). This organisation 
has already inflicted fairly serious moral and economic damage to Norwegian 
TGS-NOPEC oil research company, which has made several research drills 
off the Western Sahara coast. Hundreds of newspaper articles were published, 
radio and TV reports were broadcasted on the company generating a rather 
negative PR and inflicting economic damage. 
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To make the situation even more complex the Polisario has also offered 
oil concessions to another consortium (British-Australian Fusion Oil&Gas), 
therefore, only after the settlement of the rule over the disputed territory 
the winner of the competition for the oil production in the region can be 
announced.9
Moreover, the coastal waters comprise one of the richest fish areas in the 
world and fishing right is also disputed by the opposing parties.10 Spanish and 
Moroccan ships were confiscated by Polisario guerrillas several times when 
those had no license from them. When in December 2002 a tanker sank at the 
Spanish coast a lot of Spanish fishermen lost their jobs due to water pollution. 
Both the Moroccan Government and the Polisario proposed the fishermen 
to use the territorial waters for fishing. Moroccans also have major revenues 
from fishing and processing sea fish.11
Fishing off the Sahara coast has always been a major industry off the 
Sahara coast line although fishing has been conducted in coastal waters.12 
Local fishermen using small, home-made fishing boats (dories) usually went 
for 2-3-day-long trips to catch shrimps, mussels and various kinds of fish 
(sardine, mackerel, tuna, dolphin, etc.). Algae, kelps and seaweeds were also 
harvested for catering and other purposes. In fact local people ventured to the 
ocean only in the spring and summer months while during the stormy winter 
period they did some other jobs. 
Until 1914 the right to conduct large-scale fishing belonged to Spanish, 
French and Portuguese companies and only after the first fish processing factory 
was founded by the Spanish was the catch purchased from local fishermen who 
started exploring areas farther off the coast in order to have a better living. 
The real development began in 1927 when a shipyard was established by 
the Spanish, where 16-24-metre-long trawlers were manufactured mostly by 
local workers. Those ships had not yet storage rooms that would have allowed 
keeping the fish alive, therefore, those trawlers were unfit for longer fishing 
trips although the processing of the catch began right on board. 
Not until the occupation of Western Sahara did local people develop fishing 
industry as they were happy with opportunities provided by the Spanish. 
Naturally, in the early 1960s more and more foreign fishing boats (Norwegian, 
Italian, Danish, French, etc.) started to arrive into the region although they 
were kept away from their priviliged areas by the Spanish for a while. 
Changes took place when Morocco occupied the territories and it was 
realised that one of the richest fisheries is off the Sahara coasts. At first 
Moroccan fishermen used only small boats (korb) without engine, in the 
shallow coastal waters. 
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On a boat usually 12 fishermen worked using mostly dragnets and hook-
traps. By the late 1970s the majority of boats had been equipped with 25HP 
engines, which made work much easier.
It is fairly difficult to provide exact figures on the number of boats. The 
ones below are from Moroccan registers: 
 1981-1982  3,600 boats
 1983   4,130 boats
 1984   4,930 boats
 1985   5,370 boats
 1988   5,380 boats
 1992   8,000 boats
Nearly 75% of these boats were concentrated in the Atlantic coast and 
the remaining 25% in the Mediterranean. In fact, the number of boats grew 
significantly in the 1980s when in several regions profitable octopus fishing 
(Octopus vulgaris) could be conducted. Plastic containers tied to concrete 
blocs are placed on the seafloor and these traps are checked every 2-3 days 
on the average. Such traps are planted in 100 metres from the coast line but 
some of them can be as far as 30 kilometres—from a few metres’ depth to as 
much as 20 metres. Some ships regularly check nearly 3,000 octopus traps 
a week and make good profit although this is a seasonal job only. The same 
fishermen use lobster traps and several kilometre-long hook traps planted 
along the routes of migratory fish schools. Collecting sponge and algae is also 
part of their normal business, which then are sold either on local market places 
or to food companies (alga Agar-Agar).
Moroccan State fishing fleet has four types of vessels:13 small fishing boats 
(doires, korb, etc.) catching mainly schools of sardine, sardella, or mackerel 
near the surface. The boats have 15-25-strong crews using 250-400-metre 
long and 40-50-metre deep nets. The boats start work in the afternoons or 
evenings and finish the next morning. 
In 1927 there were only 27 such boats under Moroccan flag operating 
between Tangier and El Jadida. After World War 2, however, rich fisheries 
were discovered in the region of Safi, Essaouira and Agadir making the 
number of fishing boats increase to 180 in a short period of time. 
Local waters rapidly got exhausted, thus, after the occupation of 
Western Sahara Moroccan fishermen relocated their centre of activities to 
the ports of Tan-Tan and Layoune (El-Aaiun). There was a steady increase 
in the number of trawlers, and in 1975 the fleet counted 269 boats. In 1997, 
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however, there were merely 323 boats of such types since the Government 
intended to reduce their number and supported the commissioning of 
modern boats. 
The ageing small-boat fleet is some 40 years old and since shipyards 
manufacturing such vessels were closed down there was only repair and 
maintenance work done on these boats. 
The second type contains more up-to-date motor vessels which use trawler 
nets along the coastline. On the boats with 10-15 strong crews work starting 
from around 2 in the morning and returning to port late afternoon. Some of 
these boats are capable of cruising even for a week and are equipped with 
freezers to store the catch. However, such boats can only operate over sandy 
seafloor and lower their nets twice a day (each takes 3-5 hours). 
Currently, there are 331 such boats in the Moroccan fishing fleet, 80% of 
which operate off the Sahara coasts. 
There is a group of small (8-10-metre-long) motor boats capable of spending 
about 3 days in the open sea. These boats were first built in the 1930s and 
they were designed for catching fish farther off the coast line. Due to specific 
requirements the boats with 13-14-strong crews are equipped with freezers 
allowing the fishermen to keep their catch fresh. Currently, the Moroccan 
fishing fleet has 920 boats, 96% of which operate along the Atlantic coast line 
(primarily off the Sahara coast).
In the fourth (mixed) category all those boats are considered that use both 
types of net. Currently, the Moroccan fishing fleet has 56 such boats. 
Officially, the state-run fishing fleet was established as late as 1972 and 4 
big fishing ships were stationed in the port of Las Palmas. After former Spanish 
Sahara with its fish-rich coastal waters taken by Morocco the Government 
submitted its first project on exploiting fisheries. In the framework of the 
programme fishermen were provided long-term subsidised loans to assist 
them with buying boats, together with the ban on foreign ships from a 120-
kilometre-wide zone off the coast.14
In 1981 fishing was one of the top industries of Moroccan economy, 
therefore, the Ministry of Fishing Industry was established and plans for 
building new seaports and food factories for processing fish in the Sahara 
region was approved.15
The Moroccan fishing fleet stationed mostly in foreign ports (Las Palmas, 
Abidjan and Dakar) between 1972 and 1986, then, in reconstructed seaports 
of Agadir, Tan-tan, and Layoun.
Most of the catch of the fleet (87%) comes from the Sahara region during 
the 4-6-week-long fishing season. 
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Most of these ships are modern, equipped with radar, sonar, freezers 
and other technologies, allowing continuous fishing and processing of catch 
simultaneously. 
The following figure shows fisheries off the Moroccan coast lines and seaports:
Source: Mohammed Baddyr-Sylvie Guenette: The Fisheries  
off the Atlantic coast of Morocco 1950-1997 
Most of the catch consists of small, so-called mass fish (sardine, sardella, 
mackerel, etc.). In 1950 the annual Moroccan catch was only 110,800 tons 
and later it increased to 485,500 tons a year. 85% of small fish is sardine 
(Sardinia pilchardus), and mackerel is the second most frequent type. 90% 
of the mackerel catch is made up by common mackerel (Scomber japonicus) 
while the amount of Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) is insignificant 
since its habitats are located more to the south. 
The amount of catch significantly increased: while in the 1960s it 
was merely 4,100 tons a year this amount grew to 14,000 tons per annum 
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in the 1990s. The amount of various kinds of octopus was some 24,000 
tons a year.16
Also 12,000 tons of different sorts of lobster, shrimp and mussel (black 
mussel, oyster, etc.) were caught and sold annually. 
Naturally, it is not only Moroccan fishermen who do fishing in these 
waters as both the European Union and other countries lobby in Morocco 
for licences of fishing in the region.17 Exercising fishing rights is a delicate 
issue and triggered several conflicts between Moroccan authorities and 
ships under foreign flags. Thanks to their more advanced technology foreign 
ships return home with more catch than locals. This becomes clear when 
analysing data: e.g. in 1990, when Moroccan ships caught 402,200 tons, 
foreign fishermen caught 998,400 tons. These are only the official statistics, 
which do not include illegal fishing, which is very frequent in the region.18 
Spanish fishing fleets caught 255,000 tons of fish making up 65% of the 
Moroccan catch. This may be the cause why fishing in territorial waters 
was limited or banned for Spanish ships several times by the Moroccan 
Government. Fishing boats violating the regulation were forced to local 
ports where they were confiscated.19
Besides fishing industry sea transportation, including seaports (Layoune, 
Dakhla), was also top priority in the development policy, partly in the framework 
of agreements with Senegal. The heads of the two governments—Mohamed 
VI and President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade—concluded an agreement at 
the French-Africa Summit in Paris in February 2002 on the establishment of 
a new transportation company. 
Since there are grave ethnic conflicts between Senegal and Mauritania, 
which was regarded as supporter of the Polisario in the region, triggering 
several armed clashes Moroccans provide a comprehensive economic and 
political support to Senegal.20 A clear sign of economic relations is the fact that 
after Senegalese air company Air Afrique had gone bankrupt, new national 
air company Air Senegal was established with Moroccan support. Royal Air 
Moroc is the majority owner of the company (51%). Common projects include 
the building of a Dakar–Morocco highway across the occupied Sahara region. 
By now Senegal has become the most loyal ally of the Moroccan Government 
in Africa, which is very important for Morocco as the majority of Western 
African countries recognised SADR, the Government of Western Sahara, 
created by the Polisario.21
Windy and barren desert may seem valueless, nevertheless, the Moroccan 
Government and the University of Kassel, Germany, elaborated a joint project 
on the utilisation of wind energy. Scientists have discovered that Southern 
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Moroccoincluding occupied Western Sahara regionsis the windiest area 
of the world. 
Since the majority of the relatively small population is city dweller the 
population density is extremely low and there cannot be any obstacles to 
constructing wind farms as opposed to Europe, where higher population 
density causes various problems (opposition of local population, etc.). 
The project was named “Desert Wind”. According to Mr Gregor Czisch, 
University of Kassel, wind is a potential source of energy for the next 
generation and in the Sahara energy can be produced at a much lower price 
than the energy purchase price in Germany. At Sahara wind farms energy can 
be extracted at mere 4.5 Eurocents per kilowatt while the cheapest option in 
Germany is at 6.5 Eurocents a kilowatt. 
Moroccan scientist Khalid Benhamou, involved in the project states that 
along the roughly 2,000-km-long coastline some 2-4 Megawatts of energy 
can be produced on a square kilometre. Accordingly, the annual production 
on average can be more than 1,000 Terrawatts which is half of the EU energy 
consumption. The implementation of the project would begin in Tarfaya 
but in Western Sahara wind farms could be constructed only after the final 
settlement of disputed Sahara territories is signed. The programme can offer 
extremely tempting economic opportunities for the participants.22
Another seemingly bizarre but very profitable economic activity can be 
connected with the area of sand dunes in some 250 kilometres from Tarfaya. 
However strange it may seem, the Spanish Government pays good money for 
the fine sand delivered from this area to the beaches of the Canary Islands. 
Several ships leave the port of Layoune and sell their loads, which are valueless 
for the local people, to companies in tourist industry.23
Agriculture in the area is minimal: arable lands and oases, where fruit 
(dates) and some vegetable production is dominant, makes up a mere 5% of 
total production. Another 19% of the region is suitable for pasturage of camels, 
sheep and goats, done mainly by nomads.24
Yet another significant part of the population is involved in handcraft and 
home industry. Using semi-precious stones and remains of stones of animals 
beautiful jewellery is made which is sold mainly to tourists. Silverworks 
and leather-craft are also traditional trades. Although living standards in the 
occupied territories are well below the Moroccan average, still, it is higher 
than of people in Polisario-controlled territories. Nowadays, tourism began to 
develop, however, due to the unsettled status quo organised tourism industry 
could emerege only in the territories occupied by Morocco. Nevertheless, some 
“adventurers” take the risk to venture into the so called “free territories”.25
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The majority of foreign investors come from France and Spain because 
both historic and economic relations between firms from these European 
countries and Western Sahara remained. 
In accordance with the provisions of the current ceasefire agreement, 
and deceison of the United Nations, Morocco is not allowed to build roads or 
exploit the natural resources of the country until the final settlement of the 
status quo.26
This provision of the agreement is, however, frequenly ignored-for example 
in the Guerguerat region near the Mauritanian border a road was built with 
the involvement of the armed forces and the construction of fishing villages is 
also in progress along the Western Sahara coastline.27
To date 6 such villages had been built, and in the 2002 regional budget 
resources for another 6 settlements were earmarked. 
The reason is that in the seas rich in fish some 140,000 Moroccan fishermen 
work temporarily who stay on the Western Sahara coast during the fishing 
season as they are unable to make a living in Morocco.28 In spite of their 
merely USD 7-a-day wage they support their families in Morocco. Besides 
the existing fish processing factories (Layoune and Dakhla) operating at full 
capacity further factories are planned to be built.29
As the above data clearly indicate, Morocco gained siginificant economic 
opportunities through the occupation of Western Sahara. For this and some 
other reasons (nationalism, Berber separatist movements, etc.), it does not 
intend to return the area to the SADR.30 Therefore, local inhabitants can 
expect only partial autonomy within Morocco as the Moroccan armed forces 




The Saharawian social structure is similar to that of the other nomadic 
or partially-settled tribes living in the Sahara. The most fundamental 
agency of society is the family. Families in blood relation constitute a 
tribe (Fakhd or gabila), the leader of which has special rights in organising 
and directing the life of his tribe.1 The leading position (sheikh) is mostly 
hereditary, passing from father to son, while members of the family or the 
tribe belong to different classes on the basis of their birth or occupation. It 
is possible to pass from one class to another based on individual talent but 
it happens very rarely. However, marriage between a man and a woman 
coming from different classes is practically impossible.2
Saharawian men consider their pipe as a status symbol. They are made 
of several different metals, but all men strive to have one of silver. 
Locals constitute more than twenty major tribes, which can be divided 
into three main groups: Ouled Delim, Reguibat and Tekna. Beside these 
there were minor tribes in occasional alliance or at occasional wars with 
each other. Though maintaining a rather loose relationship with each other 
these tribes had substantial autonomy on their own territories. For this 
reason a Spanish chronicler once mentioned them as having a lifestyle of 
complete anarchy. Alexander Scott was the first foreigner to write about 
the nomads living in this territory, about their social life, and he was the 
one who mentioned them by their names such as: Reguibat, Taoubalt, 
Mejjat, Izarguien, Ouled Delim, Arousien, Ouled Tidrarin, Skarna, etc.3
As the colonists focused their attention on the free territories to be 
colonised more and more people arrived to map the region and to make 
favourable trade deals there. Colonels Leopold Panet and Faidherbe, 
who arrived at the region in 1850, were commissioned by the French 
Government to assess the strength of the local tribes and to maintain 
friendly relationship with the most important tribal leaders for the 
interests of France.4
A couple of years later Joachim Gatelle toured the region inhabited 
by the Tekna tribes and prepared a very detailed description, which the 
French later made good use of. The Spanish strived for maintaining 
friendly relationship with coastal tribes (Ouled Delim, Ouled Bou Sba, Ait 
Moussa and Imraguen) and they even entered into official agreements and 
contracts with some of them. At the end of the 1800s French Camille Douls 
visited the majority of the west Saharan region meeting other tribes such as 
Tadjakant, Mechdouf and Ouled Sidi Mohamed. The writer as a member 
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of a Tidrarin caravan experienced an attack of the Ouled Delim tribe (1887), 
who besides shepherding also dealt with slave trade and looting caravans.5
The Saharawian tribes are not all of Arabic origin as the Arabic tribes 
occupying the region mixed with local Berber tribes.6
Nevertheless, there remained some relatively clean blooded Berber tribes 
like the majority of the Reguibat tribal union, originating from the Sanhaja 
Berbers, who occupied the region before the Arab conquest. Later they 
accepted groups of Arabic descent, but Berber traditions are exceptionally 
strong both in their language and in their culture.7
The descendants of the Makuil tribe (Beni Hassan tribe) and tribes like 
Ouled Delim, Ouled Arousien and Ouled Bou Sba arriving from the area of 
present-day Yemen in the 13th century are among the clean-blooded Arab 
tribes.
The following map shows the migration route of the Arabic tribes arriving 
in the Sahara: 
Source: Besenyő János: A nyugat-szaharai kérdés és az ENSZ által vezetett 
békefenntartó misszió (MINURSO) tevékenysége  
(Geopolitikai Tanács Közhasznú Alapítvány, Budapest, 2007. p. 18.)
Tribes of Arab origin are very proud of their roots and clean blood. For 
example, the members of the Ouled Delim tribe can trace back their origin as 
far as Delim, the son of the supposed founder of the Beni Hassan tribe.8 They 
are the most populous tribe in Western Sahara and they consider themselves 
the cleanest blooded Arabs in the Sahel region.
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The tribes and the different unions were organised on a regional basis, 
therefore most tribes of the Sahara still live and migrate with their animals 
within the same area to the present day. The territories of the clean-blooded 
Arab tribes were referred to as the land of the whites i.e. “Trab el Beidan” 
although this area was further divided into smaller regions.9 The most famous 
of these was the “Sahel” which was later completely occupied by the Spanish, 
who called the natives Ahel el-Sahel i.e. “the people of the Sahel” after the 
name of the region.10
Having examined the regional aspects of the Saharawians it is also 
interesting to look at the typical occupations they pursued. 
Some tribes were mainly soldiers and in return for their armed assistance 
smaller tribes paid a kind of tax (debiha). These tribes provided armed escort 
for the caravans, though in case a rival tribe was commissioned to do the task 
they would attack and attempt to rob the traders not employing them. These 
tribes were known as “the people of arms”.11












Tribes that were conquered or forced to pay tax had the common name 
(znaga or sometimes lahma) and although they were not slaves they had a 
very similar status to the Helotes in the military state of Sparta. Stronger 
tribes would often attack and rob the znaga tribes with the pretext of 
a military exercise in order to practise their fighting skills and weapons 
handling. The word znaga comes from the Sanhaja Berbers and it denoted 
the Berber ruling class before the Arabs. The meaning of the word was 
slightly modified in the 15th and 16th centuries and the Spanish used it for 
the non-Arabic, but Berber origin nomads who did not adopt the Hassania 
dialect, but preserved their mother tongue. Later the word lost its ethnic 
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meaning and was only used in connection with tribes that had the status of 
slaves or that were tax payers.12
People of znaga status were neither allowed to carry weapons officially 
in the presence of members of superior tribes, nor to sit in the middle among 
their guests in their own tents. This was a very serious offence among the 
people of the Sahara. Subordinate tribes would often pay for the protection 
with animals or forced labour (horma).13









Some tribes whose members studied the Qur’an all their lives and worked 
as teachers of the religion were referred to as “zuaias”. Members of these 
tribes were called “people of the book” (as ahel ktub). These tribes had 
high esteem and possessed deep respect. Nevertheless, stronger tribes made 
attempts to suppress them from time to time. That happened to the Ouled 
Tidrarin tribe, which after several years of desperate fight became tax payer of 
the Ouled Delim tribe in the 18th century, thereby losing their position among 
the religious tribes became znaga.14 Ahel Berical15 and Tendega belong to the 
“zuaias” but there are some tribes along the coast which are also members of 
this group, like Kenta and Terquez.16
In order to avoid the taxpaying status some tribes tried to prove their 
Arabic descent, therefore, they would manipulate their family trees to get the 
honourable “chorfa” status (descendant of the Prophet). This, of course, led 
to a boom in the industry of pedigree forging, which used to be fashionable in 
Hungary, too (i.e. proving non-existing nobility or sheepskin). 






Ahel Sheikh Ma El Ajnin•	
Filala•	
Toubalt•	
The tribes of Arabic origin (descendants of the Beni Hassan tribe) had 
the status of free fighters which meant the highest level in the traditionally 
weapon-using Saharawian society. Although they also mixed with Berber 
tribes during their history, they are still regarded as clean-blooded Arab 
tribes.







Members of the Tekna tribe live mainly in South Morocco, in an area 
spreading from the Anti-Atlas Mountain to Saguia el Hamra. They consider 
themselves descendants of the Lemtula (Berber) tribe and the Makuils. 
Because of the latter they are also listed among the clean-blooded Arabs. The 
Lemtula tribe had already lived in the Oued Noun region, which later became 
the centre of the Tekna tribal union, by the time of the arrival of the first 
Makuil groups (1218). The tribe following a nearly two-century fight finally 
assimilated into a group of the Beni Hassan thereby forming a new tribal 
union named Tekna.17
During the centuries the tribal union was divided into two opposing groups:18
Ait Yemel “El Gazzi”1. 













The map illustrates the area occupied by the tribe and its taxpayers:
Source: Gaudio: Les populations du Sahara occidental. p. 103.
The Izarguien was the third biggest tribe in the region of Western Sahara 
and the biggest within the Tekna tribal union. Today, they are still nomads 
dealing mainly with shepherding (keeping camels) and trade. Their territory 
extends from Tislatin (south of El Aiun) to the northern part of River Draa, 
though by now they have moved into several towns of the Sahara (El Aaiun, 
Smara, etc.).19
The Ait Lahsen tribe is the second biggest member within the tribal union. 
They live mainly in South Morocco (Tan-Tan), in the northern part of Western 
Sahara and in Algeria.20 The Spanish highly esteemed their belligerence and 
employed great numbers of them in their army.21
They are members of the Tekna tribal union. Though they mainly dealt 
with shepherding, horse-breeding, and doing military (Ait Oussa) service, 
they had tribes which became known as traders. Members of the Azouafit 
tribe were famous all over the Sahara as traders and caravan leaders. Their 
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caravan leaders travelled in Essaouira (El-Kouz), Timbouktou, Walata, 
Taoudenni, Chenguitti and most of the countries of Black Africa (Senegal, 
Ivory Coast, Gabon, etc.). 
After thorough education the merchants sent their children to foreign 
countries and cities as their representatives, where they, after getting 
acquainted with the local situation, took part in organising local economic 
life. They traded mainly with horses, tobacco and wool, but they conducted 
trafficking in gold and slave for the Tichit and Oualata (Sudanese) tribes. 
Some members of this group also carried out courier services for the Sultan 
of Morocco and other higher or lower ranking local leaders. 
Since as traders they could get into Algeria and other parts of the Turkish 
Empire without any difficulty the consignments they were commissioned 
with were usually delivered to the addressees. The service they provided is 
chronicled in contemporary Arabic historical sources such as the Tarik el 
Fettach the Tarikh be Sudan.22
Evidently, they were not the only traders in the desert, because their 
relatives, the Ait Lahsen tribe was a serious rival posing a threat to their 
interests. This tribe sold animals both of their own breeding and bought from 
other tribes to the Spanish and the French.23
The Ouled Bou Sba was also a trading tribe transporting tea, gunpowder 
and fire arms from Morocco and trading them in for dates in the area of 
Mauritania24
Members of the Kounta tribe besides shepherding also monopolised the 
salt trade on the greater part of the Sahara. The French recruited their Arabic 
gendarmerie (Goumier) of frightful fame, also used as military support, from 
among them.25
Members of the Tagant tribe were mostly farmers, who traded in their 
produce of barley and millet in Atar or Saint-Louis (French forts in Mauritania) 
for salt, dates and camels. 
In Saharawian society the members of the Imraguen tribe pursued the 
most peaceful occupation, making a living exclusively from fishing for 
centuries.26 They live in the D’Arguin National Park (Mauritania) where they 
fish on coastal waters. About two hundred families constitute the tribe which 
lives in four fishing villages. The national park is on the list of UNESCO 
World Heritage and there have been considerations to move the fishermen 
from the place. Since they live in a very closed community and they have 
no other skills apart from fishing the WWF and the FIBA (Foundation for 
the Banc D’Arguin), in close co-operation with the Mauritanian Government, 
worked out a programme to preserve the traditional fishing and tribal life. 
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The tribes introduced above present only a relatively narrow cross-section 
of the Saharawian tribes. There are approximately 120 minor and major tribes 
in the region of the Western Sahara, which are related to each other live 
separately though.
The map below shows the major tribal areas:
Source: Royaume du Maroc, Ministére de l’Intérieur et de l’Information: Réferendum 
au Sahara, Recueil de textes et de cartes. pp. 176-177.
Beside the tribal leaders who represented the executive power there was 
an advisory council called Djemma which was made up of the delegates of 
various tribes. This council was dissolved without a trace with the creation of 
the Polisario. 
At war time a war council was established in order to fend off external 
threat. When the community was divided by internal conflicts like the more 
than thirty-year-long war between the tribes of Reguibat and Tadjakent,27 or 
the disputes about the use of wells, the Council of Fourty (Ait Arbajn) was 
established.28 This organisation, which none of the neighbouring countries 
ever employed or even was aware of, always had a job to do because the tribes 
were very likely to solve their disputes with the use of weapons, and also 
stronger tribes liked looting smaller and weaker ones.29
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English explorer Alexander Scott was visiting the region when the Mejjat 
and the Izerguine tribes unsuccessfully tried to protect their areas from the 
Ouled Delim warriors (1810).30
Leopold Panet recorded about the Reguibat tribe that constant fighting 
was their natural element. So, it happened that two tribes while at war with 
each other joined forces to rob the Ouled Bou Sbaa living in their vicinity.31
Another specific office that the Saharawians had was one which we today 
would call an ambassador (kafir). It was a person delegated and authorised by 
the tribes to officially represent them at the neighbouring tribes. 
It is interesting to know that the women of Western Sahara as opposed to 
the tradition of the neighbouring countries take part in the work in several 
ways. For example, in Mauritania it would be impossible for a woman to 
milk the animals while among the Saharawian people it is a woman’s job. 
Nowadays, women have a very important role in society because the number 
of men living in the refugee camps is very small. As a result, they have to do 
jobs which were considered to be men’s responsibility earlier.32
To this day camels have a very high value for the locals. The possession 
of a camel is a kind of status symbol in society. Even though the number of 
nomads have decreased considerably there are still Saharawians possessing 
herds of several hundred animals. The price of a camel is nearly 10-12,000 
dirham (USD 1,000-1,200), and it still happens that on signing the marriage 
contract the negotiated “price” of the bride is paid in camels.33
The Saharawians are proud of their origin and although they still keep 
in evidence where they come from, the tribal ties are much looser today 
especially among towndwellers and also because of the different ways of 
living they lead. 
This is due to the fact that the Moroccans forced the majority of the 
Saharawians who had led a nomadic life for centuries to settle down in cities. 
There may be a slight similarity to the gipsy minority in Hungary who do 
not live by their old living standards and laws any more, but the norms and 
laws accepted by the majority of society still do not have enough influence 
on them. That is they do not apply their old laws any more, but they have not 
“mastered” the new ones yet. 
Although the majority of the Saharawians have settled down in the towns 
with the lack of stable job opportunities they just increase the number of those 
who live on social aids. When the locals made a living from shepherding 
and trade the number of able-bodied men receiving social aid was minimal, 
while today the majority of men living in towns are unemployed. Extensive 
unemployment soon results in a state where unemployment is accepted and 
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work and the old way of life devaluate. As a result, people living on social aid 
become more vulnerable (financially and politically) since they are unable to 
keep themselves up without social support.
Saharawians speak the Hassanija dialect of Arabic, but since the 
occupation of the region they have mostly used the Moroccan Arab dialect.34 
A lot of them also use Spanish, the language of the former colonists, and 
thanks to state education the number of French speakers has considerably 
increased recently.35
The majority of the population is Sunni but there are some Shiites and some 
Christians (mostly Catholic) among them. Saharawians are characterised by a 
high degree of religious tolerance both within and outside their communities. 
The estimated population of the Saharawians living under Moroccan rule 
is 90,000, but there are about 120,000 refugees in Algerian camps (Tindouf) 
and an additional 30-40,000 abroad in different countries. However, Polisario 
leaders think, if they gain their independence and all Saharawians return 
home, at least there could be 750,000 inhabitants.36
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The hisTory of The region before The arrival of 
The europeans
In prehistoric times the climate of the region provided fairly good living 
conditions for the Negroid and Berber tribes living there and mainly 
dealing with animal grazing (period between 5000 BC and 2500 BC). 
Only rock paintings and a couple of beautifully carved rocks remain after 
them (Smara, Bir Lahlou, etc.). These depict elephants, giraffes, buffalos, 
rhinoceroses and Negroid people.1
The desertification of the area was already in an advanced state by the 
3rd millennium BC, which saw the beginning of the southward migration 
of the Negroid tribes lasting as long as the first century AD. That time the 
Negroid bafur and sarakolle tribes were replaced by the sanhaja tribal 
alliance (the lentuna, the gudula and the Massufa Berber tribes), 
and according to contemporary Egyptian sources they were of “Ibero-
Mauritanian” type that is light complexioned with fair hair.2
Around 1000 BC Phoenician settlers colonised the Atlantic coasts of 
present Morocco where they controlled the trade and the shipment of gold 
from Senegal.3 By the 3rd century BC the traders got as far as Cap Juby, 
and not much later as far as the Gulf of Guinea. 
Carthaginian traders transported various goods, especially salt to 
countries of Western Sudan as far as the River Niger, from where they brought 
along slaves, gold, precious stones and date with them. Trade in general terms, 
however, was mediated by people of nomadic tribes. The Carthaginians 
had accumulated different types of knowledge and information about the 
territories but due to special trade interests, the mediators kept them under 
wraps. Despite all this, today there is evidence that the Carthaginians were 
familiar with the geography of Western Sahara.4
In 603 BC Egyptian Pharaoh Necho II sent an expedition of 
Phoenician sailors from the Gulf of Suez with the task to cross the Red 
Sea and along the coasts of Africa to circumnavigate the continent, then, 
through the “Pillars of Hercules” (Strait of Gibraltar) to return to Egypt 
sailing the Mediterranean Sea. This voyage lasted for three years and 
the Phoenicians succeeded. Although there is no written report of the 
journey, Herodotus—quite doubtingly—mentioned it in his works.
The second naval expedition was sent by the Carthaginians, led by 
Hanno the Great, son of Hamilcar, just the opposite direction: from 
Carthage via Gibraltar to the Western coasts of Africa, either in the 6th 
century BC or at the beginning of the 5th century BC. The exact date of 
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the expedition is not known. Some researchers suggest that it was in 570 BC, 
others state it happened either in 520 BC or in 470 BC. It is proven, however, 
that during the journey Carthaginians founded several trading posts along the 
coasts of Northern Africa. One of them was the town of Kerne on the territory 
of Western Sahara.5 The story of the expedition was written by Hanno himself 
in Punic language, but the document is available only in Greek transcripts.6
This is known as the time of Roman expansion and most probably of 
the domestication of camel, too. The life of local tribes was not specifically 
influenced by the Roman Empire although those centuries saw an increase in 
commerce.7 Romans also sent numerous expeditions to the Saharan territories, 
but whether these succeeded or not, we have limited information—what we 
know is that they were launched.8 In the second half of the 2nd century BC 
Greek military historian Polybius—while serving the Romans—explored 
and took down present-day Mauritania and the Northern coastline of Africa. 
Although the Romans themselves drew a fairly punctual map of the Western-
Saharan territories, Pliny, in his geographical work mixed up the River Niger 
with the River Draa (the later can be found south of Morocco, functioning as 
border river between Moroccan and Western-Saharan nomadic territories).9
The life of the region was significantly changed by the emergence of the 
Arabic tribes (sidi okba tribes) led by a military leader called okba ben 
nafi, coming from the Omajad dynasty of Damascus. These tribes reached 
the Maghreb region as early as 647 and the Atlantic Ocean by the 680s. Okba, 
as leader of the Ifrriqia (Tunesia) Province of the Omajad Empire led several 
military expeditions to the area mostly for capturing slaves, and by 681 he 
reached the valley of River Draa. His successor Moussa ben nusair, who was 
appointed governor in 705, defeated a Berber army in 711 thereby providing 
relatively free movement for his traders. 
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On the next map you can see the main commercial roads:
Source: Donald R. Wright: The World and a Very Small Place in Africa. pp. 31.
However, it was not until the governorship of abderrahman ben habib 
(in 745) that the first commercial station was established and wells were dug 
along the caravan route leading to the town of Aoudaghost on the order of the 
governor. In the same year a caravan escorted by a strong military unit started 
off and successfully reached the town situated on the territory of present-day 
Mauritania. 
As the Arab leaders saw the strong opposition of the Berbers they strived 
to build commercial and cultural relationship with inhabitants of the region. 
What they could not achieve by fighting accomplished this way, and in 
a relatively short period of time a significant part of the Berber tribes was 
converted to Islam.10 This is how Miknassa, the largest group of the Zenata 
Berber tribal alliance, joined the Kharijite branch of Islam (in 755). 
That was the tribe that founded the town of Sijilmassa, which functioned 
as a commercial and Muslim cultural centre for more than two centuries.11
The Berbers in the region, however, had to fight not only against Arab 
invaders but also the soninke empire in Ghana.12 That was the power that 
kept both the commercial routes from the south and the trade in gold from 
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Western Africa under control. Since Sanhajas posed a threat to his commercial 
interests the Soninke king took the town of Aoudaghost in 990. Between the 
two peoples the struggle went on for almost 100 years and resulted in the fall 
of the Soninke Empire later on.13
That was the time when gudula, one of the Sanhaja tribes, invited a 
famous religious teacher, abdallah ben yasin to teach them about Islam. 
The leader of the tribe Yahja ben Ibrahim el-Gadali together with the teacher 
of the new religion went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, where he ascertained that 
his entire tribe must take Islam as their religion (in 1036).14
After the conversion of the tribe Yasin visited the area of the Lemtuna 
tribe, where in a short time he gathered a large number of followers, whom the 
locals referred to as “al-murabitun”, which is Almoravidas.15 
In a short time the teacher became the leader of the alliance and he 
appointed Yahja ben Omar the Lemtuna a leader of outstanding military 
abilities his deputy.16
In 1039 Abdallah ben Yasin, the leader of the Almoravidas, declared 
a holy war against the Zenata tribal alliance. After heavy fighting they 
occupied the towns of Aoudaghost and Sijilmassa. This meant that the whole 
of Western Sahara and the African region came under the rule of the new 
alliance. However, after the victory the old antagonisms came to surface and 
the Gudulas set a trap for and killed the Lemtuna military leader (in 1056). 
abubakr ben omar the brother of Yahja assumed leadership and after 
suppressing the revolt the military operations resumed. 
As a result, as early as 1059, they reached the Atlantic coast, and later the 
Atlas Mountains. In the same year in an attack the soldiers of the Berghwata tribe 
killed Yasin, so Abubakr took over the control over the emerging empire, too. 
Under the leadership of Abubakr Ibn Omar Berber tribes, especially the 
Sanhaja living in the region of the Southern Sahara were at war with the 
Kingdom of Ghana between 1062 and 1076. 
As the first step they provided financial support to the revolt of the little 
Muslim states in alliance that is in vassal subordination with the king. When 
the rebels engaged a substantial part of the Ghanaian army, the Berber tribes 
also launched an attack and soon won the war.17
It was then that the town of present-day Marakesh was founded and it 
became the capital of the new empire.
In 1082 the Almoravidas occupied Algeria, and later a great part of what 
is Spain today (in 1094). Despite the victorious battles the Almoravidas lost 
power and in 1125 when the uprising led by the Almohads broke out, the 
Empire fell in a short time.18
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The following map illustrates the development of the Almoravida Empire:
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Almoravid-empire-en.svg 
This way the Sanhajas became independent from the Arabs for a while, and 
together with the Zenata tribes, their former enemies, they fought for a long time 
to keep their independence. Because of their resistance it was as late as around 
1270 that the first fights took place between the Arabs representing Islam (banu 
hilal and soleim tribes) and the Western Saharan tribes.19 The two Arab 
tribesbecause of the problems they had causedwere driven from the Delta 
of the Nile by the Khalif of Egypt, and eventually they settled in Libya and 
Tunisia. Although their presence in Western Sahara was not too long they had 
several clashes with tribes living there and also their caravans crossed the area. 
This is what the famous Arab writer ben Khaldun said about them: “They are 
like a huge group of locusts, they destroy everything that gets in their way.”20
That was the time when the Sultan of Morocco drove the Makuil tribe 
coming from Yemen out of the territories under his rule (in 1218). The tribe 
fled to the area south of the Draa River where they mixed with the local Berber 
tribes during the centuries to follow, thereby creating a new ethnic group (the 
Saharawians) who later reached the northern borders of Mauritania.21
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Colonisation of the area
Europeans arrived to the Canary Islands first (1309), which they could 
only occupy by 1401, due to the resistance of the Guanche population. 
Jaime ferrer sailed along Boujdour not much later, in 1346, however, he 
never returned home from his voyage of discovery.1
As the Spaniards almost exterminated the native population of 
the Canary Islands there was no sufficient labour force available for 
cultivating the land, therefore, slave-hunting expeditions were launched 
to the coasts of the Sahara. The first raids were somewhere at coastlines 
of Boujdour in 1405, where a complete caravan was looted, the captured 
Saharawians were sold as slaves at a good price.2 The Spaniards having 
become enthusiastic over the success of the first escapade repeated the 
slave-hunting journeys called “entradas” or “cabagadas” for almost two 
centuries. Certainly, it could not be officially declared that only the slaves 
were required, therefore, they hid their real intentions behind the likeness 
of Christian mission work.3
The very first colony created by Europeans was established by the 
Portuguese in Ceuta (1415), then, mapping the neighbouring areas began, 
till in 1433-1434 an expedition led by Gil eanes and alfonso Goncalves 
Baldaya reached Cap Bojador, the coastal region of present-day 
Western Sahara.4
During the following expedition, which was led by Goncalves and 
nuno tristao, the Portuguese captured 12 nomads, among whom only 
a few could speak Arabic as they were of Berber origin. During the 
expedition in the year of 1440, as many as 235 nomads were captured 
who were partially sold to the Spanish.5 By that time a sort of competition 
evolved between the Spaniards and Portuguese in slave-hunting.
A short while later the Portuguese, systematically mapping the 
coastline, established their first trade-station on Isle of D’Arguin (1445), 
slightly south of Cap Blanc.6
Portuguese historian Gomes Eannes de Azurara wrote about the 
expedition of Joao fernandes in one of his books. The Portuguese explorer 
set foot on the shores somewhere near to Dakhla in 1445 and prepared a 
detailed report for the Royal Court. In his report he mentioned that the 
nomads living there had hardly resembled those living in the territory 
of Morocco, even the language they spoke was different, and it was the 
religion alone that was identical as they also recognised Mohammad as 
their Prophet.7 In the meantime the Portuguese realised that it was more 
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simple to purchase cheep slaves from tribes of the Sahara than organising 
risky surprise raids, therefore, they established trade relations with several 
coastal tribes who sold black slaves and gold to them.8 Black slaves were 
transported from the town of Ouadana to the Isle of D’Arguin, which meant a 
merely six-day long journey. Slave-trafficking had been organised from there 
for about two hundred years by the Portuguese and annually thousands of 
slaves had been transported from the island.9
Later the islands had been occupied by the British (1666), then, by the 
French (1667), finally, by the Dutch (1685-1721).
Holland bought up the acacia gum (Acacia verek) originated from 
Mauritania, which was used in their textile plants set up in Portendick in Africa. 
Today, nomads tap this type of acacia tree, too, and use it for textile dying, or 
make jewels out of its hardened version. Although the Dutch captured the Isle 
of D’Arguin in 1638, later they had to give it up to the French, in this way they 
completely disappeared from this area (hague Convention, 1727).10
By the end of the 15th century, the right to control the area from Cap Bojador 
up to Agadir, including the Canary Islands (toledo Convention, 1480), was 
awarded to Spain in accordance with the resolution of Pope Sixtus VI.11
At the end of the century Diego Garcia de herrera, the governor of 
Canary Islands erected a fortress (Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena, 1476) and 
permanent colonies (Ifni) nowhere else but only in the coastal zones as Spain 
had not taken the risk of permanent settling. By that time, however, they 
had already led several expeditions to the inner areas of the Sahara. In fact, 
Herrera had built the new fortress in order to store captured slaves, since the 
Spanish exterminated the entire population of the islands of Fuerteventura 
and Lanzarote. Their raids were launched from this fortress and the captured 
slaves were transported to the Canary Islands from here. The success of the 
slave-hunters is marked by the fact that local tribes led a siege against the 
fortress within two years after its building and the garrison had only been 
saved from massacre by the relief troops of 700 men urgently sent by the 
governor. As slave-hunting was extremely lucrative and the Court acquired 
one fifth of its total revenue from this source the raids continued. A slave-
hunter, Juan Camacho participated in forty-six actions in 1491 alone, which, 
in his narration, were all successful. Nevertheless, when Governor Herrera 
died (1485), the fortress was abandoned and the local tribes demolished it at 
once.12
However, the Spanish sovereigns henceforward needed the revenue 
derived from slave-trafficking, therefore, the fortress was rebuilt and operated 
as a trading centre onward. In October 1550 the Spanish King appointed 
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Captain alonso fernandes de lugo from Andalusia Captain of Africa, and 
ordered him to establish new fortresses. The Captain had constructed three 
new fortresses: the fortresses of Taghaost, San Miguel de Saca and Cape 
Bojador. The fortress of San Miguel de Saca was attacked one night prior to 
its completion by the local nomads, who butchered more than 300 Spanish 
soldiers, even the life of Lugo was saved by his interpreter, originated from 
the tribe of Ait Bou Tata.13
The increasing number of slave-hunting sorties infuriated the local tribes 
to such an extent that finally they declared a holy war, jihad. The attacking 
Bedouins seized and demolished the fortress of Santa Cruz in 1517, massacred 
the resisting forces and the survivors were sold in style as slaves. The Arabs 
attacked the slave-ships sailing under Spanish and other flags, later they 
attacked the settlements in the Canary Islands.
They also sent the captured people to slave-markets. As a repercussion 
of this, the Spanish officially banned the actions, expecting the Saharawians 
to end their pirate raids, too. Yet, the unpermitted slave-hunting expeditions 
deluding superabundant return went on till 1593.14
However, the lost revenue was supposed to be replaced somehow, therefore, 
the discovery of the fish exuberant off-shore waters came in time. The Spanish 
concluded several fishing agreements with coastal tribes who granted free 
fishing or had not attacked the fish-drying plants established on the shores.15 
However, the Spaniards had no intention to share the territories with other 
Europeans, thence when the Scottish George Glas established a trading 
station opposite the Island of Fuerteventura (1764), he was imprisoned by the 
Spanish, and the station christened Hilsborough was set ablaze. The Scottish 
businessman was arrested when he went to Lanzarote Island to purchase a 
ship and recruit a new crew. Although he got restored to liberty from his 
year-long imprisonment by the intervention of the English Government, the 
building of the trading station that had remained unhurt so far were destroyed 
by the nomads.16
In 1727 the Spaniards and the Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohamed ben 
Abdallah signed the treaty of Marrakech. However, neither the Kingdom of 
Spain, nor the Kingdom of Morocco could handle the piratical tribes, which is 
proven by their agreement on common fishing, concluded on 28 May 1767. 
The agreement provides exclusive fishing rights to Spain in the coastal waters 
from Santa Cruz (Ifni) to the Northern borders. 
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Nevertheless, Article 18 of the agreement well indicates the existing 
problems of the two states in this region: 
“His Imperial Majesty warns the inhabitants of the Canaries against any 
fishing expedition to the coasts of Oued Noun and beyond. He disclaims 
any responsibility for the way they may be treated by the Arabs of the 
country, to whom it is difficult to apply decisions, since they have no fixed 
residence, travel as they wish and pitch their tents where they choose. 
The inhabitants of the Canaries are certain to be maltreated by those 
Arabs…”17
This agreement was amended several times in the forthcoming years, but 
the article quoted had steadily been remained in it.
It is to be known that Morocco had never been a nation state till the 20th 
Century but it consisted of a Principality of several areas independent from 
each other. Many a time the Monarch had no power over the tribes living in 
that area, thus, they could live according to their laws. The territory under 
the control of Moroccan leadership (makhzen) at that time was called “bilad 
el-makhzen”. The majority of the cities and oases where the Moroccans 
established their authority, and over which the representatives of the Sultan 
(kaid) exercised their control, also belonged here. However, there were areas 
which were only known as “bilad es-siba” at that time; this meant the land of 
refugees, i.e. absconders.18
The mentioned territory covered the Rif Mountains populated by Kabyles, 
the Berber settlements of the Atlas Mountains, and the northern part of 
Western Sahara. Although the Sultans of Morocco officially expressed their 
supremacy over these areas their power and military strength was enough only 
to control the most important trading stations and cities. There were periods 
when the Sultans were not able to oversee a given area as long as for a number 
of decades, or even for a century. Still, there were some tribes, which attached 
importance to maintain relations with the Sovereign of Morocco, therefore, 
they entered into an alliance (bayaa) with him, and the Sultan appointed the 
chief of the tribe by a decree (dahir) as his representative.
A few tribes of the Sahara also agreed upon alliance with the Sultan 
but there were some tribessuch as the tribes of Arosien, Ait Lahsen, or 
Ouled Bou Sbaa, which fled from his reign to the Sahara. Nevertheless, 
the Reguibat tribes, which constitute almost 60 per cent of the Saharawian 
population, had never signed any document, which would have provided legal 
title to the Sultan to hold dominion over them.19 The fact that the Sultan of 
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Morocco had no influence over the Saharawian tribes caused several problems 
not only to the Spanish but to the French diplomacy, too, as the mediation of 
the Emir of Mauritania was needed to ransom French seamen shipwrecked at 
the coasts of Western Sahara. Since the Emir maintained good connections 
with the ‘Council of Forty’, he could have successfully negotiated between 
the parties.20
Alexander Scott was among the mariners who suffered shipwreck 
between Cape Noun and Tarfaja in 1810. The captors of the sailor sold him 
as a slave to a warrior from the Toubalt tribe, who had been his master for 
five years. When Scott was travelling in the Atlas Mountains with his owner 
he escaped and was assisted home by an English major in official mission in 
that locality.21 That was the time when leaders of Spain decided to occupy 
the coastal lines of Western Sahara, partly to eliminate the pirate actions, 
together with defending the Canary Islands. Therefore, the leaders of the 
country announced to establish a protectorate on the area from Cap-Blanc 
to Cap Bojador in December 1884. This idea was later approved and then 
legitimated by the participants of the Berlin Conference on 26 February 
1885.22 The Spaniards created the Compania Comercial Hispano-Africana on 
30 March 1884 on the model of the well-functioning North-African Company 
(Mackenzie Company-Cape Juby) with English-Scottish interest.23
Several people participated in the company who took positions in the top 
political or economic leadership of the kingdom restored in 1874. According to 
their concept, the Kingdom of Spain, having lost her power and vegetating like 
her own imperial shadow ought to have established new colonies, particularly 
on the territories of Africa not occupied by other European countries. The 
concept was promoted by King Alphonso XII himself and he donated 3,000 
Pesetas to the company, which collected 37,000 Pesetas within a short time, 
covering the expenses of two expeditions.
The first expedition led by Manuel Iradier, Amando Ossorio and Bernabe 
Jimenes headed to the area of Equatorial Guinea, while the other group led by 
Emilio Bonelli Hernando went to Western Sahara. The concept of founding 
colonies had been approved by royalist, conservative Prime Minister Canovas 
del Castilo, however, the Government resigned in the meantime, thus only the 
minister of foreign affairs of the new Government could order the army to 
conquer the unoccupied coasts of the Sahara. The Spanish unit led by Captain 
emilio Bonelli hernando conquered Dakhla (Villa Cisneros), where they 
erected a fortress and established the mail-service. Only 25 soldiers served in 
the fortress at that time, and they were rotated in three-month periods when 
the ship carrying supply from the Canary Islands arrived. Bonelli became the 
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first military commander who had been living in Morocco for more than six 
years, therefore, he was fluent in Arabic and could develop good connections 
with the representatives of the local tribes. The captain made a proposal to the 
government to establish further stations along the coastline (Angra de Cintra, 
Cape Blanc and Rio de Oro).24
To provide protection to the coasts of the Sahara and the newly-established 
settlements the Government sent a considerable fleet reinforcement to the 
Canary Islands with the order to pacify the shores of Western Africa. By 
April 1886 the Spanish penetrated inside the continent and appointed the first 
Governor, who represented the Government in the area.
With the aid of a Spaniard speaking Arabic perfectly the Spanish managed 
to find several local representatives of the tribes, who were ready to sign an 
agreement recognising the Spanish control (iyill Convention).25 In spite 
of the fact that their representatives had signed the Agreement the tribes 
represented by them took up arms against the Spanish troops marching in. 
The Saharawian tribes organised several insurrections against the Spanish 
power of occupation, and they assaulted the fortress of Villa Cisneros in 1887, 
then, they attacked the fort in 1892 again, while in 1894 they set the ships 
“Tres de Mayo” and “Las Marias” anchored in the bay on fire.26 All that the 
Spanish managed to achieve was a single agreement signed on behalf of the 
Saharawian tribes by Ould Laroussi, the chief of one of the Ouled Delim 
tribes. Namely, the tribal leader recognised that it was easier to trade with the 
Spanish than to fight against them.27 Naturally, complying with the agreement 
was not meant by other tribes, so the skirmish went on. 
The Saharawian tribes still independent from Spain fought a battle 
at Daora in 1899 against the troops of the Sultan of Morocco, where they 
stopped the Moroccans to gain grounds in the Sahara area.28 In the meantime 
the Spanish wanted to ensure their rights already won against the French 
and other European states, therefore, they came to an agreement with France 
occupying Moroccan and Mauritanian territories on disputed border issues. 
As a result of the negotiations the first French and Spanish border agreement 
was ratified on 27th June 1900, which was amended by secret agreements, 
signed on 3rd October 1904 and later, on 27th November 1912.29
51
The following map shows the borders established by the agreements:
Source: Gaudio: Les populations du Sahara occidental. p. 48.
These agreements established the borders which were also approved by 
the contemporary states, with the sole exception of present-day Morocco. The 
borders were also established within the framework of a new agreement in 
1954. Despite the successful Spanish and French diplomatic co-operation the 
Spanish were able to effectively act only in the coastal areas while the French 
managed to gain grounds in the Sahara areas faster and more spectacularly. That 
is why sheikh of smara Ma el-ajnin, a religious leader of Mauritian descent 
asked the help of the Moroccan ruler to fight against the French (1905).
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The popular religious and military leader known by the nickname ‘Ma El-
Ajnin’ (Water of the Eyes) did not belong to any Saharawian tribe.
The latter holy man of the Saharawian tribes was born in Hodh, near the 
banks of the River Niger around 1830-31, under the name Mohammed Mustafa 
Ould Sheikh Mohammed Fadel.30
His family came from Tafilalet (South-East Morocco) and moved to Hodh 
in the 17th century. His father, Mohammed Fadel Ould Mamin, was one of 
the most honourable religious leaders (marabu) of the city, who founded the 
Kadirija denomination of Sufism (Muslim religious school). As a tradesman, 
Ma El-Ajnin moved to the North-Western part of the Sahara in 1859, close 
to Tindouf city founded by the Tadjakent tribe a few years earlier. When he 
arrived to this area he had already performed his pilgrimage to Mecca, thus, 
he received great prestige among the inhabitants who had never reached the 
Holy Place.31 Because he maintained good connections with the members of 
the Alavita dynasty it was not surprising either that in 1887 the then Monarch 
of Morocco appointed him his official representative to the nomads of the 
Sahara, who already worshipped him as a saint. When the construction of 
the city of Smara founded by him had begun, Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz sent 
masons and building material (timber beams and other material not available 
in that region) to expedite the construction.32
However, the Sheikh worried about the headway of the French, who 
approved a plan in 1899, the developer of which proposed the creation of a 
French protectorate from Senegal to the River Draa. In the spirit of the plan 
the French had occupied the entire territory of both Algeria and Tunis by 1903. 
The fortified city of Brakna, the last refuge of the resisting Arab warriors, 
was conquered by Xavier Coppolani of Corsican origin in French service by 
the end of 1903.33 Thus, there was no more considerable power in the North, 
which could offer resistance against the colonisation intentions of the French, 
although the French commander and a few soldiers were slaughtered by the 
nomadic troops led by Sidi Seghir Ould Moulay Zein in the village of Tagant 
later on, when he stood overnight in the local caravansary in transit with a few 
soldiers (12 May 1904).34
According to the French assumption, the raid was ordered by Ma El-Ajnin. 
Of course, the assassination could only temporarily delay the French who 
soon appointed a new commander to lead their troops.
The French troops started to occupy the still independent little desert state, 
Adrar, at that time (9 January 1909). The French defeated the resisting tribes 
(Ouled Delim, Reguibat, and Aroussiyine tribes) in several battles, which 
surrendered after losing their leaders and most of their warriors.35
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This is the reason why Sheikh Ma El-Ajnin tried to counterbalance the 
French headway by founding a new town, present-day Smara, in the territory 
still under Spanish control (1898). The town was located between Tindouf and 
Adrar, near a busy caravan route and the good lands, and well-suitable for 
grazing further increased its value. The construction of the main buildings of 
the town was completed by 1902 and Ma El-Ajnin dislocated his headquarters 
here for good.
It is interesting that the Sheikh did not regarded the Spaniard so 
dangerous, who really had control over the three major cities strengthened by 
them, namely Villa Cisneros (Dakhla), La Guerra and the port of Cabo Juby 
(Tarfaya), and Sidi Ifni later. Therefore, the patrolling warriors of the Sheikh 
left the Spanish patrols in peace, moreover, they even exchanged commodities 
with the smaller Spanish military posts, where they could pay for tea, sugar, 
flour and other commodities with their products (furs, stock, dates, etc.). As 
the Spaniards had not presented a considerable threat, the chiefs of the local 
tribes rather focused on the attacks against the French forces.36
As early as 1902 the French launched an expedition to the Sahara, which 
surveyed the area of present-day Western Sahara and Mauritania, and also 
collected information for the French troops (Blanchet expedition) springing 
to attack soon afterwards. One of the members of the expedition, lieutenant 
Jouinot-Gambetta in his report warned the French military leadership about 
the dangerousness of the Sheikh:
“Ma El-Ajnin, alias Mohamet Fadel, who lives among the locals is a truly 
fanatic Muslim, and according to his vision their faith will triumph and 
by that they will overcome the infidels occupying their land.”37
The new town, Smara, soon became the spiritual centre of the nomads of 
the Sahara, from where they started to organise the armed uprising against 
the French. According to the concept of the Sheikh, they could have joined 
the factious tribes with the support of Morocco, then, they could have 
announced a holy war (jihad) against the infidels. The Monarch of Morocco 
first promised his support for the revolt, but he compromised with the French 
later, and then the betrayed Sheikh attacked Morocco. His troops comprising 
of Saharawian and Mauritanian tribes occupied Marrakesh, but suffered 
defeat at Fez on 23rd June 1910 from the better equipped and trained French 
troops led by General Moinier.38
The Sheikh died within a few months, and his sons el-hiba and 
Mohammed laghdaf continued the struggle, however, they were far from 
being as talented strategists and spiritual leaders as their father. The reputation 
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of the Sheikh is also shown by the fact that his descendants, as an independent 
tribe, became integral part of those living in Western Sahara and had seats in 
the ‘Council of Forty’, later even in the Djemma.
The tribes of Western Sahara continuing their struggle used the area of Saguia 
El Hamra under Spanish rule as the hinterland of the fight against the French.39
As Spain was greatly disturbed by the French intention to develop a 
bordering colonial empire on the territory of Western Sahara, there was no 
particular Spanish intervention against the Saharawians. Moreover, there is 
evidence of paying monthly salary for Laghdaf even in 1919, so that he would 
not attack Spanish military check-points and other interests.
It is also surprising that the movement with considerable religious 
background and declaring all-out war against Christians had procured the 
majority of their weapons from the companies Woerman of Hamburg and 
Torres of Barcelona.40
That was also well-known by the French military high command, therefore, 
army units penetrated the territory of Saguia El Hamra under the cover of 
chasing rebellious tribes several times. During one of these attacks the units 
of Mouret comprising of the Senegal Rifle and Kounta, Oulad and Ghalian 
tribesmen Gendarme following a more than 800-kilometre-long forced 
march captured and later demolished Smara together with its library founded 
by Sheikh Ma El-Ajnin.41 More than 5,000 valuable, ancient manuscripts 
were stored in that library, a significant part of which perished. This march 
is mentioned by the French even today as a daring military action as the 
lieutenant colonel departed with his unit from Atar Garrison on February 9 
and arrived in Smara on 1st March.
Laghdaf tried to force a battle with the French troops leaving the town, 
therefore, he lured them to the environs of Leburat. He passed false information 
to the French that he had barely 250 armed men so that they could surely expect 
a victory, but in reality, he had 1,200 warriors, mostly from the coalition of 
Reguibat Sarg and Sahel tribes. The Saharawians attacked the rearguard of the 
French camping in the Valley of Tagliat (Oued Tagliat), and also the units sent to 
their rescue, finally completely surrounded the troops of Mouret (10 March).
The raid was just partial success since the total loss of the 400-strong 
French unit after the battle were two officers (Lieutenant Morello and 
Captain Verhardt) and 28 enlisted, while more than 200 soldiers of Mouret 
were wounded. Finally, the French retreated toward Mauritania, but the 
Saharawians were unable to exploit their dubious victory, as they suffered the 
loss of nearly 100 men and the discouraged desert warriors refused to chase 
the French any further.42
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After the lost battle Mouret (according to his memoirs, at least) could 
have defeated the Bedouins led by Laghdaf, however, he ordered retreat to the 
French Garrison in Atar city (28 March 1913), where his units were originally 
stationing.
Otherwise the French deny the fact of setting the library ablaze. According 
to their story the soldiers of Mouret only placed mines under the most important 
buildings, in order to demonstrate their determination to the local population, 
but they did not detonate anything. Although, due to an unfortunate accident 
(lightning) a part of the library really took fire, but they rescued the books, a 
part of which later went into Moroccan possession somehow.
Two French travellers in 1930 visited Smara and still saw the books, and 
the airplanes of the French colonial army took photos on the city to prove to 
the world that their predecessors did not destroy the city.43 The photos were 
published in a Moroccan daily; even so, the descendents of the Sheikh have 
possessed no reliable information about the library to this day.
There was no significant fighting on the territory during World War I, apart 
from a smaller marine conflict, in which two German cruisers encountered 
with one of the battleships of the British Fleet near to Dakhla. Naturally, 
the German high command tried to engage French troops in the Sahara, as 
well; therefore, they delivered weapons and other equipment to El-Hiba. The 
UC20 submarine sent by the Germans reached the coastlines of the Sahara on 
15th October 1916, where Edgar Probster, the consul stationing in Fez earlier 
handed over 600 modern weapons and the letter of the Ottoman Sultan to the 
Saharawians. On his way back the Spanish captured the German envoy near 
Tarfaya and deported him to the Canary Islands.44
As France and Spain did not wage war on each other, the Spanish authorities 
tried to consolidate the relations of the territory under their rule.
The Spanish Governor, francisco Bens argandona, appointed in 1903, 
established good relations with the Ouled Delim, Ouled Bou Sbaa and 
Arosien tribes. The veteran of the Cuban war overbore the members of the 
tribes with his unescorted trips in the Sahara area, accompanied by a few 
Saharawians. However, his friendships with the Saharawians was not looked 
with favour by the French, and when he met with Sheikh El-Hiba, who was 
one of the leading personalities of the uprising against France, they protested 
in an official note against contravening the agreement between the two states. 
During the 22 years of his governorate he founded the second settlement, 
Cabo Juby (29 June 1916) of the conclave on the previous location of the 
North-West African Company of Mackenzie.
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The next settlement, which was occupied and fortified by the Spanish 
under his command, was the city of La Guerra (27 November 1919).
Although the Spanish Government officially banned the occupation of the 
settlement, they easily occupied the city with three officers and two platoons 
of the 66 infantry regiment under the shroud of the night. As a matter of 
course, the leadership in Madrid, previously worried about the attack of the 
French and the local nomads, declared the entire operation their own success. 
Anyhow, the capture of the new city counter-balanced the trading influence 
of the nearby French city, Port Etienne.45
703 Spanish soldiers served at the areas of the Sahara at that time, out 
of which 121 in Villa Cisneros, 159 in La Guerra and 423 in Tarfaya. The 
strength of the contingent in Tarfaya was increased due to the airfield and 
the proximity of the French forces. 6 military airplanes (Heinkel aircraft) had 
been deployed at the airfield since 1928.
In the meantime the new French Governor, General Gaden, developed new 
plans to pacify the nomads living on the territory. However, the situation in 
Mauritania and some parts of Western Sahara began to consolidate only later, 
after the Battle of Trefiya in 1925, where the French completely eliminated the 
troops of the rebel tribes.
Nevertheless, the raids went on and the situation in the Sahara worsened 
so far that France threatened Spain with the occupation of Spanish-controlled 
territories in 1934, if Spain could not hold up law and order there.46
In order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation the French troops 
led by Colonel trinquet occupied the town of Tinduf, which was an extremely 
important strategic point, and was annexed it to Algeria within a few years.47 
The resistance of the Sahara tribes had become exhausted by then, and when 
the revolt of Ait Ba Amrane tribe was suppressed in the same year (4th March 
1934), the nomads definitively gave up to maraud the French territories.48
The Spanish, led by Captain Galo and Lieutenant Carlos de la Gandara, sent 
their camel detail comprising of Saharawian soldiers to Daora. Following the 
occupation of the town the scarcely defended city of Smara was also occupied 
by the Spanish, where they established a permanent garrison.49 Nevertheless, 
they were able to completely occupy the areas of Western Sahara only by 




As a consequence of the occupation of the region, local tribes launched 
several uprisings against Spanish rule. The most significant among these 
took place in 1938though it was rapidly suppressed by the units of the 
Spanish Legion. In fact, only towns got under Spanish control while tribal 
areas were attempted to be controlled through heavy patrols.1
The map below shows locations of former Spanish garrisons and military 
checkpoints: 
Source: John Mercer: Spanish Sahara (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1976)
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That time the Spanish Army in the Sahara comprised the following 
personnel: 
527 Officers and senior officers 
246 Non-commissioned officers 
12,713 Soldiers and police officers
Total:  13,486 troops
The control over the region was primarily the task of the units of the 
Spanish Legion, the Ifni riflemen, recruited from local tribes (Tiradores 
de ifni), local police forces (policia Territoria) and nomadic cavalry units 
(Troopas de nomadas).2
The Spanish Legion was established by Alfonse XII, King of Spain 
in 1920 similarly to the French Foreign Legion. Lieutenant Colonel Millan 
Astray was appointed the first commander of the Legion, who began to set 
up the first battalion (bandera) in Ceuta that very year. The soldiers of the 
unit participated in every local battle until 1976, which saw the withdrawal 
of the Spanish forces. The personnel of the unit also included soldiers from 
Saharawian tribes although their proportion comprised only a few percent.3
In the Sahara region the following units of the Legion stationed for some time: The 
2nd Battalion, 4th Battalion, 6th Battalion, 9th Battalion and the 13th Battalion.
The training and equipment of the units were sufficient: besides camel 
troops they also had French AMX-30, or AML-90 Main Battle Tanks and 
Heinkel 111 fighter aircraft. 
Tiradores units were established in Morocco (Ifni) with Spanish and 
Moroccan officers but by the eruption of the Sahara conflict 98% of their 
officers had been Spanish because of the unreliability of locals. 
The majority of soldiers were Moroccan and nearly 40% was recruited 
from Saharawian tribes around the town. The units had transportation, signals, 
supply and medical sub-units. First, the troops of the units were equipped with 
small arms and light weapons, but later on artillery units were also established 
equipped with 50-, 60-, 81- and 120-mm guns.
The official establishment of nomadic cavalry units was achieved in 
1926 although nomads of the Sahara had been employed for reconnaissance 
and other military tasks by the Spanish.4
The “Cabo Juby” unit was set up on 27th July 1926 by local military leaders, 
which was reorganised sub-unit on 10th October 1928.5 
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Later, in order to increase their efficiency infantry units were equipped 
with horses. In 1930 the personnel of the nomadic unit comprised 30 
Europeans (including 6 officers) and 198 Saharawians, who had 62 horses 
and 183 camels. In 1937 one of the units was stationed in Tan-Tan (Saguia el-
Hamra) and the other in Villa Cisneros (Capitan de Gandara).
After the Spanish Civil War the Spanish augmented nomadic troops and 
established new units so two units stationed in Tan-Tan, one in Smara and 
another one in the town of Villa Cisneros. Nomadic units were independent 
of one another and the regular army, and they were under the command of a 
Government Envoy.6 Nomads were tasked with controlling the border area 
and the tribal territories, collecting information for garrisons, policing and 
crowd control, and keeping rebelling Saharawians at bay. 
The structure of the nomadic unit (company) was as follows:7 25 European 
soldiers (mostly officers and Non Commissioned Officers); 140 NCOs 
and soldiers recruited from local tribes; 146 riding camels; 37 camels for 
transportation; 2 machine guns; 1 small calibre knockdown field gun and a 
portable radio transceiver.
By the early 1970s all units were modernised and equipped with Land 
Rovers and Pegazo trucks except for one which continued to patrol on camels. 
Although it is not a well-known fact, several Saharawian soldiers served 
in General Franco’s forces though only Moroccans are mentioned by most 
historians dealing with the Spanish Civil War (14% of Franco’s soldiers were 
Muslim during the war).8 In the Sahara region the only event related to the 
Spanish Civil War took place in March 1937 when Communists kept in the 
Villa Cisneros prison bribed a guard, seized some weapons, and broke out 
from their captivity. Since they had no chance to take the entire town they 
took a fishing boat and almost immediately left the port.9
That was also the golden age of Cabo Juby (Tarfaya), recorded in the 
history of civil and military aviation. For soldiers serving there the town was 
more infamous than famous as the Spanish armed forces ran a disciplinary 
company there. Between 1918 and 1936, a civil and military airfield operated 
in the garrison. Although there was an enormous competition between Spain 
and France in the region there happened to be no obstacle to building and 
using Cabo Juby airfield together.10 The French moved there their air-mail 
service operating between Casablanca and Dakar (Compagnie Generale 
Aeropostate), managed by the famous French writer Antoine de Saint-
Exupéry between 1927-28. He wrote his short story “Courrier”, published in 
the monthly “Him navire d’argent” and French Gallimard. This is the short 
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story that brought him fame in literature. In 1929 the writer was appointed 
Head of Argentinean Air Mail and left town but remembered the 18 months 
spent there with pleasure.11
That time Saharawian tribes lived in relative peace and the Spanish began to 
reorganise the regional administration. They had no real interests in their Sahara 
colonies as that time there were no data on the phosphate and iron ore deposits 
in the area.12 The only income for the Spanish came from fishing industry, and 
so the colony produced only deficit for the Spanish Government.13
It is well-indicated by the fact that in 1958 523 tons of fish and other 
products were exported at an overall value of 958,015 pesetas while import 
was twenty times higher: 21.4 million pesetas.14 Fishing was supervised by 
the state-founded company IPASA, which built cold stores and controlled 
seaports. In the early 1950s 26,000 tons of fish was caught annually, mostly 
off the coast of Villa Cisneros and La Guerra. Besides fishing the company 
also ran seaweed-gathering and -processing plants but their revenues did 
not grow significantly. In order to found new bases for the fishing fleet the 
Spanish Governor deployed troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
Del Oro who established the town of Laayoune in the Saguia el-Hamra valley, 
merely 25 kilometres from the Ocean (1940.). The new settlement (El Aaiun) 
was named after the wells (ayoun) in the vicinity and was renamed only after 
the Moroccan occupation.15
The Spanish selected El-Aaiun as their administrative centre where 
the Governors of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro had their residencies. 
However, the development was very slow as in the region there were only 
small settlements with little population like Smara, La Guera, Dakhla, and 
some minor fortresses, such as Tichla and Zug. 
World War 2 had no influence on the region although the German 
Command considered the area of Spanish Sahara as a potential base for 
military operations in Africa (The Germans established and run a submarine 
base in another Spanish colony: Spanish-Guinea).16 Since not only did Franco-
led Spain support the Third Reich but also had Fascistic features itself, the 
Germans trusted a tacit Spanish support, and were ready to occupy the region 
with the use of military force at the same time. Just in case the curriculum 
at the Berlin Military Academy included military topography of Spanish 
Sahara in the academic year 1942-43. (Spanisch-West-Sahara, Rio de Oro 
mit Spanisch Sahara und Spanisch-Süd-Marokko, Generalstab des Heeres, 
Abteilung für Kriegskarten und Vermessungswesen, Berlin 1942.) 
This relatively consolidated situation changed after WW2, when in 1946 
Ifni and Western Sahara were united under the name of Spanish West-Africa 
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and new unrests broke out in the area. In the early 1950s local people were 
involved in the fight of the Moroccan Liberation Army (Jaich at-Tahrir) 
and as one of its results; Morocco offered its support to help their fight for 
independence.17
After the liberation of Morocco (April 1956) Moroccan military units 
fought shoulder to shoulder with Saharawian tribes against Spanish troops 
stationing in Spanish Sahara.18 By that time the region got increasingly 
important for Spain as in the late 1940s Spanish geologist Manuel Alia 
Medina discovered the first phosphate deposits in the region of Bou Craa.19 
The discovery grabbed the attention of General Franco, visiting the area in 
1950, and ordered the Spanish Institute of Geology to send an expedition to 
confirm the findings of the geologist.20 According to scientists in Spanish 
Sahara, there is a major, nearly 85%-pure phosphate deposit in the territory. 
The scientists also found oil, but the Spanish Government did not undertake 
the exploitation, because the logistical background was insufficient.21
Spain had no intention to allow Morocco or any other nation to exploit 
those deposits promising extra profit. 
Officially, however, Morocco was not at war with Spain, moreover, it 
attempted to maintain good relations with the Spanish Government in order 
to gain some time to stabilise the internal structure of the newly independent 
state. Of course, Sahara areas rich in minerals and the Spanish towns along 
the Atlantic coast (Ifni, Ceuta and Mellila) caught the attention of the 
leaders of the sovereign state. Therefore, then, Chief of General Staff of the 
Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales-FAR)later King Hassan 
IIprovided support both in terms of weapons and information to irregular 
forces attacking the Spanish colony.22
The primary objective of attacks of Moroccan and Saharawian troops 
(mostly from Tekna and Reguibat tribes) was the town of Ifni, which was 
officially handed over to Spain by the Sultan of Morocco back in 1860. 
Although the town was taken under siege between October 1957 and June 
1958 the Moroccan troops were unable to occupy it.23 On 23rd November 
1957 the Moroccans cut the telephone lines and launched an attack against 
the airfield, weapon stores, and several points of the town, defended by the 
3rd infantry battalion, the 3rd artillery battery, and a unit of the Sahara Police 
Force (1,500 Spanish soldiers and 500 Saharawian police officers). Since they 
did not trust the town-dwellers they disarmed civilian and forced them to 
stay in their houses. The artillery of the attackers kept the town under fire for 
several hours, then; the barrage was followed by an attack of some 1,200 rebels 
equipped with automatic weapons. The Spanish troops lost 55 soldiers, 128 
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were wounded, and 7 were missing in action. The attackers had huge losses, 
too, and in the following weeks did not attempt any major attacks against 
the town, however, they eliminated minor Spanish outposts (Tamucha, Mesti, 
T’zelata de Sbuia, Tiliuin, Sidi Inno, Tabelcut) in the desert.24
The fortress of Tiliuin was defended by a platoon of Tiradores and a 
platoon of Saharawian police officers with the support of local Bedouins 
but by 25th November their losses had grown so high that relief units had 
to be deployed to help them. The relief force comprised Legion soldiers, 
paratroopers and an 81-mm artillery battery. Although the outpost was 
saved the defenders had so many casualties and wounded that they had 
to leave the fortress and retreat to Ifni. Other outposts saw similar events 
since the Spanish had no intention to give up their positions without fight.25 
Nevertheless, by 9th December they had lost all of their outposts and every 
Spanish unit was forced into Ifni, which was completely surrounded by the 
Moroccan troops. The siege was taken only 6 months later in June 1958 when 
the attackers retreated. 
Naturally, fights broke out not only around Ifni but in the entire 
territory of Spanish Sahara. One Moroccan group e.g. attacked and took the 
unguarded lighthouse of Cape Bojador capturing 7 Spanish workers there 
and destroyed the entire equipment of the lighthouse.26 Soon afterwards a 
column of vehicles was attacked near Arbaa el-Mesti but the rebels were 
forced to retreat. 
On 12–13 January 1958 rebels launched an attack against El-Aaiunt, 
defended by the 13th Battalion of the Spanish Legion. Although the attackers 
outnumbered the defenders they were not able to capture the town. The 
victorious Spanish began to pursue the retreating enemy but were ambushed 
in the sand dunes (Edcherra) near the town. The commander of the Spanish 
unit (1st Company), Captain Jauregui was fatally wounded at the very 
beginning of the ambush. Although the majority of the company managed 
to retreat the 3rd platoon was isolated from the main unit. The platoon kept 
fighting for several hours losing half of its personnel, finally, Sergeant 
Francisco Fadrique and legionnaire Juan Maderal Oleaga with their machine 
gun covered the successful retreat of their comrades still alive and got killed 
in action. The overall losses of the Spanish counted 37 killed and 50 wounded 
in action. The two legionnaires covering the retreat of their comrades and 
sacrificing their lives were awarded San Fernando medal, posthumous.27
As a consequence of the fights, the Spanish were pushed back to the coastal 
area. There, however, together with the French who were also threatened by 
the rebels, they planned a joint military operation against Western Sahara 
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tribes. The joint Spanish-French military operation began on 10th February 
1958 (Operation Ecouvillon or Teide), in the framework of which allied 
troops extremely quickly and in some places rather brutally eliminated the 
resistance of local tribes.28
The joint forces consisted of 9,000 Spanish and 5,000 French soldiers and 
officers, supported by an air force of 60 Spanish and 50 French aircraft. The 
Spanish units were commanded by General Lopez Valencia, commander 
of troops on the Canary Islands, and the French and Mauritanian troops 
were commanded by General Bourgund. Allied troops showed significant 
differences in equipment and morals. While the French were well-equipped 
and possessed the armament suitable for desert warfare (they even tried 
Napalm against rebel forces, which happened to be brand new ‘weapon’ that 
time), the Spanish had really outworn equipment (their small arms were from 
the ‘40s; they did not have armoured tools, and their Junker-52’s, Heinkel-
111’s and Messerschmitts Bf-109’s were made during the Spanish Civil War), 
together with their logistics support being catastrophic. Despite all these, the 
allies finally succeeded with the joint operation.29
The Spanish main forces started to retake the area from the towns of El 
Aaiun and Villa Bens (Tarfaya), while the French launched their offensive 
from Tindouf (Algeria) and Fort Trinquet (Mauritania). The rebel forces 
concentrated their troops in the valleys of rivers Tan-Tan and Sagiet el Hamra, 
taking up positions in caves and the riverbank. However, the area was bombed 
by allied warplanes and Saharawians lost more than 150 men and most of 
their weapons in the air raids. Between 10th and 20th February 1958 Spanish 
mechanised forces (4th, 9th and 13th battalions of the Legion, Santiago armoured 
regiment, one rifle battalion, and an artillery unit) took Edchera Pass then 
towns of Tafurdat and Smara. 
On 21st February Spanish and French troops eliminated another, 300-
strong rebel unit between Awsard and Bir Aznaran. As a result of these 
operations there remained significant forces only in the region of Agadir, with 
some 12,000 rebels stationed there. However, when the locals saw the massive 
allied forces the insurgents sneaked back home. The total losses suffered by 
the allied forces during the operation was 8 Spanish and 7 French killed in 
action and a few wounded.30
Thanks to the results of the military operations the Moroccan Government 
got scared and refused to deliver food or weapons to the rebels and later on 
concluded an agreement with Spain. In exchange for their neutrality, Morocco 
was given the Tarfaya region in the northern zone of Sahara, dwelled primarily 
by Saharawians (Cintra agreement, 1 april 1958).31
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The next map shows the territories Spain left as part of the agreement:
Source: Ian Brownlie: African Boundaries. p. 150.
In the period of time after the military campaign the region had a 
relative peace. The only incident took place in March 1961 when American, 
Canadian, French and Spanish researchers of the Union Oil and Company 
were kidnapped. Later the hostages were freed after the ransom money was 
paid for them.32
Meanwhile, the political course of colonialist countries changed. After 
the Bandung Conference on 19th April 1955 these countries started to give 
autonomy to their colonies.33 
The rapid decolonisation was also supported and underpinned by UN 
Resolution 1514, the so-called “Colony Declaration”. The approval of the 
declaration by the colonising countries was a significant step toward the 
elimination of colonies resulting in a nearly total redrawing of the political 
map of Africa in the following 10 years.
In 1962, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, the three countries surrounding 
Spanish Sahara also gained their independence, and in 1965 there were 38 
independent countries in Africa. Partly because of this fact and partly because 
of an increasing diplomatic pressure the option of gaining autonomy by local 
people emerged.
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The Beginning of The STruggle for independence
At the beginning of the 1960s Western Sahara was already considered to 
be valuable because in 1947 the first phosphate mine was discovered and 
later, after a successful search production started. The Spanish started 
searching for other minerals, and thus, holding the territory became more 
important. In the meantime, part of the nomads settled down and a slow 
migration process started.
The Saharawians tried to establish their own political organisations, and 
to achieve this, in 1967, they created the Saharan Liberation Organisation 
(MlS-harakat Tahrir saguia el-hamra wa oued ed-dahab). Its 
first leader was Mohamed Sidi ibrahim Bassiri.1 Bassiri was member 
of the Reguibat tribe from the city of Tan-Tan and later he was granted 
state scholarship for his studies in Casablanca. Following this period he 
had the opportunity to earn more degrees from the universities of Cairo 
and Damascus where he came under the influence of the Baathists who 
professed Pan-Arab ideas. After graduation he returned to Morocco where 
he became the founding editor-in-chief of a radical newspaper entitled 
“The Torch” (Al-Chibab).2
In 1967 he decided to return home and started working as a teacher 
of religion in the local mosque in the town of Smara. Using his religious 
influence, he established his organisation which was secret at first and 
started the instigations against the Spanish. The Spanish military counter-
intelligence took notice of his activity and in June 1970 they prepared 
a report for the Governor. The report attracted the Governor’s attention 
to the threats posed by the new organisation which numbered several 
Saharawians serving in the Spanish Legion, in the local police, and in the 
Nomad Troops among its members.
The organisation first wanted to pursue peaceful means to achieve 
its aim: the independence of the Saharan territories. On 17 June 1970 
they organised a huge series of demonstrations to protest against the 
Spanish plan to officially transform the Sahara into a Spanish province. 
The demonstration was suppressed, 12 people were killed and hundreds 
got wounded. Several members of the movement, among them 16 soldiers 
were jailed or deported to the Canary Islands. After his arrest their leader 
simply disappeared and never turned up again. A significant part of the 
locals concluded that it was impossible to achieve their aim by peaceful 
means and consequently more and more people supported the idea of an 
armed rebellion.3 On 10th May 1973 they established the polisario (Frente 
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Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro) with the aim 
to fully liberate Western Sahara by means of armed fight. The first leader 
of the Organisation was el ouali Mustapha Sayed.4 The first action was 
carried out 10 days later, on 20th May, under his leadership when they attacked 
the Spanish military post in el-Khanga.5 The attack was characterised by 
amateurism and a lot of lessons had to be learned for the sake of successfully 
organising the next raids. 12 soldiers of the Nomad Troops were on duty at the 
isolated post, some of them went on patrol when they captured two young men 
hiding around the place. They were arrested and the soldiers had no idea that 
one of them was El Ouali.
The commander of the unit reported the incident to the nearest Spanish 
garrison, but they could not transport the captives because of the raid. The 
soldiers were taken by surprise and they could not even use their weapons, so 
the attackers could set their captives free and swiftly left with the weapons. 
The members of the Spanish patrol that was sent to the scene could only find 
the nomads who were tied together.6
In a short period of time they carried out more attacks against Adjedjimat, 
Bir Lehmar, Tifariti and Guelta. They attacked the phosphate mines in Bou 
Craa and damaged the transport installations that linked them with the 
harbour. Because of these events, the UN sent an investigation team in May 
1975 and concluded that the Polisario acted as a liberating, not as a terrorist 
organisation (although they were supported by Libya with weapons and in 
other ways as well).7
 (In 1965 the Moroccan Ministry for Saharan and Mauritanian Affairs 
established the FLS – Frente de Liberacion del Sahara bajo Dominacion 
Espanola, the party working for the liberation of Spanish Sahara, which then 
was put under the supervision of Moulay Hassan Ben Driss, the uncle of the 
king.8) This organisation sent a delegation to the November–December 1966 
Session of the UN General Assembly under the leadership of Ma El-Ajnin’s 
grandson El-Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohammed Laghdaf in order to lobby in 
Morocco’s interest. The party even published a newspaper Nuestro Sahara 
under the supervision of Brika Zaruali who was member of the Moroccan 
government party Istiqlal.9
In 1974 the Saharan national unity party (punS) was founded with 
Spanish support with appointments for some tribal leaders and Jemma 
members. The party adopted a 14-point programme, in which they mentioned 
the implementation of the right for self-determination as well as the complete 
rejection of the territorial demands of the neighbouring countries. This political 
formation wanted to achieve its aims in co-operation with the Spaniards and 
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excluded the possibility of armed combat. The preservation of the old society, 
culture and religion was a significant aim of the organisation, and as such, its 
representatives and leaders were sheikhs, wealthy people as well as the older 
generation. A proof of the force they represented was that in 1975 more than 
60% of the Jemma members belonged to the National Unity Party. After the 
Spanish retreat from Western Sahara the organisation ceased to exist.10
The front for liberation and unity (flu) was established with Moroccan 
support mainly with the participation of soldiers who left the Moroccan military. 
There is no available information on its activity.11 Already in June 1972 the 
MorehoB (Mouvement de resistence des hommes Bleus) movement 
was established in Morocco with the aim to liberate Western Sahara, Ceuta 
and Melilla.12 Their leader was former policeman Bashir Figuigui, or a soldier 
of fortune known as eduardo Moha. The only verifiable activity of this 
organisation was that they sent leaflets to different foreign embassies in which 
they condemned the Spaniards. When the UN representatives visited Western 
Sahara they reported that they had not met any person who was member of 
this organisation or anybody who knew about its existence. Moha first wanted 
to ask Algeria for money to support the struggle for liberation, but because he 
did not get any support he moved to Rabat and represented the Moroccan view 
point from that time on.13
As an international reaction to the raids organised by the Polisario on 
23rd and 24th July 1973 in Agadir, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco held a 
tripartite summit meeting and a joint statement was issued:
”The three Heads of State devoted special attention to the issue of the 
Sahara which is still a Spanish colony. They reiterated their commitment 
to the principal of self-determination and they pledged to keep an eye 
on its implementation. Self-determination should be implemented in a 
framework which ensures that the free will of the people of the Sahara 
prevails in accordance with pertinent UN resolutions”. 14
On 21st September 1973 General franco announced that he would grant 
territorial autonomy for the Saharawians and gradually also the right for self-
determination.15 As a result, Morocco started a powerful diplomatic offensive 
in order to prove their historical rights to the territory of Western Sahara. 
According to them, the locals had only two choices: either to stay under Spanish 
rule, or to join the Moroccan homeland. France supported the second version.16
When on 4th July 1974 Spain made its plan on granting autonomy to 
Western Sahara public, the outraged King hassan ii sent a message on the 
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same day to the already ill Franco and warned him not to take any unilateral 
steps concerning Spanish Sahara. In a different statement the King already 
dismissed the result of the referendum that was accepted at all fora, except 
if that would mean joining Morocco. At this point he was already preparing 
for military intervention and appointed colonel dlimi, one of his most loyal 
soldiers to be the commander of the border district. In virtually no time the 
Colonel amassed 24,000 troops along the border.17
The King derived his right to the Saharan Territory from the so-called 
“Greater Morocco” line of thought. The expression was first used by Allal 
el-Fassi the leader of the Istiqlal party on the day Morocco gained its 
independence.18 According to the politician who had just returned from exile, 
their freedom was only partial because the Moroccans had the task to restore 
the old Almoravida empire, which he simply called as “Greater Morocco”.
On 27th March 1956 at a public meeting the politician talked about the fact 
that the whole territory between Sahara Tindouf and Atar, as well as part of 
the Algerian territories belonged to Morocco. 
“Even if Morocco is independent, it is not entirely free. The Moroccan 
people will continue their fight until Tangier, the Sahara from Tindouf 
to Colomb-Bechar, Touati, Kenadza and Mauritania are freed and can 
rejoin Morocco. Our independence can only be complete together with 
the Sahara. The border of Morocco in the south will be at St. Louis in 
Senegal”.19
The mostly uneducated masses were easy to manipulate and in the fever 
of the newly-won independence it was easy to fanaticise them, and they really 
believed that there was a chance for this vision to come true. Seeing the extent 
of his influence, El-Fassi got even greedier and in a newspaper financed by 
his party “Al Alam” he went as far as to call the whole of Algerian Sahara, 
Mauritania and the northern part of Mali an ancient Moroccan territory.20
The Moroccan Government did not pay attention to this theory, which they 
considered unserious and unfounded but they could not allow any other political 
force, except for the central power, to mobilise the masses. Since the structure 
of the independent kingdom was only being formed, a rival party or politician 
who could manipulate the masses would have posed a serious threat. 
On 25th February 1958 King Mohammed V in a speech held in the valley 
of the Draa river on the marketplace of the M’hamid oasis stated for the first 
time that he would do anything in his power to unify families and to regain the 
Saharan territory.21 The use of military force seemed to be unrealistic since 
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at that time the units of the Liberation Army in Rio de Oro suffered a harsh 
defeat from the French and Spanish troops. 
In spite of this, in accordance with the Cintra Agreement, Spain handed 
over Tarfaya and its surroundings without requesting any compensation 
from Morocco.22 Although this unexpected gesture took the Moroccans by 
surprise, they immediately announced that they ask the Spanish government 
to modify the borders, even though this meant the end of a significant part of 
El-Fassi’s dreams. First, they gave up their demand for the northern part of 
Mali in September 1960, when the first president of the country, Modibo Keita 
participated in a meeting that established a political-economic organisation 
called “The Casablanca Group”.23 When the UN recognised Mauritania 
as an independent state in 1960 the Moroccan territorial demands became 
unfounded.24
On the map you can see the territory that the politicians demanded for 
Morocco:
Source: Tony Hodges: Western Sahara. The Roots of a Desert War
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“The Sand War” that broke out with Algeria in 1963 was the end of the 
“Greater Morocco” dream25 and subsequently the Moroccan government had 
only territorial demands for Western Sahara.26
In spite of the troop concentration on 21st August, the Spanish Government 
sent a note to the then UN Secretary General, in which they announced their 
willingness to conduct a referendum on self-determination. 
Mauritania also had territorial claims for Western Sahara claiming that the 
same people lived on the two sides of the artificially created border. 
“I cannot help destroy the ties that bind us together: we have the same 
names, we speak the same language, we follow the same noble traditions, 
we have the same religious leaders and saints, our animals graze on the 
same places and we let them drink from the same wells. To sum up, we 
are members of the same desert civilization that we are very proud of. 
This is why I call upon our brothers who live in Spanish Sahara to make 
the dream of a spiritually and economically unified Mauretania come 
true.”27
These words were spoken by Vice-President Mokhtar ould daddah, six 
weeks after his inauguration despite the fact that Mauritania was at the time 
under joint governance by the French and Mauritanians, which meant that the 
territory was a French Protectorate under the French President.
According to the plan of the newly-elected Vice President, the establishment 
of a new, greater Mauritania would have been possible only by unification with 
the Saharawian tribes that spoke the Hassania language.28 The Moroccans, of 
course, protested and called the Mauritanians “loyal puppies of the French”. 
To prove his steadfastness the new Vice President demanded a part of the 
territories handed over by the Cintra Agreement because those were once 
under the influence of the Tekna tribe.
Naturally, behind the half-unreal demand there was a serious anxiety 
concerning Moroccan territorial expansion. If the Moroccans had had 
occupied the demanded territory, a common border of 1,200 kms would 
have been formed between the two arch enemies. Morocco would not have 
recognised the border as final, so it would have attempted to put its theoretical 
demands into practice, which could have meant the end of the independent 
state of Mauritania.29 This is why Spanish Sahara secured a kind a status 
quo for Mauritania since the presence of the Spanish troops refrained the 
Moroccans from any possible military actions.30 Consequently, they had good 
diplomatic and economic relationship in the background, while officially 
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they had territorial demands and criticised Spain as a colonial power.31 The 
independent politics of president ould daddah lasted only until October 
1974, when the two countries reached a secret agreement on the division of 
the territory (26-29 October).32 Algerian president Boumedien disapproved 
these plans, and starting from the summer of 1975 he supported the Polisario, 
and in June he recognised it as a liberation movement. The Algerians were, of 
course, not driven by unselfishness but by serious economic interests as they 
wanted to get hold of the exit to the Atlantic Ocean. This would have made the 
establishment of an ocean-fishing flotilla and the exploitation of the iron ore 
mines around Tindouf possible.33
There were rich mines in the surroundings of the city but without any 
transport capacity, production would have been unprofitable. However, in 
case there had been a seaport on the coast of Western Sahara, opening the 
mines would have become profitable. To reach the Algerian ports on the 
Mediterranean a 1,100-km-long railway line should have been built, while 
510 kms would have been enough to Tarfaya. With the longer version iron ore 
mining would not have become profitable even after decades (not to mention 
investments), but the possible use of the Saharan ports could have brought 
serious profits for the country.34
It should also be mentioned that Algeria and Morocco are arch enemies 
and up to this date they have had border disputes. This is the reason why 
Algeria would support any initiative that could weaken Moroccan influence 
in the Maghreb region.
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The early acTiviTies of The UN iN The resolUTioN 
of The problem
The recognition of Moroccan and Mauritanian demands based on 
unproven historic facts, coupled with the ignorance to the right of 
autonomy of the people of Western Sahara meant a significant step back 
from UN Resolution 1514 (XV) approved in December 1960. That was the 
document known as the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to colonial countries and peoples” also known in some countries as the 
Colony Declaration.1
Although Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the UN Charter provides for the 
compliance with the principles of the right of autonomy the real result 
was the Colony Declaration approved at the XVth Session of the General 
Assembly. This document also states the equality of nations and the 
enforcement of their right to autonomy even if they are not independent 
yet. The Declaration calls on the involved countries to a rapid and 
unconditional elimination of any kind of colonisation. 
Article 2 states that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” The 
Declaration also states that “inadequacy of political, economic, social, 
or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying 
independence.” 
In 1961 Spain officially declared that Western Sahara was its 
overseas province.2 The very same year a Decolonisation Committee was 
established at the UN which regularly put the Western Sahara issue on 
the agenda from September 1963 on, and on 16th October 1964 its first 
resolution was published calling on Spain to enforce the right to autonomy 
in its Sahara territories.3
In the UN organisations Morocco supported the idea that “Western 
Sahara and the other Spanish colonies should gain their independence in 
the shortest possible time, allowing the peoples in the region to exercise 
power without the presence of colonisers.” 
At the same time Morocco expressed its hopes in the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) that due to historic reasons Saharawians would 
join Morocco. That time Mauritania supported the establishment of an 
independent State of Western Sahara, leading to several conflicts with the 
representatives of Moroccan diplomacy. In such a tense situation and on 
the basis of Resolution 2229 (XXI) of the UN Decolonisation Committee 
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approved on 16th December 1965 Spain was called on to put an end to the state 
of colony of Western Sahara and Ifni.4
However, this Resolution was not accepted by Spain and Portugal, 
therefore, a year later the UN reinforced the right of Saharawian people to 
autonomy and identified the declaration of a referendum in accordance with 
the following: 
“Public administration in accordance with the thrives of the native 
population of Spanish Sahara and in co-ordination with the Governments 
of Morocco and Mauritania and all the involved parties should define the 
conditions of a UN-supervised referendum in order to allow the native 
population of the region to exercise their right to autonomy.” 
Responding to this Resolution the Government of Spain gathered over 
800 sheikhs who submitted a joint declaration to the UN on 21st March 1966, 
stating their wish to further belong to the Kingdom of Spain. At the same 
time, the tribal leaders explicitly rejected the idea of accepting the rule of any 
of the neighbouring countries.5
On 11th May 1967 a decree was issued by the local Spanish leadership on 
the establishment of the People’s Assembly (Jemma), whose members were 
partly delegated by the authorities and partly elected by the people.6 This was 
an attempt to maintain Spanish influence over the region although between 
1967 and 1973 the UN repeated its previous resolution on the right of native 
people to autonomy and a referendum.7
With reference to the UN Resolution of 14th December 1972 the rightfulness 
of the establishment of the Sahara Arabic Democratic Republic was justified 
by the Memorandum of the Polisario issued on 20th May 1976. 
The Resolution confirmed the “special responsibility of the UN” for the 
organisation of a referendum and the expression of the “unalienable right of 
the peoples of Sahara to independence” was read four times in the text. 
Stating that the nomadic way of life of the majority of the population 
complicates the organisation of a referendum the Spanish authorities delayed 
its declaration for several years. Both the Mauritanian and Moroccan 
Governments benefited from this attitude as they could use the time at their 
disposal for gaining the support of the members of the Jemma. 
On 21st September 1973 the Jemma was provided the basic rights for 
exercising legislative power by the Spanish Government and General Franco 
made a promise to allow the population of Western Sahara to make a free 
decision on their future when they wish to do so.8
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In July 1974 a new Constitution for Western Sahara was declared by Spain, 
which significantly increased the responsibilities of the Jemma. Then, a mere 
6 weeks later, it was also declared that the referendum would be conducted in 
the first semester of 1975.9 
As part of the plan, a census of those with a right to vote was conducted 
resulting in a figure of 73,497 although a part of the nomads living in the 
desert could not be reached, therefore, they could not be put on the list of 
voters either. This referendum is not uninteresting at all, as the Polisario, the 
Government of Morocco and various UN organisations regularly refer to its 
outcomes. 
All tribes living in Spanish Sahara were involved in the 1974 census. 
On the basis of their geographic location, and social status the Saharawians 
were divided into different groups. These were called: Arabs, Tekna, Chorfa, 
Zuaias and Znaga, or Tribus Costeras. 
The differentiation between tribes was made as follows: one letter stood 
for each tribe depending on their population in the territory. 
Reguibat was the biggest tribe (over 50% of the registered Saharawians 
belonged to that), and both groups of the tribe were marked with a separate 
letter. Although Reguibats are regarded as a single tribe their two groups 
(Sarg and Sahel) were dealt with independently by the Spanish as they highly 
emphasised their different features. 
As a result of the census, the seven biggest tribes were marked with letters 









The map below shows the location of various tribes during the Spanish 
census: 
Source: IDC Centre, Layoune
The remaining 103 tribes were grouped on the basis of their geographical 
location in accordance with the following:11
a) Tribes originally inhabiting areas north of river Draa but with descendants 
migrating to the Sahara region. These tribes (Tribus del Norte), i.e. the 
Northern Tribes, were marked with letter H and consisted of the following 
ones: Yagout, Ait Musa Ould Ali, Ould bou Aita, Ait Ba Amran, Escarna 
and other minor tribes (Tribus Varias).
b) Tribes of Zuaia and Chorfa descent were the following: Ahel Sejk Ma el 
Ajnin, Filala, Toubalt, Ahel Berical-la, Tendega and Oulad Bou Sbaa. 
c) Fishing or shepherd tribes living along the Atlantic coast (Tribus costeras 
y del Sur) made to pay tax by stronger tribes. These came originally from 
the southern part of the Sahara (Mauritania, Niger, etc.), such as: Foicat, 
Imeraguen, Le Menasir, Mejjat, Idegob and other coastal tribes.
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Thus letter codes from A to G marked tribes and the codes were further 
modified into combinations marking sub-tribes and clans. Clans were 
given the letter codes of their tribes and a two-digit number resulting in the 
registration of several small groups under the same combination of letters and 
numbers. (Code H61 e.g. was shared by 17 tribes).12
The results of the census in the case of tribes marked with letters A and G 
were as follows: 
A – Reguibat Sarg (4 sub-tribes and 26 clans)  20,275
B – Reguibat Sahel (7 sub-tribes and 39 clans)  18,239
C – Izarguien  (2 sub-tribes and 10 clans)    7,984
D – Ait Lahsen  (3 sub-tribes and 13 clans)    3,540
E – Arousien  (2 sub-tribes and 9 clans)    2,858
F – Oulad Delim  (5 sub-tribes and 20 clans)    5,382
G – Oulad Tidrarin (15 clans)     4,842
Total:       63,120
Categories marked with letters H, I, or J were added another two digits 
referring to sub-tribes and not to clans. 
H – Northern tribes (29 tribes)     3,373
I – Chorfa and Zuaia  (6 tribes)     4,631
J – Coastal tribes  (68 tribes)     2,361
Total:       10,363
In the case of these tribes there are no precise data on clans and most of 
them could not be registered as they had no names of their own. 
In 1974 during the Spanish census every person in their reach was registered. 
However, not every registered person (73,497)13 belonged to the Saharawians, 
therefore, three more categories were created:
Spanish      20,156
Allies          548
People temporarily in the area       857
Thus, the final result of the census in 1974 was 95,058 persons.14 The 
Spanish were marked with letter Z and although they were also put on the list 
approved by the UN they had no right to vote. 
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Under the title ‘Allies’ persons were marked with country codes indicating 
their home state, such as: MAU, ALG, MAR, GUI, MAL, SEN (Mauritania, 
Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Mali or Senegal).
Although these persons were listed by the 1974 census they were not 
included in the list compiled by the UN. Nevertheless, several of them 
indicated their intention to participate in the referendum on the future of the 
region, making negotiating parties agree that a person recognised by any of 
the tribal leaders as one belonging to their tribe can have full right to vote. 
Of course, this decision was first disputed by Morocco but when later it was 
assured that these were only voters in the Spanish-organised referendum 
and not their descendants tensions were decreased.
The third group comprised persons temporarily staying in Spanish 
Sahara and since most of them were of Saharawian descent and lived in 
the area they were registered by the UN as full right voters.15 Naturally, 
there had been heated discussions within even the department preparing the 
referendum and the final decision was made on the basis of the advice of 
the first head of the Registration Office established by MINURSO, Gabriel 
Miliev. 
Temporary settlers were marked with letter code K:
K – Temporary settlers in the area (10 groups) 857
The figure below shows the results of the referendum: 
Source: IDC Centre, Layoune
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After the census was accomplished the Jemma was summoned by Governor 
of El-Aaiun in 1973-74 M. Fernando de Santiago y Diaz de Mendevil, in order 
to discuss issues related to the organising of the referendum. 
139 members of the Tribal Council arrived in the town of El-Aaiun in the 
composition below:
Reguibat tribe, 43 representatives•	
Ouled Delim tribe, 23 representatives•	
Aroussiyine tribe, 11 representatives•	
Izerguiyine tribe, 21 representatives•	
Ouled Tidrarine tribe, 13 representatives•	
Ait Lahcene tribe, 7 representatives•	
Ahel Sejk Ma El-Ainin tribe, 5 representatives•	
Ait Moussa tribe, 2 representatives •	
Ahel Barik-Allah tribe, 2 representatives•	
Filala tribe, 1 representative•	
Toubbalt tribe, 1 representative•	
Tandha tribe, 1 representative•	
Ouled Bou Sbaa tribe, 1 representative•	
Ouled Bou Aita tribe, 1 representative•	
Ait Ba Amrane tribe, 1 representative•	
Skarna tribe, 1 representative•	
Yagout tribe, 1 representative•	
Lafoulkai tribe, 1 representative•	
Imraguen tribe, 1 representative•	
Lemmaur tribe, 1 representative•	
Mejjat tribe, 1 representative•	
The Council unanimously supported the Spanish leadership and approved 
its plans on the future of the area.16
The Moroccan leadership hoped that as a result of the referendum Western 
Sahara would unite with the Kingdom but due to the changes in the political 
situation in Spain Morocco could not rely on Spanish support. Thus, King 
Hassan II contacted the International Court of Justice in The Hague (on 17th 
September). He also promised not to impede the work of the UN commission 
analysing the situation in Western Sahara. 
Consequently, on 13th December 1974 UN Resolution 3292 (XXIX.) was 
approved on the postponement of the referendum, on the establishment of a 
board of enquiry and on consulting the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague. After large-scale preparations and organising activities the delegation 
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visited Western Sahara, Madrid, and the capitals of neighbouring countries 
between 8th May and 9th June 1975.17
Governor of the Sahara Territories General Gomez de Salazar wanted 
to exclude even the chances of a pro-Polisario demonstration, therefore, 
everyone involved in anti-Spanish policy was removed from the town. At the 
arrival of the delegation thousands of local people were gathered to be waving 
the symbols of Spanish-supported PUNS Party along the highway between 
the airport and the town. However, the Governor was shocked when they left 
the airport for the town with the Head of the Delegation, UN Ambassador of 
Ivory Coast Simon Ake because the crowd that had cheered for the Spanish 
before threw away PUNS symbols and began to wave Polisario flags and 
symbols. Wherever the delegation went the following weeks the Polisario and 
its supporters organised mass rallies and demonstrations while the Spanish 
were only supported by a weakening PUNS Party. 
The biggest pro-Polisario demonstration was held in El Aaiun on 13th May 
and even Spanish papers reported on over 15,000 demonstrators supporting 
the opposition organisation. 
Not only the representatives of the Spanish Government but ordinary 
Spanish people were also surprised by the level of commitment of people. 
These emotions generated counteractions and the Spanish population upset 
by the pro-Polisario demonstrations and denouncing the organisation sang 
falanquist songs “Arriba Espana” and “Viva la Légion” on the rooftops of the 
European quarter. Later, on 15th May more than 200 Spanish women held a 
demonstration in front of the building of the Governor’s Office demanding 
that the Governor should silence terrorist supporters.18
PUNS leaders were similarly shocked by the events and the losing of their 
seemingly strong leading role. They managed to hold their positions in Villa 
Cisneros (Dakhla) only where they demonstrated separately from independence 
supporters but in the same place. This was the only town where the Commission 
had negotiations with local PUNS leaders representing various positions even 
within the Party as far as the future of the region was concerned. Some of them 
envisioned their common future under Spanish rule while others supported the 
idea of an independent state.19 It was the opinion of the leader of PUNS that 
changed the most. When Khalihenna Ould Rashid realised that his Party had 
lost its firm leading position in local political life and its Spanish allies did not 
represent a solid background and safe support he immediately changed his 
previously stable opinion. Until that time he envisaged the future of the area 
in co-operation with the Spanish and labelled Moroccan territorial demands 
a nightmare. Nevertheless, on the night of 18th May he and two of his closest 
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colleagues left El Aaiun and visited Hassan II in Casablanca. Two days later the 
party leader who escaped from his party took the oath to the King in the name 
of the Saharawians and denounced the Polisario as a dangerous communist 
organisation.20 Apart from him only former Mayor of El Aaiun removed by the 
Spanish took the oath (bayaa) to the King of Morocco. 
The reason is that Saharawian leaders considered anything better than 
unification with Morocco. That may be the reason why PUNS suggestions 
were not regarded important by the UN Commission, which did not deal 
with the issue in depth. Ake, and his Cuban and Iranian fellow diplomats 
toured Western Sahara, where they got convinced that a significant part of 
Saharawians did not wish to support Spanish rule and wanted an independent 
state. 
After the week-long thorough fact-finding mission the Commission 
submitted a report to the UN, which included the following: 
“the co-operation with Spanish authorities allowed the Commission 
to visit every major centre in spite of the very limited timeframe at its 
disposal and collect information on the position of local population. 
Everywhere the Commission went was met with political mass 
demonstrations. The Commission had meetings with the representatives 
of all of the communities of the Sahara. All this made the Commission 
clearly understand that there is a major agreement among the people of 
the Sahara on the issue of independence.”21
Almost simultaneously with the visit two platoons of local soldiers serving 
in the Spanish Army (Troopas Nomadas) rebelled against their officers on 10th 
and 11th May. An officer resisting was killed, then, the rest of Spanish officers 
and soldiers were locked up in the prison and the rebels joined Polisario troops 
with their weapons.22 The unit participated in a field exercise near Mehaires 
in the Gourellia Mountains. The atmosphere was extremely tense all the time 
and officers checked the personnel more rigorously but a part of the NCOs 
took also the soldiers’ side. 
Resting and unable to significant resistance type of officers were disarmed 
at the time of siesta. I was told the history of the incident by a former junior 
NCO serving in the Spanish Army and participating in the mutiny, currently 
Head of Personnel Department of the 4th Military District (Mehaires). On the 
third day after the mutiny guerrillas fighting against Spanish rule attacked the 
Police Station in Guelta Zemmour and captured the Saharawian Commander 
after the police officers changed sides. As a response to this event some 200 
soldiers of the nomadic troops were arrested and accused of co-operation with 
rebels by the Spanish authorities.
Nevertheless, the Polisario control over the desert area further increased.On 
27th May armed members of the organisation attacked a local police unit (Policia 
Territorial) near Ain Ben Tili and captured 14 local police officers. Then, on 
14th June the entire personnel of the Guelta Zemmour police station joined the 
insurgents after those had taken the building of police station in a raid.23
These events significantly impeded the Spanish authorities in keeping the 
real situation secret from the Commission, and it was also clear that local 
population did not wish to remain a part of the Spanish Kingdom as a colony 
or an overseas county. When the Commission visited Spain and the countries 
neighbouring Western Sahara (Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) its members 
unanimously came to the conclusion that the area should be provided with the 
right to autonomy. Of course, there were several plans on the transition, and 
the seemingly final version was agreed upon at the meeting of the Head of the 
Commission and Polisario leader El-Vali Mustafa Sayed on 29th May.24
In accordance with the plan the Spanish were first to hand over public 
administration to a “National Council”, then, parallel with their gradual 
withdrawal from the area the right of control over the area was to be handed 
over to Polisario fighters. The UN was to supervise the entire process and to 
exercise the right of protector over the region. 
Since Moroccan and Mauritanian territorial demands were also 
unanimously rejected by the local population the Commission suggested that 
local people should be able to independently make a decision on their future.25 
Then, it was only the statement of the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague that the UN needed.
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The Decision of The inTernaTional courT of 
JusTice (icJ) in The hague
Since the report of the UN Visiting Mission was not favourable for 
Morocco it officially turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
order to ask for the “re-annexation” of Western Sahara. At the same time 
Morocco was also trying to exert influence on the Saharans. The armed 
members of the “Movement for Free Unification” (Frente de Liberacion y 
de la Unidad-FLU) which they established in February 1975 and financed 
conducted several terrorist attacks against Spanish soldiers and Sahrawi 
civilians on Saharan territory.1
Before the arrival of the UN Visiting Mission they attacked the 
military checkpoint in the village of Jdiriya, then, they fired at two 
Spanish patrol aircrafts and shot dead a Sahrawi businessman as he was 
returning home. The organisation did not target only Spanish but also 
Polasario sympathizers especially when they did not have any chance to 
defend themselves. Eventually, the Spanish authorities had enough of the 
actions of the FLN and started to organise a preventive military action.
A double agent paid by the Spanish as well falsely informed the 
leadership of the FLN that the Spanish fort in Mahbas was guarded only 
by 4-5 soldiers while the others were searching for Polisario guerrillas in 
the mountains. The gunmen of the organisation walked into the brilliant 
trap and all of them (44 fighters) were captured by the Spanish. The 
captives possessed documents which proved beyond doubt that the terror 
attacks were financed and directed by the Moroccan government. Among 
the captives there was a Moroccan captain (Abba el-Seikh) as well as 
several other NCOs and soldiers. The Spanish protested officially, but 
the attacks continued until a Spanish patrol near Hagounia eliminated a 
more than 20-strong unit where several leaders of the FLN were taken 
captive. Since the organisation lost a significant part of the leadership and 
the Spanish almost fully closed down the Moroccan-Saharan border with 
troops relocated from the Canary Islands, the organisation could not carry 
out any more serious actions.2
As a response, the Moroccan leadership amassed troops in the 
border region, the strength of which was estimated at 25,000 by Spanish 
intelligence sources.3 The Spanish being concerned that they would lose 
even their remaining influence on the territory, initiated secret talks with 
the leaders of the Polisario on a peaceful takeover and suggested that 
PUNS, Djemaa and the Polisario should be unified.4
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Although some of the leaders of PUNS and Djemaa started talks with 
the Polisario, they were not able to put an end to the lack of confidence 
that had already existed, and as a consequence, it was impossible for these 
organisations to join forces.
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pedro cortina Y Mauri was also 
involved in the secret talks with the Polisario.5
The Saharans made an offer according to which Spain could use the 
phosphate mines free of charge for another 20 years as well as a significant 
part of the fishing rights. In return, the Spanish set free 23 jailed Polisario 
activists together with the 7 guerrillas who attacked the Fosbucraa mine and 
the organisation was semi-officially recognised.6
The co-operation between the organisation that was illegal until that point 
and Spain sealed the fate of PUNS, which had become completely insignificant 
by that time. Finally, on 10th October the representatives of the former leading 
Sahrawi party officially joined the Polisario in the presence of the members 
of Djamaa and the mandated members of the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) 
(Khatri Ould Said Ould el-Joumani és Saila Ould Abeida), although the two 
parties got united only later.7
The Polisario also made attempts to convince Mauritania to side with them 
and they offered President Mokhtar Ould Daddah to establish a federal state 
which would unify the two territories under his leadership.8
However, the Mauritanian President was convinced that they would not 
to be able to stop the Moroccans and that the ICJ would also support their 
territorial demands, so he chose to co-operate with Morocco. 
Soon after he had a meeting with the Moroccan King and after receiving his 
guarantees that Morocco would withdraw its territorial claims to Mauritania, 
he assured King Hassan II of his full support.9
Eventually, the week before the Court’s decision the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian diplomats basically managed to win the acceptance of 
the neighbouring countries (except for that of Algeria), according to 
which by the end of the year Western Sahara would be returned to the 
Kingdom of Morocco.
In December 1974 the representatives of the UN member states held a vote 
on the questions to be submitted to the Court, but Morocco and Mauritania 
had already reached an agreement on the summit meeting in Rabat (26–29 
October 1974) on how to divide the territory, as well as on their common 
standpoint in the UN.10
Although Spain suggested that the Court should also take a stand on 
the question of decolonisation and self-determination the Moroccan and 
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Mauritanian proposals where adopted with 81 votes for, 43 abstentions and 
no vote against them.
The UN requested the Court’s Advisory opinion on the following questions:
1. Was Western Sahara a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius) at the 
time of colonisation by Spain? 
2. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? 
The International Court of Justice requested the official documents for the 
investigation to be handed in and started the proceedings on 25th June 1975. 
Four months later, on 16th October 1975, only two days after the findings of the 
UN Commission for Western Sahara was made public, the Court announced 
its decision.11
According to the Court, the Moroccan evidence concerning common 
history “was not sufficient to prove that there had ever been de facto Moroccan 
authority over the territory”. On the basis of the evidence presented, the Court 
decided that as there was no proof that Morocco had ever collected taxes on 
the territory, there was nothing to prove Moroccan authority.12
During his 1882 and 1886 campaigns the Sultan of Morocco did not even 
reach the Draa River not to mention Western Sahara. At the same time there 
was no evidence to prove that the Raguibat tribe had accepted the authority of 
the Sultan to the contrary of what the Moroccan documents claimed. The fact 
that Sheikh El-Ajnin requested help from the Moroccan ruler does not prove 
the recognition of Moroccan authority either. 
However, the Court accepted a possible explanation that the Moroccans 
could have exercised authority over some nomadic tribes in Western Sahara 
and South Morocco through the Kaids who lived in the border region. (For 
Morocco this sentence was the reference for occupying Western Sahara, in spite 
of the fact that no international organisation recognised its right to do so.)13
As for the international agreements, the Court considered that they “did 
not prove the international recognition of Moroccan territorial sovereignty 
over Western Sahara at the time of Spanish colonisation”. 
The Mauritanian claim was also rejected by the Court on the basis that 
in spite of the existence of different emirates and tribes on the territory of 
Mauritania there had never been a strong central power, i. e. “It had no 
recognisable legal entity”. The opinion of the Court was that irrespective 
of facts, even if the two countries had historical rights, they could not have 
any territorial demands because in accordance with modern international 
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jurisdiction the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people enjoyed 
precedence over anything else.
The court voted twice on the decision; first, the result was 14 to 1 and after 
that 15 to 1.14 This way the UN and the International Court of Justice reached 
the same conclusion.
The involved countries reacted almost immediately to the decision. Spain 
declared that it was content with it, while Mauritania felt that the Court had 
reiterated its legal claims over the Saharan territory. 
Morocco only acknowledged the first part of the decision which stated 
the possible connection between the Kaids and some nomadic tribes. In 
terms of Islamic law this was on expression of sovereignty and in conclusion 
there was no need for a referendum to integrate Western Sahara into the 
Kingdom of Morocco.15
Nevertheless, the world was taken by surprise when on the day the Court’s 
decision was made public, King Hassan II announced that he would start a 
peaceful march towards Western Sahara with the participation of 350,000 
people.16
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The Green March and SubSequenT evenTS
When Hassan II announced the “Green March”, his hidden purpose was to 
prepare the invasion of Western Sahara. The announcement was met with 
enthusiasm and by the end of October already 600,000 people registered 
for participating in the march.1 Tarfaya, which was 30 kms from the 
border, was declared as starting point.2 The Spanish Government, taking 
into account the imminent death of Franco (he had got another serious 
heart attack) would have liked to find a solution, so when they found out 
about the action they requested the Security Council to convene in order 
to prevent the intervention against the territory. However, the UN only 
asked the parties to display self-restraint, i.e. “to avoid any unilateral step 
or any other action which would aggravate the situation”.3
The members of the Polisario and Jemma asked the Spanish authorities 
officially to prevent the planned invasion of the territory even by use of 
force. Jemma leader Khatri Ould Said Ould el-Joumani in an interview 
given for a Spanish newspaper stated that the Saharawians would fight 
the Moroccans to the end. The leader of the PUNS, Dueh Sidna Naucha 
initiated negotiations with the Spanish and offered the active participation 
of the local population in the fight against the Moroccans if the Spanish 
provide them with weapons. The Moroccan threat brought the hostile 
parties together, the Spanish living in the Sahara as well as PUNS and 
Polisario representatives were willing to fight against the invaders.4
On 2nd November Crown Prince Juan carlos, who by that time had 
been appointed temporary Head of State, paid a short visit to El-Aaiun, 
where he inspected the Spanish troops and stated that “Spain would 
fulfil its commitments in Western-Sahara”.5 However, the next day he 
had talks with Moroccan Prime Minister ahmed Osman in Madrid 
where they made arrangements about further talks. The UN statement 
was interpreted by Morocco as encouragement and on 5th November the 
King announced in his radio speech in Agadir that he would start the 
march the next day. As a response, the local Spanish governor, General 
Gomez de Salazar held a press conference and claimed that “the Spanish 
military would perform its duty and would face the participants of the 
march if they tried to cross the line of defence couple of kilometres from 
the border”. 
The soldiers in the Spanish Legion, together with the soldiers of the 
Saharan units still loyal to the Spanish were put on alert by the order of 
the General.
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The urgently convened UN Security Council approved a resolution which 
disapproved the march and called on Morocco to immediately withdraw 
the action from the territory of Western Sahara. Furthermore, the Council 
asked all the parties in the conflict to co-operate on the basis of previous UN 
resolutions.6
In its statement the following day the Spanish government declared that 
“peace was what it would like first and foremost, but not at any cost.” The 
peaceful aggression continued, and on 6th November the participants of the 
march crossed the border and penetrated 12 kms deep into Spanish-Saharan 
territory.7
More than 40,000 people were camping in the desert; they were followed 
by other tens of thousand. Organising the march and providing logistics was a 
serious challenge for the Moroccan leadership, but through great efforts they 
managed to provide for the participants. The National Office ordered complete 
traffic restriction on the whole territory of Southern Morocco and only vehicles 
transporting food, water and other provisions for the participants were allowed 
on the roads. During the march 7,813 lorries and 230 ambulances (470 doctors) 
were on duty. As the military did not have enough vehicles the King ordered 
the civilian transportation companies to provide their vehicles and drivers for 
free during the march. From Tarfaya the aircraft of the Moroccan Air Force 
airlifted the provisions for the masses. Because of the presence of the Spanish 
military they did not want to risk sending the almost entirely military vehicle 
convoy into Spanish-Saharan territory. 
The aircraft provided the participants of the march with 23,000 tons of 
water, 17,000 tons of food and 2,590 tons of fuel. According to the calculations 
of the Moroccan government, financing the Green March cost the state 80 
million French Francs (8 million Pounds) without the additional expenses. 
Some of the political analysts were of the opinion that the march had been 
organised months before, as the movement and logistic support of such a mass 
of people would have been impossible in a few days. 12.5% of the participants 
(43,500 people) were state employees and the full support and security of the 
march was provided by the military and the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie 
(Gendarmie Royale).8
According to the official Moroccan point of view, the march was prompted 
by the spontaneous indignation of the people as well as by their concern for the 
Saharan territories and people, which had been part of Morocco for centuries. 
Irrespective of how it happened, it was a brilliant trick from the King to force 
the Spanish to withdraw this way, as they would not have had the chance to 
defeat them by military force. (At that time, the Spanish had a 302,000-strong 
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well-trained and well-equipped force, while the Moroccans had a 61,000-
strong poorly-trained and a poorly-equipped force.) 
With this move the king made both his opponents and the most dissatisfied 
major officers of the army silent (during 1971-72 two coups and assassination 
attempts were committed against the king by some army officers, both 
resulting in failure).
The trick also reduced the internal opposition to silence, as in that 
emotionally heightened situation it would have been very dangerous to oppose 
the King.9 The King, who was considered less religious up to that time, became 
the unifying force of the breakaway territories and the leader of the followers 
of the true faith (amir al-muminin).10 The King called the participants ‘divine 
fighters’ (mujahideen), and as a result, the incited mass would have taken the 
fight with the Quran in their hands against the Spanish colonisers in exchange 
for earthly and other-worldly compensations.11
The King compared the march to the return of Prophet Mohammed from 
his exile in Medina to Mecca and this is how he encouraged the participants: 
“May the sacred book of Allah be our only weapon in this fight”.12
By the time the King arrived in Tarfaya the whole Moroccan population 
supported him and Moroccan pop star Jil Jilala, who did not appreciate him 
too much before that, wrote a song about him and the march. The song was on 
the first place of the Moroccan pop charts for several weeks.13
But the Spanish civilians living on the territory of the Sahara and the 
soldiers serving there felt that the Spanish Government betrayed them and let 
them down. Not only them, but even most of the generals and high-ranking 
officers loyal to Franco were against handing over Spanish Sahara to Morocco 
and Mauritania.14 Unfortunately, the person who could have given guidance, 
old Caudillo got ill at the 17th October government session and had several 
heart attacks during the following week. Although his followers stood by 
his politics, and Franco was already in coma, those who were against the 
agreement started to falter and did not dare to take action. It is true that those 
days the danger that the military could appoint a new head of state instead 
of agonising Franco was real. This would have meant that Franco’s era could 
have stayed with small corrections though. The new King and the forces 
loyal to him recognised this fact and by acting quickly and decisively they 
did not give any chance to the old system. They reached agreements with the 
leaders who were considered to be the most dangerous for the new system 
and convinced the majority of the still undecided generals and high-ranking 
officers to take sides with them. This way the military could not represent a 
unified standpoint on the issue of the Saharan territories.15
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The King was supported by those leading politicians as well as those 
who even under Franco had a good relationship with the Moroccan ruler, 
for example arias navarro, the leader of the Council of Ministers, antonio 
carro Martinez, the Minister for President’s Office and José ruiz, one of 
the leaders of the Falange Party. These politicians convinced the young King 
that their militarily and diplomatically weakened country would not be able 
to handle the economic boycott of Morocco and other Arab states turning 
against them. An eventual war would pose a serious threat for the 18,000 
strong Spanish community in Morocco.
Through diplomatic channels the Moroccans gave a signal to the Spanish 
that in case they supported the independent state of the Saharawians, they 
would immediately reclaim the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and would even 
use force to get them back. The military leaders loyal to the King thought that 
fighting a successful war would have been impossible because of the division 
and conditions of the Armed Forces.
General Gomez de Salazar later on in 1978 felt aggrieved that before 
signing the Madrid Agreement nobody had consulted him, in spite of the 
fact that he had started negotiations with Polisario representatives about 
the peaceful handover of the territory with the backing of the Spanish 
government.16 According to the General, if the Moroccan troops had attacked 
 them, they would have destroyed them within 48 hours in such a special 
situation. 
On 29th October, when Franco was administered the last unction by the 
representative of the Catholic church, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs 
ahmed Laraki started secret negotiations with the members of the Spanish 
diplomacy. That very same day Laraki and Carro Martinez agreed that the 
Spanish would demilitarise a 10-km stripe on Saharan territory where the 
participants would symbolically enter, but they would leave it in 48 hours. 
This way none of the parties would have suffered any loss of prestige as 
consequence of an eventual retreat. By the end of the month Laraki was 
joined by Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, who was in charge of the logistic support 
of the “Green March”, Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamdi Ould 
Mouknass as well as by other Moroccan and Mauritanian diplomats.
As the talks with the Spanish government on handing over the territory 
reached the final phase, on 9th November 1975 the Moroccan King ordered 
the participants to go home since the march had achieved its aim. By that 
time there were approximately 350,000 Moroccans in the desert for whom 
the possibility to reach Western Sahara meant getting to the Promised Land. 
The King managed to convince these people to retreat from the territory that 
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was still ruled by Spain. He offered the participants settlement on the Saharan 
territory, which would later be taken under control by Morocco, as well as he 
mentioned land at a reduced price to these people, and this way he managed to 
calm down the initial indignation of the masses.
On 11th November the negotiations between the Spanish, Moroccan and 
Mauritanian governments was announced, and three days later the Madrid 
Accords were signed, which divided Western Sahara between Morocco and 
Mauritania and the Spanish announced their final retreat.17
During the period of negotiations the units of the Spanish Foreign Legion, 
the Spanish Naval Infantry, Airborne and Police units in the city of El Aaiun 
surrounded the districts where locals lived and started collecting weapons 
and arrested those who demanded independence. Local soldiers serving the 
Spanish (Troopas Nomadas, Policia Territorial and members of the Spanish 
Legion) were disarmed and disbanded. The governor of the territory took 
discriminatory measures against the local people, for instance, he prohibited 
petrol stations from selling petrol to the local people. The Spanish military 
leadership set down immediately to work out the Golondrina Evacuation Plan 
of the civil population, then, they reinforced the defence of phosphate mines, 
important buildings and they started evacuating the garrisons in the desert.18
By 8th November more than 12,000 civilians had been evacuated from 
the territory by sea and air to the Canary Islands. Spanish merchants sold 
their shops with stocks and state-run schools were closed down because of the 
lack of teachers. The Spanish even transported their animals from the zoo to 
Almeria, exhumed their relatives buried in local cemeteries and transported 
the remains to the Canary Islands, where they reburied them.19 So, by the 
time the parties announced the Madrid Accords, there had been no Spanish 
citizens in the territory of once Spanish Sahara except for the armed forces 
and civil servants. 
On 12th November leader of Polisario Front El-Vali announced that the 
Madrid Accords are considered null (15th November), while independently of this 
Hassan II announced on 15th November that he had closed the Western Sahara 
file and appointed Ahmed Bensouda governor of the territory in El-Aaiun. 
As for the Polisario, the King stated that their leaders were unable to pull 
together the almost 60,000 Saharawians and they could stage actions only 
with the help of mercenaries who were unable to fight a desert war against the 
well-trained Moroccans. This is why the organisation itself did not pose any 
threat to the state of Morocco. He made this statement being aware of the fact 
that the approximately 2,500 local troops and policemen previously hired by 
the Spanish joined the Polisario with their weapons.20
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In the UN camp at Megaries Mehdi, one of the cooks who had been member 
of the Territorial Police in El-Aaiun joined the rebels together with the others 
after the retreat of the Spanish. According to him, the Spanish let them down 
and he would have still served them if they had not retreated. 
Many more of the soldiers like him serving now in Polisario units but who 
used to serve with the Spanish Legion, with the Saharan nomad troops or the 
local police before, applied for a rent of merit to the Spanish Government. In 
accordance with the current negotiations, the Spanish government would pay 
service rent to all those who had served at least 10 years in any of the armed 
units established and led by Spain. 
Subsequently, the Moroccan military started their entry into Western 
Sahara and Spain announced that in a couple of months they would end civil 
administration on the territory (only Franco could have protested because of 
the Moroccan occupation but he died on 20th November). The situation was 
further complicated by the fact that on 28th November in Guelta the Jemma 
dissolved itself in spite of the fact that according to the three-party agreement 
the council was intended to play a significant role in settling the situation.21
A delegation of people living in former Spanish Sahara held a press 
conference organised by the Polisario in Algiers on 6th December. The Deputy 
President of Jemma together with 56 other representatives were also part of 
the delegation (three of them were also members of the Spanish Parliament, 
the Cortes). The Secretary General of Jemma declared their joint proclamation 
on the dissolution of the Council and the establishment of the 41-strong 
Saharawian Interim National Council. The statement was signed by the 67 
members of Jemma as well as by several tribal leaders.22
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On the map you can see the territory divided between the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian governments in the Madrid Accords:
Source: Ieuan LL Griffiths: An Atlas of African Affairs. p. 93.
Since the Madrid Accords recognised Jemma as the official representative 
of the Saharawians, by dissolving the Council the Saharawians deprived 
Morocco of the possibility to use the organisation for its own purposes and the 
other signatories of the Accords were also put into an embarrassing situation. 
“The views of the Saharan population, expressed through Jemma, will be 
respected.” (Article 3)23
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It was under these circumstances that on 10th December the UN passed 
two resolutions that partly contradicted each other.24
The first Resolution (3458/A) reiterated the right to self-determination of the 
people of Western Sahara already present in previous resolutions, which stated 
that Spain and the UN are responsible for decolonising the territory.25 The 
resolution was passed with 86 votes for, 41 abstentions and no votes against.
The second Resolution (3458/B) acknowledged the three-party Madrid 
Accords and called on the signatories to ensure respect for the freely expressed 
aspirations of the Saharan population. At the same time it requested the 
Secretary General to appoint a representative who would supervise the free 
referendum.26 The situation in this case was not as clear as in the previous one 
because 56 countries voted for the resolution, 42 against it and 34 abstained. 
By the time the resolutions were passed, a significant part of Western Sahara 
was occupied by the Moroccans. 
97
The occupaTion of The Sahara TerriTorieS and 
The beginning of hoSTiliTieS
By the end of November 1975 the Moroccan army occupied a significant 
part of the Sahara territories.1 The invasion forces, in co-operation 
with the withdrawing Spanish army, launched the operation from two 
separate directions.
The objective of the units advancing along the coastline was to 
capture El-Aaiun and the phosphate mines at Bou Craa. According to 
the first official reports, the Moroccan forces penetrated Western Sahara 
100 kilometres deep, and on 28th November the second largest settlement, 
Smara, was also taken.2
In less than a month a 25,000-strong contingent, that is one third of the 
Moroccan Army, was stationed in the occupied Sahara territories. 15,000 
troops were deployed in the Saguia El-Hamra garrisons (Farsia, Jdiriya, 
Haousa, Smara), 5,000 men in El-Aaiun, and another 5,000 soldiers 
were stationed near the southern borders of former Spanish Sahara. The 
offensive went simultaneously with a mass migration of the population.3
On 11th December Moroccan units captured El-Aaiun (there was some 
Polisario resistance only in a few places although on 12th December a 
minor unit attacked the Moroccan troops in the town), while Mauritanian 
forces, launching their offensive occupied La Guerra, then, Tichla.
By the end of December the Spanish forces had gradually withdrawn 
from the town, on 28th December the airfield was handed over, then, on 
12th January 1976 the last of their soldiers left former Spanish Sahara 
when Villa Cisneros was abandoned.
Afterwards there were only 150 Spanish civil servants in El-Aaiun 
in order to implement and supervise the smooth handover of the public 
administration of the area. The last Spanish citizen who left the town in 
late February 1976 was Colonel Rafael de Veldes Iglesias and thus the 
Kingdom of Spain ceased to be a factor in Western Sahara.4
Local soldiers made redundant from Spanish military service joined 
their previous enemy, the Polisario, and established the Sahara Liberation 
Army for fighting Moroccan troops (SLA).5 In spite of the fact that ill-armed 
Western Saharans tried mostly to defend (and evacuate civil population), one 
of their minor units attacked the Mauritanian town of Zuerat as early as 29 
December. The town, also a mining centre, is located 400 kilometres from 
the capital deep in the desert. During the attack the infrastructure of the mine 
was damaged but the town itself was not occupied although it was defended 
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only by 60 Mauritanian troops. At that time the Mauritanian army had merely 
some 3,000 trained soldiers, 2,000 gendarmes and a few obsolete fighter planes, 
which made its units an easy target for Saharawian guerrillas, constantly harassing 
them. Former foreign legion fortress, the famous Ait Ben Tili, surrounded by 
Saharawian units, was also defended by Mauritanian forces. In order to help out 
defenders in dire straits President Ould Daddah requested combat planes from 
the Moroccan Air Force.
However, not even the Air Force was able to bring relief to the fortress, 
moreover, one of the Moroccan Northrop F-5s was downed by the guerrillas. 
Finally, the fortress was captured by Polisario troops on 21st January.6
In the following days insurgents attacked the towns of Bir Moghrein and 
Inal but despite the huge damage inflicted they were unable to capture them 
because of the concerted counterattacks of the Mauritanian army.
With French assistance the Mauritanian forces were reorganised and in 
the third week of December launched a counteroffensive near the border with 
Western Sahara. After a short but bloody battle they took the town of La 
Guerra and started to push back Polisario fighters and their civil supporters 
from the area (19th December).7 On the next day Tichla fell, but Argoub, a 
small town near Villa Cisneros was captured only on 11th January after a two-
week-long siege. The roughly 200 soldiers and civilians defending the town 
fought until the very last bullet and the Mauritanians managed to take only a 
few prisoners—seriously wounded soldiers—as the majority of defenders had 
gotten killed during the battle. Since that time Saharawians had had only one 
option: to flee.8
The refugees went first to the northern area of Western Sahara bordering 
Mauritania (Amgala, Guelta-Zemmour, Oum Dreiga, Tifariti, etc.), then, they 
were evacuated to Algeria with the assistance of the Algerian Army.9 Besides 
providing transportation to the refugees Algeria also supplied weapons, food, 
drinking water and medicine to Saharawian soldiers.10
As early as that time the first cracks in the Moroccan–Mauritanian 
Alliance appeared because the Moroccans were worried that the Mauritanian 
troops could not take Villa Cisneros on time and entered the town under the 
command of Colonel Dlimi. A Moroccan garrison was established there in 
spite of the fact that in accordance with the Madrid Agreement the town would 
be controlled by the Mauritanians. Although a Mauritanian administrative 
centre was set up in the town the real power was represented by Morocco.11
On 27th January 1976 Moroccan military units attacked an Algerian 
convoy at Amgala (first amgala battle) and the Algerian troops withdrew 
after a several-day battle, as they had suffered heavy casualties.12
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Thanks to its significant water supply Amgala is a very important place in 
the Saguia el-Hamra valley, where a Polisario logistics base was established 
with Algerian support. Refugees were provided with food and medicaments 
from this place, and they were also further transported to safe havens in 
Algerian territories. The unexpected Moroccan attack inflicted heavy damage 
to the Algerians and 99 of their soldiers were captured.13 The furious Algerian 
High Command demanded an immediate retaliation and the breakout of a 
war between the two countries were prevented by the bold and decisive action 
of Algerian President Boumedien. From that time the Algerian leadership 
increased its material support to the rebels but held back its troops from 
further clashes.14
The retaliation came fairly soon—between 13th and 15th February Polisario 
units defeated Moroccan troops in the second amgala battle.
As for the balance of power Moroccan and Mauritanian troops had 
superiority although the combat worthiness of the Mauritanian units equipped 
with French weapons and trained by French specialists was rather low.15 The 
rebel forces consisted of a few thousand volunteers equipped with small arms, 
mortars, and some antitank missiles and SAMs from the Algerian and Libyan 
armies.16 As the performance of the Moroccan troops in the desert was far 
from what Hassan II had expected from them the Moroccan Air Force raided 
the refugee camps in order to put an end to war in the quickest possible way. 
From 22nd February several air raids were launched against refugee camps 
Guelta-Zemmour, Tifariti, and Oum Dreiga. The bombings were approved 
by Colonel Dlimi and it was also him who approved the use of napalm bombs 
which are more efficient than conventional ones.17 However, those bombing 
raids were nearly inefficient from a military aspect as their victims were 
mostly children, women and elderly people.18
The Royal Moroccan troops also applied methods that had already 
been used by the Spanish before: poisoning wells, machine-gunning herds, 
looting civilian population, tortures, and even public executions.19 As a 
result of such events and atrocities, the mass migration of civil population 
accelerated. By the end of February the number of people, mostly children, 
women and elderly people living in refugee camps in Algeria had increased 
to more than 100,000.20
The Spanish troops were supposed to withdraw by 28th February 1976 but 
had left the area earlier, thus abandoning its population.
Although the UNHCR realised the desperate situation of refugees in camps 
it could not respond immediately, therefore, called on those sympathising with 
the Saharawians to help.
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The Algerian Government was not prepared to receive and supply so many 
refugees either, which led to critical medical and hygienic situation in the 
camps soon.
On the actual situation in the camps a report was compiled by the members 
of a Swiss group of medical doctors, who had arrived in the region with the 
help of the International Red Cross in order to support the refugees.21 This 
is how the members of the group—Dr. Elio Canevaschini, Dr. Emmanuel 
Martinoli, Dr. Marie-Claire Martinoli and Dr. Marc Oltramare—tell about 
their experience:
“We have the sensation that both the Algerian Government and the Red 
Cross are able to provide only limited assistance to the refugees, therefore, 
we regard the rapid international co-operation and immediate help to 
refugees of extreme importance. The number of refugees is growing 
by the day due to newcomers, and the majority of the mass of people 
is comprised by women, children and elderly people. The proportion of 
children under 15 is 45% and that of babies under 1 year is around 6-7%. 
The refugees are accommodated in 14 camps and their number is over 
70,000. Their accommodation poses a serious problem as 3-4 families 
share a tent. Due to infections and other diseases there is a grave risk 
of epidemics. Firewood is another serious problem as these people often 
have to go 200 kilometres for collecting firewood. Then, it is equally 
divided among the refugees but still there are some who lack firewood. 
Food supply also presents difficult problems as the monthly supply of a 
refugee is 6 kg of flour or wheat, 3 kg dried vegetables, 2 kg sugar, 2 kg 
powdered milk, 3 kg dates and 1 kg of tea. The refugees are living under 
very bad conditions—many of them are traumatised or suffering from 
burns from the bombings. They are treated by 3 doctors, 15 assistant 
doctors and a few enthusiastic volunteers.”
On the basis of the mandate provided by the General Assembly in December 
1975 un Secretary general Kurt Waldheim sent a special representative to 
Madrid, Rabat, Algiers and Western Sahara in order to initiate negotiations 
on the soonest possible implementation of UN Resolutions.22 His Special 
Envoy was Swedish UN diplomat olaf rydbeck, who started his work on 
7th February when he visited El-Aaiun, Smara and Dakhla. He was deeply 
shocked by the news on the events that took place in the territories occupied 
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by the Moroccan and Mauritanian forces (bombing of refugees, escalation of 
guerrilla war, etc.) and in his report clearly stated that on the basis of what he 
had seen it was impossible to organise a free referendum in Western Sahara. 
Thus, the tour of duty of the UNSG Special Envoy was unsuccessful and 
“Morocco could continue the reunification of the territories of Western Sahara 
to the motherland.”
On 16th February the Jemma was summoned (out of its 102 members 
57 came to the conference but not all of them supported the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian territorial demands),23 thus, the vacant seats of those supporting 
the rebels were handed over to representatives loyal to Morocco. The new 
Council sworn in to Hassan II but neither the UN, nor the Polisario, nor 
even Spain accepted the new Jemma as the legal representative body of the 
Saharawians since the genuine Jemma was dismissed in November 1975.24 
That time Spain submitted a report to the UNSG and declared a withdrawal 
from the territory.
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs oreja said on the events in an 
interview to Le Monde on 21st August 1979:
“We maintain good relations with Morocco, however, the interpretation of 
an international issue is different. Spain does not regard the 25th February 
1976 oath of the Jemma (in El-Aaiun) to the King of Morocco legally 
binding. The Jemma did have a meeting in order to receive information 
on the Madrid Agreement. During the session Jemma Members were 
requested to give a statement on the future of the area. Then, the Spanish 
Governor withdrew although his presence would have been important for 
making the Jemma Resolution legally binding. Afterwards Morocco and 
Mauritania divided the area, thus violating the Madrid Agreement, which 
had provisions on the public administration of Western Sahara and not 
on exercising sovereignty.”
Responding to the Moroccan measures President of the Sahara Interim 
National Council Uld Ziou on the main square of a refugee camp in Ait Ben Tili, 
near Bir Lahlou, declared the establishment of the Sahara Arab Democratic 
Republic at midnight 27th February.25 In front of celebrating people the black-
white-green flag (with a red triangle on the left side and a red crescent and a 
five-pointed star in the white part) of the new state was raised, then, Polisario 
leader El-Vali held a press meeting where he said:
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“The declaration of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic is the 
expression of the will of our people. It is also in concert with the UN 
Charter and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). We 
are ready to fight even for several generations since the King of Morocco 
intends to escalate the war.”
On 5th March 1976 Ahmed Baba Miske introduced the first Government 
of Western Sahara in Hotel Saint-Georges in Algiers. Madagascar was the 
first country to recognise the new state and later on another 78 countries 
followed suit.26 In spite of the fact that later, due to diplomatic pressure, many 
of them suspended the relations with the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, 
it keeps maintaining some official relations with 54 countries. However, the 
declaration of independence did not trigger many changes as the Moroccan 
Army continued to occupy the territory.
On 14th April 1976 the allied powers, occupying most of the territories, 
officially signed the treaty on the division of the area and on drawing a new 
border line between the two countries.27 Morocco received the two biggest 
towns, El-Aaiun and Smara, and the phosphate mines, thus increasing its areas 
by some 35%28 while Mauritania was given Villa Cisneros and a long section 
of the coast line with good fisheries, however, the inland area comprised only 
desert and nothing else.29 That is, the treaty on the division of the area clearly 
favoured Morocco.
103
After the DeclArAtion of inDepenDence – the 
escAlAtion of the conflict
Once the new state was declared the UN Secretary General decided to 
delegate the Swedish UN diplomat Olaf Rydbeck to help bring about a 
possible agreement. In his statement of 25th March 1976 the Secretary 
General detailed the purpose of the delegation: to obtain the opinions 
of the Moroccan and Mauritanian Governments about Resolution 3458 
of the General Assembly. The planned visit elicited strong objection in 
Moroccan public opinion, and the Swedish diplomat’s visit to the refugee 
camps in the vicinity of Tinduf on 31st March led to serious tension 
between Morocco and the UN.1
On 4th April 1976 Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed 
laraki informed the UN Secretary General that the special representative 
will not be authorised to continue his mission in Rabat.2 Shortly afterwards 
the Government of Mauritania also announced, that the diplomat’s visit 
would not be timely. Following these reactions, the Secretary General 
himself initiated negotiations with the UN ambassadors of the involved 
countries, but could not achieve any significant results. 
The Polisario re-opened hostilities. The series of attacks known as the 
May 20 offensive commenced in earnest on 11th May, when co-ordinated 
assaults were launched against El-Aaiun, Smara, Bou Kra, Bir Moghrein and 
Chinguetti, and damaged the phosphate-carrying conveyor-belt system.3
Before launching the offensive the Saharawians warned the foreign 
citizens working in the phosphate mines and the Mauritanian iron-ore 
mines that if they do not leave the area they would be treated as enemies. 
At that time over 280 highly-trained French experts, employees of 
COMINOR (Comptoir Minier du Nord) worked in the Mauritanian iron-
ore mines. The Mauritanians were supposed to guarantee their safety. 
The warning was labelled as a terrorist threat, and those affected did not 
take it seriously, so the attack against Mauritania’s capital, nouakchott, 
by Polisario units on 8 June 1976 was a serious surprise.4
The fact that a military unit of about 600 men was able to march 
unnoticed more than 1,000 km through enemy territory indicated a thorough 
knowledge of the terrain, and the support of the local population. The attack 
lasted nearly one hour; the selected targets (including the presidential palace) 
were subjected to mortar and machine gun fire. Some of the local units fled, 
but the Saharawians were not able to exploit their success because their 
leader, El-Vali Mustafa Sayed was also killed during the attack.5
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At the same time the Polisario also attacked tan-tan, Jdiria és Guelta-
Zemmour in the northern areas. At that time the Saharawians had already 
changed their tactics: they had realised that in the face of mechanised and well-
equipped Moroccan units they could not successfully defend the population 
centres still in their possession, and reverted to guerrilla warfare with which 
they were already familiar, and which had brought them greater success.
Since tribes related to the Saharawians lived throughout Mauritania and 
southern Morocco, they could count on support from a part of the population 
during nearly all of their attacks. Polisario units consisting of several hundred 
men could move with relative ease not only through the occupied territories, 
but on the territory of enemy states, as well. 
The Moroccans firmly held the towns and forts handed over by the Spain, 
but their supply lines were under constant attack. 
Mauritania, beset by economic and ethnic tensions, was the weaker of 
the two countries, therefore, the Polisario was more active in the territories 
occupied by itself, than in those occupied by Morocco.6
On 15th January 1976 President Oud Daddah appointed a trusted veteran 
politician, hamoud ould Abdel-Wedoud as Governor of the territories 
occupied by Mauritania.7 The new governor initiated an administrative 
reorganisation of the territory and turned it into a separate region called Tiris 
el-Gharbia, with Dakhla as its capital.8 The new region was subdivided into 
four districts (Dakhla, Awsard, Tichla and Argoub). 
They created three military districts in order to establish firmer control of 
the occupied territories. The headquarters of the first district was established 
in the town of Awsard; its commander was Colonel Viah Ould Mayouf, who 
had prepared the occupation of the territory and directed the war against the 
Polisario. The headquarters of the second district was deployed in Zouerat; 
its commander was Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif, who was 
responsible for Mauritania’s north-eastern territories. Bir Moghrein and 
Ain Ben Tili were under him also. The headquarters of the third district 
was established in Dakhla, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi was 
assigned to command it.9
About this time the task of settling the refugees in camps was completed, 
and the Saharawians could begin the systematic destruction of the financial 
institutions of the two occupying countries. 
In the spirit of the Sahara-Arab traditions—and due to low standards of 
training and a shortage of heavy weapons—the Polisario organised guerrilla 
operations (ghazzi). Their units (kataeb), equipped with Land Rovers and 
light personal weapons, would cover several hundreds of kilometres, deliver a 
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quick raid, then disappear.10 Since the Mauritanian desert is nearly twice the 
size of France, the military and law enforcement forces available to the local 
authorities were insufficient to keep the territory under control. 
Insurgent attacks made transportation of phosphate excavated from the 
Bou Craa mines impossible (between 1976 and 1979 the Fosbucraa company 
lost 1.722 billion Pesetas due to the attacks). The rail line connecting the 
Mauritanian iron-ore mines to the seaport was regularly damaged which 
caused serious problems to Mauritania, whose main source of earnings was 
iron-ore.11 The Mauritanian political leadership was shaken by the attacks, but 
they thought that the situation could be salvaged by some quick changes in the 
armed forces leadership.
Thus, the Chief of Staff was immediately dismissed. Lieutenant Colonel 
Ahmed ould Bouceif, commander of the second military district replaced him. 
This was the first time the Mauritanian leadership criticised the activities 
of the Moroccan army, since they had been expecting the Moroccans to start 
a counteroffensive against the Polisario. However, the Moroccans settled into 
defensive positions and did not pursue the Saharawians retreating into the 
Sahara. As a result, Polisario fighters launched attacks against the Mauritanian 
towns of nema and tisitt from territories occupied by Morocco.
Due to the escalating attacks the Mauritanian army’s strength was 
increased to 17,000 men (of these 10,000 officers, non-commissioned officers 
and soldiers belonged to the black minority; this would eventually generate 
serious tensions within the army and lead to several mutinies), and purchased 
modern weapons.12 Training of the new recruits was accelerated in the training 
centre established with French assistance in the town of Atar. However, none 
of these measures brought any significant success.13
In this auspicious military situation the III. Polisario Congress was held 
on 24th August 1976. In addition to the press, several official government 
delegations (Benin, Algeria, Bissau-Guinea, Libia and some others) also 
attended. Members of the former Jemma and the Deputy Secretary General of 
PUNS (Sahara National Unity Party) also participated. During the Congress 
the first Constitution of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was 
approved, which meant the final ratification of the draft the Sahara Provisional 
National Council had published in February. 
That was the time when new Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz was 
elected Head of the Council of Ministers. Although the delegates agreed to 
continue the armed struggle they also decided to commence a diplomatic 
offensive in order to inform the world on the real situation. As a result, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic hakim Brahim 
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even participated in the Geneva Congress of the Socialist International as an 
observer. Since every diplomatic contact was extremely important for the new 
state it tried to establish contacts with every country, regardless of its political 
leanings, in order to gain the broadest possible recognition. 
SADR representatives participated as an official delegation in the XIII. 
Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Port Louis (Mauritius), 
where 29 African countries voted for the Western Saharawians’ right to self 
determination, independence and territorial integrity. As a consequence of the 
voting, Morocco announced suspension of its activities in the organisation. 
The diplomatic offensive, launched with the assistance of Algeria, brought 
some success, since by the first half of 1977 the Western-Sahara state was 
recognised by nine African countries (Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, 
Bissau-Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ruanda and Togo).14
Naturally, as a result of this, they also tried to increase the effectiveness 
of military operations, thus, on 1st May 1977 the insurgents launched another 
attack against Zuerat in Mauritania. The town was defended by a garrison 
of nearly 1,000 men as well as a 60-km barrier of 3- to 5-metre-deep ditches 
reinforced with barbed wire. 
There were nearly 250 French miners (among them military advisers), 
employees of SNIM (Societé Nationale Industrielle et Miniére) and their 
families in the town. Although the expert responsible for their safety, 
Jean-charles eudeline had repeatedly recommended evacuation of the 
families his recommendations had been overruled. The guerrillas opened 
their attack at 05:00 o’clock with a co-ordinated mortar barrage. The attack 
lasted about four hours, during which the power station, the fuel tanks and 
the mining equipment were so heavily damaged that production had to be 
suspended for a while. During the battle two French experts were killed and 
six others were taken prisoner by the attackers. As a consequence to this, 
most French personnel and their dependents (altogether 449 persons) were 
evacuated to France.15
The suspension of production caused serious damage to the Mauritanian 
economy. At that time Mauritania was able to handle its problems stemming from 
the situation in Western Sahara only through military assistance from Morocco 
(as a result of the 13th May 1977 military agreement, some 10,000 well-trained and 
well-equipped Moroccan soldiers were stationed in Mauritanian territory), and 
financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.16
In spite of the freshly arrived Moroccan troops, Polisario units launched 
another attack against Nouakchott, then, after the successful operation they 
withdrew without losses. 
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The attacks generated protests from France. French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs louis de Guiringaud accused Algeria of organising the attacks, and 
demanded the release of Frenchmen taken prisoner. The Algerian leadership 
rejected the French accusation in an official communiqué. 
France then sent a 200-men military unit to secure the capital, and from 
the end of November strengthened the defence of the larger Mauritanian 
population centres with Jaguar strike aircraft from Dakar airbase (operation 
lamantin).17
The Mauritanian situation worried France because the country was a 
former French colony and belonged to their military and economic spheres 
of interest. Mauritania had emphasised separation from France after gaining 
independence (introduction of its own currency, Ouguiya, and nationalisation 
of the iron-ore mines), yet a thousand ties linked it to the former colonial 
power. When even the capital came under Polisario attack, the frightened 
president turned to the French leadership and requested their urgent assistance. 
A new military assistance and co-operation agreement was soon signed, and 
France sent fifteen military instructors to the Atar military academy, to assist 
in training Mauritanian officers. 
However, these steps only encouraged the guerrillas, who took two more 
French mining experts prisoner. Then, French president Giscard d’estaing 
immediately created a crisis team in the presidential palace in order to solve 
the situation as soon as possible. 
The crisis team included Minister of Defence Yvon Bourges, Minister for 
Co-operation between the Armed Services robert Galley, Chief of Staff of 
the French army General Guy Méry, and the president’s representative louis 
de Guiringaud. Calling on experts of the army and the intelligence services, 
the crisis team began to develop possible plans in the rooms of the headquarters 
beneath the Elysée Palace (COA-Centre Operationnel des Armées). 
Due to the high risk factor and difficulties in locating the French 
hostages, the Chief of Staff rejected the possibility of a commando-
style rescue operation. After a short debate his opinion was accepted by 
the other participants. General Méry then recommended negotiations to 
free the hostages, and at the same time deploying forces in Mauritania to 
defend French interests. The participants accepted the General’s plan and 
immediately started to execute it.18
Some of the French supersonic combat aircraft stationed at Oukkam 
airbase in Senegal were placed on alert, since they could reach Nouakchott’s 
airspace in less than 50 minutes. The unit of 1,300 French soldiers deployed 
at the airbase was reinforced by an extra 300 troops. During the night of 1st 
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November a force composed of rapid response units under the command of 
General Michael Forget landed at the base in Senegal, then, a few days later 
the General and 60 of his specially-trained soldiers redeployed to Atar, in 
Mauritanian territory.
Command of the Ouakkam base was taken over by Colonel Huret, who 
was also responsible for the logistic support for Operation Lamantin. On his 
arrival Forget immediately began to develop communications routes between 
Ouakkam and the Mauritanian bases. Meanwhile, Breguet-Atlantic aircraft of 
the French Navy carried out reconnaissance patrols over Mauritania. Although 
these aircraft had originally been used for detecting submarines, they and their 
trained crews constituted an important element of the operation. In addition, 
the French also used long-range Mirage 4 reconnaissance aircraft to map and 
photograph less well-known regions. In accordance with the request of the 
Oaukkam airbase, the aircraft were launched from Bordeaux, France. 
The purpose of the reconnaissance flights was to locate the Polisario 
units and observe their movements, then, inform the Mauritanian military 
and gendarme units preparing for a counterattack, as well as the French 
strike aircraft. In order to support the operation, the Moroccans sent another 
600 troops to areas occupied by Mauritania, where soon there were 1,200 
Moroccan soldiers, and further units were arriving from Morocco. In January 
1978 there were 2,400 soldiers stationed in the area of Zouerat-Nouadhibou, 
600 at the Akjouj iron-ore mines, and a further 2,800 men in Tiris el-Gharbia. 
The Moroccan Air Force deployed three F-5 fighter-bomber aircrafts to 
Nouadhibou airfield, in order to participate in combined operations.19
It seemed unlikely that the Polisario would challenge such a powerful force, 
therefore, the Mauritanian leadership restarted rail traffic on the Nouadhibou-
Zouerat line, which had already been shut down for a month.
However, the Saharawians attacked the first freight train and took the 
French engineer prisoner, along with the train’s Mauritanian military escort. 
The French were incensed, and on 25th November they transferred a further 
four Jaguar combat aircraft from their base in Toul to Mauritania, in order to 
participate in the counterattack against the Polisario. This type of combat 
aircraft was far more modern than the Northrop F-5 used by the Moroccans. 
The French army commissioned these long-range aircraft in 1971. Each 
was equipped with two 30-mm cannons and an anti-aircraft missile jammer 
system. At that time the French had six Jaguars, two KC-135 F, two Breguet-
Atlantic and four Noratlas aircraft at Ouakkam airbase.
The Jaguars were first used on 2nd December against guerrillas attacking 
the rail line near Boulanour, then, on 12th December in the vicinity of 
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Zouerat.20 As a result of the air strikes, the Polisario offered to release the 
French prisoners taken in Mauritania, but the French forces continued their 
attacks. The Polisario commenced talks with then UN Secretary General 
Kurt Waldheim, and on 23rd December released the French prisoners without 
any conditions.21
The French leadership would have liked to continue the operation, but due 
to the press-campaign of the SADR and the protests of several human rights 
organisations they finally instructed the General Staff to withdraw the French 
forces. After this, although they continued to aid the Mauritanian government, 
France took no active part in operations against the Polisario.22
The guerrillas, no longer threatened by French air strikes, immediately 
renewed their attacks against Mauritanian targets (rail lines, mines, etc). 
By that time Mauritania was facing serious economic and internal political 




Peace TreaTy beTween MauriTania and The 
Polisario
Although “Operation Lamantin” caused serious damage to the guerrillas it 
was not able to stop them; on the contrary, having analysed their experiences, 
they divided into smaller groups and continued to attack Mauritanian 
targets.1 In 1977 and 1978 their attacks paralysed communications and 
halted iron-ore mining which contributed with a significant portion to 
Mauritania’s total budget. They rendered inoperable 26 engines of the 
COMINOR Company (valued at 1 million dollars each); their repair took 
several months, and some drivers refused work because of the constant 
danger. In 1977 the company had to cancel 150 scheduled trains, which 
caused 22 million dollars (18 percent of iron ore exports) lost revenue to 
the country. In storage sheds in the iron-ore mines nearly a million tons of 
iron-ore waited for shipment to the port of Nouadhibou; the government 
could not market it due to a shortage of transportation capacity. The 
country was already listed among the poorest in the world, and this time, 
as a result of guerrilla operations, it had to face an almost complete halt of 
iron-ore mining, which provided the basis of its economy.2
Of course, the war was not the sole reason for the economy’s weaknesses. 
Every nation that had no oil reserves and therefore had to buy oil in the 
open market—Mauritania among them—was seriously affected by the 
international oil crisis that broke out in 1973. Furthermore, due to a crisis 
in the steel industry, the market price of iron-ore had been in decline since 
1976. Since the market price of copper was also very low mining copper 
in the country’s copper mines in Akjouj became so uneconomical that the 
mines were closed down in May 1978. As a result of these mine-closures 
many people lost their jobs.3
This table shows the iron-ore export of the period:
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
production (million tons) 11.9 8.6 9.4 7.5 7.1
export (million tons) 11.7 8.7 9.7 8.4 6.5
export (million USD) 123.5 137.6 153.7 127.0 93.4
Source: Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 258.
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The next table shows the country’s balance of payments for the period: (The 
values are in billions of Ouguiya):
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
export 6.4 9.2 8.0 9.1 8.2 7.5
of this iron-ore 4.6 5.9 6.2 6.9 5.7 4.6
import 6.9 11.1 13.3 18.1 17.7 16.3
deficit 0.5 1.9 5.3 9.0 9.5 8.8
Source: Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 258. 
 The official rate between Ouguiya and USD at this time 74, 43  
(source: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-8538.html)
Although there are several regions suitable for agriculture in the country, 
due to the use of primitive implements and to several years of drought, 
Mauritania had to import food (in this period domestic production covered 
less than 60 percent of food consumption).
The next table shows grain output between 1973 and 1978:
1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
grain production (tons) 50,000 45,000 36,000 21,000 14,000
Source: Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 259.
Although the government’s revenues declined significantly, military 
expenditures were raised by nearly 50 percent in 1976 (From 1.2 billion Ougiya 
to 1.8 billion), then, in 1977 by another 26 percentmilitary expenditures 
amounted to nearly 30 percent of all government disbursements.
The cost-increases were somewhat limited by the fact that Saudi Arabia 
assumed the cost of some arms purchases and provided the price of weapons 
bought from France as aid.
In order to increase government revenue, a new tax—fittingly named 
“solidarity tax”—was introduced in 1976.4 In spite of the new tax, the standard 
of life for both civilians and military declined to an all-time low, and more and 
more people began to voice their reservations about the government’s and the 
president’s performance.5 
The government could maintain order only by calling in further Moroccan 
troops for assistance, but this could not halt the guerrillas, and shook the 
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military leadership’s confidence in the president’s policies concerning the 
Moroccan alliance in May 1978.6 The fact that the Mauritanian political 
leadership requested the assistance of the French Air Force against guerrillas 
attacking the capital shows the extent of the panic in the country.7 The French 
minister of foreign affairs, Louis de Guiringaud lost no time to emphasise 
at a press conference that French combat aircraft conducted operations at 
the request of the Mauritanian government not in Western Sahara but in 
Mauritania. In spite of this the Polisario press statements claimed that the 
French aircraft had carried out attacks not in Mauritanian territory but in the 
vicinity of Oum Dreyga (Western Sahara).
Mauritania had to face not only economic difficulties, but also the problem 
of the black minority (Wolof, Soninke, Peuls and Toucouleuts tribes).8 Twenty-
five percent of the population belonged to these minorities, which provided 
most of the urban intellectuals, a significant portion of the officers and men 
of the army, and most of the agrarian population.9 The black minority had 
serious objections to the Mauritanian leadership’s Arabisation efforts, and 
in 1966, when the use of Arabic became mandatory in state education mass 
protests broke out all over Mauritania. 
This problem has not been completely solved to this day; this was the reason 
for a mutiny in 1987-88 by 500 black officers and men cashiered from the 
army, which led to the death of several black and Arab officers. The question 
of the black minority almost led to war with the neighbouring Senegal, too. 
Thus, black officers of the army seized the opportunity, and on 10 July 1978 
they took part in the coup against President Mokhtar Ould Daddah.10
The bloodless coup was organised by the then (March 1978) appointed 
Chief of Staff, Mustafa ould Mohamed salek, and so he became President 
and Prime Minister at the same time.11
Salek began his military career in 1961, he participated in the defence of 
Nouakchott in June 1976, then, he was appointed commander of the third 
military district (Atar region). In this position he gained the confidence of the 
army commanders and the friendship of many senior officers, so he could be 
certain of the army’s support during the coup.
Morocco was not happy about the changes, however, the Polisario 
announced a unilateral ceasefire with Mauritania, with a commencement 
date of 12 July. Since there were nearly 10,000 Moroccan troops deployed in 
Mauritanian territory the country’s new leader used careful language in his 
radio address on 14 July:  “The goal of the new government is to end the war 
in accordance with the interest of the people, and in co-operation with the 
Kingdom of Morocco.”12
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The government announced a new agricultural policy, launched an 
agricultural development programme with the involvement of foreign capital 
and encouraged private venture projects. 
Salek announced that in the territories occupied by Mauritania—Tiris El-
Gharbiya, the new Mauritanian name for Rio de Oro—he would support a 
free referendum organised in accordance with UN resolutions. At the same 
time he requested the Government of Morocco to withdraw its troops from 
Mauritanian territories.13
In spite of this, on 12-13 January 1979 as a result of negotiations 
between the two countries several agreements were ratified; they agreed 
on establishing a common development bank and a joint sea transport and 
fisheries enterprise, and agreed on broadening co-operation in mining, 
housing construction and education. 
On 6 January 1976 the increasingly impatient Polisario leadership urged 
the Mauritanian Government to start official peace negotiations.14 Since the 
ceasefire did not apply to Morocco, on 4 January Saharawian troops crossed 
the river Draa, the historical and actual border, and attacked the Moroccan 
town of assa. 
Although the Moroccan troops did not sustain a significant defeat the 
next day Hassan II called into session the National Security and National 
Territorial Defence Council. A few days later he sent a letter of complaint 
to President nimeri of sudan, who was serving as President of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at that time. After the successful raid 
the Saharawians launched the “boumedienne offensive”, named after the 
President of Algeria.15
They carried out the first attack only about 10 km from Laayoun, against 
Lem Siyed settlement (16-17 January 1979). In the two-day battle they 
destroyed two large Moroccan columns. This was the first occasion when 
a motorized Moroccan unit, equipped with armoured assets, was defeated 
by the West-Saharan soldiers. The Polisario statement listed 600 dead, 250 
wounded and 51 prisoners among the Moroccan officers and men. They also 
took 4 armoured vehicles, 60 cross-country vehicles, destroyed seven tanks, 
96 trucks, one F-5 fighter aircraft and four helicopters.
The Algerian president, Benjedid Sadli, enthusiastic about the successes 
of the West-Saharans, on 24 February also requested Ould Salek to commence 
peace negotiations.
On 28 January a Polisario unit of about 2,000 men and 200 cross-country 
vehicles entered Moroccan territory again. The West-Saharans attacked 
and for a few hours occupied the town of Tan-Tan in the centre of southern 
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Morocco, which served as a logistic centre and a base for the Moroccan Air 
Force. After the successful raid the attackers withdrew to the desert, carrying 
with them their Moroccan prisoners. 
The international press was intrigued by the fact that they made a 500-km 
march through territories controlled by the Moroccan army. Thus, although 
Morocco denied that the raid occurred, the world knew about it.16
On 6 April 1979 a new government was inaugurated in Mauritania. 
The new Prime Minister, Lieutenant Colonel ahmed ould buceif wanted 
closer co-operation with Morocco. However, when he departed for a 
conference of CEDEAO (Centre Economique du Development de l’Afrique 
de l’Ouest - West African Economic Development Centre) on 27 May, his 
aircraft crashed into the ocean during landing. There were no survivors. 
His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khuna ould haidalla, 
who had been the Minister of Defence in Boucief’s government. On the day 
of his inauguration the new prime minister announced that President Salek 
had resigned and Mohamed Mahmud ould ahmed luli was nominated 
to take his place.17
The new leadership was more amenable to a peaceful settlement, especially 
after a unit of the Polisario had attacked Tisla, the southernmost town of 
Western Sahara under Mauritanian occupation, and took prisoner the local 
prefect and several soldiers.18
The attack shocked the Mauritanian leadership, and prodded them to 
begin peace negotiations at the earliest possible time. Still, the next step of 
Mauritania shocked the whole world, when at the 16th Summit of the OAU it 
voted for a ceasefire agreement and referendum over the independence of the 
Western Sahara. The resolution was supported by a two thirds majority (33 
countries), thus, the Moroccan position was rejected. By way of protest the 
Moroccan delegation left Monrovia before the conclusion of the summit.19
After the Monrovia Resolution, on 5 August Mauritania and the Polisario 
(as representative of the people of Western Sahara) signed a peace agreement 
in Algiers, according to which Mauritania recognised the Polisario and 
withdrew all its territorial claims in Western Sahara.20
Although the Moroccan King received Mauritanian Head of Government 
Mohamed Khuna Ould Haidalla after the announcement, he was already 
planning his response. 
On 10th August Colonel Mohamed ould bah ould abdelkader, former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Mauritanian Air Force, issued a statement supporting 
Morocco in the name of the committee of Free Mauritanian officers. The 
members of the Mauritanian delegation learned of the statement and returned to 
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Nouakchott from the formal dinner given in their honour. The Committee was 
dissolved in a matter of hours, thus, the possibility of a coup was avoided.
The day after the agreement was signed five Hercules C-130 aircraft landed 
at Dakhla, with several hundred Moroccan soldiers on board. Officially they 
arrived to relieve the Moroccan contingent of the Dakhla garrison, but in fact 
they set up their camps around the town’s important buildings. Although the 
garrison’s Maruitanian commander found the allies’ behaviour suspicious not 
wanting to exacerbate an already tense situation, there was no reaction to 
events, and the Mauritanian troops were not placed on alert either.
In the evening on 11th August four ministers of the Moroccan government 
arrived in Dakhla, which at that time was the administrative centre of Tiris El-
Gharbiya. The superior Moroccan units, reinforced by the 750 paratroopers who 
had been redeployed from Zaire’s Saba province and by other troops, occupied 
the town in a short time, without interference from the Mauritanian garrison.21 
In a few days Morocco occupied the entire area under Mauritanian 
occupation, then, they took the cadi of Dakhla and 360 individuals from 16 
Western-Saharan tribes to Rabat, where they swore loyalty to the King on 14 
August. The occupied territory was immediately annexed to Morocco under 
the name of Ved Ed-Dahab.22
The map shows the Kingdom of Morocco enlarged with the territories taken 
from Mauritania:
Source: Andrew Boyd–Joshua Comenetz: An Atlas of World Affairs. p. 124.
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The Mauritanian government dared not to oppose Morocco since 
Moroccan troops were stationed in several areas of Mauritania, which did not 
have sufficient armed force available. 
Although Mauritania condemned the occupation of the territory in official 
statements, it could not do anything against it. On 20th August the leaders of 
the country submitted a memorandum to the world organisation and asked  for 
considering the peace treaty as the proof of neutrality for the Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania in the Western-Saharan conflict.23 They could only submit a 
note of protest to the UN Security Council on 27th November, in which they 
accused Morocco of violating Mauritania’s territorial sovereignty. Pressured 
by the world organisation, Morocco finally withdrew its last forces Mauritania 
(Bir Moghrein, Zouerat) on 26 December.
Following this event the relationship between the two countries became 
very tense; they broke off even diplomatic relations for a while. Mauritanian 
leaders were so afraid of a potential Moroccan attack that they asked for 
help from France. At the end of October, after some minor talks the French 
military leadership approved another 150 military personnel to protect the 
Mauritanian capital. The Moroccans, however, did not deal with their former 
allies as they fully focussed on consolidating their power over the newly 
captured territories.
As a response, Mauritania officially not involved in the conflict any more, 




EvEnts aftEr thE occupation of thE arEa by 
Morocco
When the Mauritanians withdrew their troops, only the guerrillas 
attempted armed resistance to Moroccan troops occupying the area of 
Rio de Oro.1 Although in the battle of bir anzaran they inflicted heavy 
casualties to the Moroccans and destroyed a large part of the garrison 
they managed only to slow but not to prevent the occupation of the area 
by Morocco. After Polisario leaders realised that they were unable to hold 
the settlements against better-equipped Moroccan troops they returned 
to proven guerrilla warfare.2 The bigger Moroccan Army could not 
prepare and successfully counter Saharawian units harassing and raiding 
occupation forces. 
In the occupied territories several Moroccan garrisons were established 
but they failed to control desert regions, where small enemy units could 
move relatively at will. Small Polisario bases were builtmost of them 
hidden undergroundwhich served as safe havens before and after raids. 
The majority of the bases were located in the Saguia el-Hamra valley, 
which was appropriate for hideout, and in remote places in the Zemmouri 
Mountains. (I myself saw one of these bases in the Gourellia Mountains, 
relatively close to a UN Compound in Mehaires).3 In order to avoid being 
spotted by reconnaissance planes the guerrillas moved at night. When the 
units were on the move in daytime they used all-terrain vehicles without 
any glass parts (all windshields and mirrors had been removed) so that 
their reflection would not give their positions away.4
Laayoun, Tarfaya, various settlements, the bridge on the river Oued 
Chebeika, linking Tan-Tan and Tarfaya were favourite targets of guerrilla 
attacks.5 However, the real targets for guerrillas were the Bou Kraa 
phosphate mines, where they managed to make phosphate production nearly 
impossible, similarly to the Mauritanian raids.6 Their primary target was 
the almost 100-kilometre-long conveyor which was used for transporting 
phosphate from the mines to the port of El-Aaiun. The conveyor was 
damaged at several places by the attackers and the Moroccans did not 
manage to achieve any results with their countermeasures although they 
tried to repair damaged parts and protect the area with patrolling.7
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The table below shows the changes of Moroccan phosphate export from 
Western Sahara mines between 1975 and 1979:
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export (tons) 2,638,000 277,000 25,000 441,000 139,000
Source: Interview with Larbi el-Omari, Direcor of Fosbucraa phosphate mines, 
20th June 1978, El-Aaiun (Mining Annual Review, 1980) 
The following table shows the revenues of Moroccan State Treasury from 
Sahara phosphate export between 1974 and 1979 (billion Dirhams. The 
average official rate between the Dirhams and USD is 4,10)8
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
4.1 3.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.3
Source: World Bank, Morocco: Economic and Social Development Report 
(Washington, D.C., 1981) 
Due to the raids by Polisario units phosphate mining almost entirely ceased 
in the Western Sahara and was restarted only after the building of the Berm, a 
defensive wall envisaged by General Dlimi. Naturally, the Polisario was never 
able to completely eradicate phosphate production and export as Morocco has 
its own phosphate mines, too.9
The most delicate issue for the Moroccan leadership was the fact that 
Polisario units launched attacks against military and economic targets in 
Southern Morocco, as well. 
One of the targets of the guerrillas was Sidi Amara in the valley of River 
Draa (27th August 1978), where one of the Moroccan army units (Forces 
Auxiliaires) was ambushed and almost totally destructed. Then, on 30th 
September border station Guelb Ben Rzouk on the Algerian border was taken.10 
SADR Defence Minister warned King Hassan II, if his troops do not withdraw 
from Western Sahara the raids will continue and the organisation is ready to 
launch military actions even in Rabat, Agadir, or Tangier. In fact Saharawian 
units were active only in the Quarkziz Range, the Bani Mountains, the Draa 
valley, and in some regions of the Atlas Mountains, and never got close to the 
above-mentioned towns and cities.11
That was the time when a highly confidential report landed in front of 
the leaders of the State Department of the USA, analysing the spending of 
military aid to Morocco. The report was written by Richard Knight, who was 
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in the region in early 1979 and took several photos illustrating the fact that 
Moroccan troops fight the locals with weapons delivered by the USA.12
Morocco, similarly to other loyal Arabic allies of America was armed with 
F-5 fighter planes and C-130 transport planes with the necessary ammunition, 
bombs and missiles13 under the condition prohibiting the use of those weapons 
outside Morocco since the USA officially did not regard the Sahara region 
belonging to Morocco.14
Nevertheless, the Moroccan Government justified the use of air force, 
often against civil population, with the fact that Western Sahara is not an 
independent state but integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco. On the basis 
of the case Richard King wrote a declaration published by the New York 
Times and the Washington Post.15 Those articles stirred a major scandal in the 
Senate. Although the issue was frozen Morocco started to search for new arms 
suppliers and found some among the arms manufacturers of the Apartheid-
driven South-African Republic. (This is how still up-to-date Ratel and Eland 
armoured personnel carriers and certain small arms were purchased).16
The following table shows the funds in the budget spent on defence and inland 
security between 1974 and 1982 (million Dirhams):
1974 1977 1981 1982
Defence sector 838 1,560 3,014 3,750
Inland security 693 871 1,766 2,145
Total 1,531 2,431 4,780 5,895
Total budget spending 5,815 8,886 18,178 22,554
Source: World Bank, Morocco: Economic and Social Development Report 
(Washington, D.C., 1981) 
As it is clear from the data above the Moroccan leadership was continuously 
increasing both the defence and security budgets parallel with the increase in 
the personnel of armed forces and gendarmerie.17
The figures below show the growth of the personnel in the Gendarmerie 
between 1974 and 1982: 
1974 56,000; 1975 61,000; 1976 73,000; 1977 84,650; 1978 89,000; 
1979 98,000; 1980 116,500; 1981 120,000; 1982 141,000
Source: Tony Hodges: The Roots of a Desert War. p. 293.
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However, regardless of the increase of Moroccan troops’ strength or of their 
use of the most up-to-date weapons the guerrillas managed to entirely destroy 
and demolish well-fortified garrison of Lebuirat on 24th August.18 The town 
and its garrison were defended by 1,200 troops of the 3rd mechanised infantry 
regiment of the Royal Army against the guerrillas raiding the neighbourhood 
for several weeks. Two unsuccessful attacks had already been launched against 
the town (6th July and 10th August), and although the town was not taken the 
garrison was significantly weakened. The combat moral of Moroccan troops 
significantly dropped as they burnt out in the four-year-long service without 
rest and recreation. 
Commander of the unit Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Azelmat requested 
immediate help from his superiors in his report but he was not taken seriously 
and his nightmare came true (the copy of the fax was found on the spot). That 
time frequent sand storms caused huge problems for the Moroccan Air Force; 
no airplane was able to take off which deprived the surrounded garrison from 
air support. The unit ordered to bring relief to the besieged garrison was 
ambushed by the Polisario near Zag and forced to retreat. During the 24th 
August attack resistance was eliminated and the garrison occupied for over 
24 hours by intruding Western Saharans. Moroccans suffered heavy losses; 
according to reports, 812 dead, 111 captured, and several main battle tanks 
and armoured vehicles were destroyed. 
According to the official communiqué of the Moroccan Ministry of 
Information, “an investigation was initiated in order to identify responsibility 
and to find those involved.” As a result of the investigation commander of the 
garrison and 9 officers who had escaped with him were executed, while another 
36 NCOs and soldiers were imprisoned. In February 1980 they were pardoned 
by the King’s amnesty. The battle has a Hungarian line, too, as reporter of 
the Hungarian Television Mr Alajos Chrudinak made a documentary film on 
the events in the region. (Nota bene: Algeria, flirting to Socialist Bloc and 
providing support to the Polisario that time was given huge support from the 
Soviet Union in the Arab World.) Thus, the reporteralready in the region 
for over 3 weekscould see the battle and was one of the first reporters who 
could take photos of the occupied garrison. His film was awarded the “Golden 
Lion” prize at the 1980 Film Festival in Venice. 
Rebel units continued to attack the Moroccan troops occupying the region, 
and on 5th October opened fire at Southern Moroccan town of Zag for diversion 
of attention, following the next day, on 6th October, with the second largest 
town in Western Sahara, smara.19
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The town was well-reinforced by the Moroccan troops and several Mirage 
warplanes were stationed in its airfield. The Royal Army deployed some 
4,000-5,000 well-equipped soldiers and Mirage F-1s against the insurgents.20 
Nevertheless, the attackers took the upper end. After the battle local 
representative of the army acknowledged the loss of 121 soldiers with the unit 
commander, Colonel Driss Harti, while several of them were captured by the 
guerrillas but there was no reliable information on them.21
The next battle took place on 14th October at the town of Mahbas, 60 
kilometres from the Algerian border. The town was abandoned by its civil 
population back in 1975, thus, Mahbas was used as a forward base by the 
Moroccan troops, in order to prevent Polisario infiltration. The base was 
defended by 780 soldiers and officers against some 1,200 attackers. 
In the 24-hour battle the attackers prevailed and managed even to halt the 
relief troops arriving from the town of Zag. According to Moroccan military 
reports, more than 20% of the personnel of the garrison had fallen and the 
proportion of wounded had been even higher.22
The next Polisario attack was carried out inside the country in the Bani 
Mountains. The small Berber town of Akka is located north-west of Agadir in 
its close vicinity, therefore, raids aimed at it and its neighbourhood raised fear 
in all those who expected military actions only in Western Sahara. The next 
raids hit the town of Tata and the oasis of M’hamid, where Mohammed V first 
declared his country’s aspirations for Western Sahara. 
The attacks nearly shocked Moroccan military and political leadership 
that launched operations “uhud” (the place where Prophet Mohammed 
fought his famous battle in 625) and “imann” (Faith) against the Polisario 
on 5th November 1979.23 Both operations were commanded by Dlimi, newly 
promoted to General, deploying 7,000 soldiers and several Mirages and F-5s. 
The General also employed Saharawians, with a thorough knowledge of the 
desert. Although the majority of Saharawians supported the Polisario, several 
of them served in the Royal Moroccan Army forming independent units. Their 
most famous units were the 8th rifle regiment and the Maghzen (anti-insurgent 
units). Most of them were recruited from Southern Morocco, where militant 
Saharawian tribes with military experience and traditions lived. From among 
these tribes most soldiers came from the Ait Oussa tribe belonging to Tekna 
Alliance, which was a traditional enemy of the Reguibat tribe.24
In the newly-established units also fought local people who had served in 
Polisario units then were captured. They served in the Moroccan army for 
their own and their families’ freedom. Moroccans successfully utilised lessons 
learned from previous events and slow-moving military convoys were replaced 
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by well-armed rapid jeep-mounted troops.25 During the operations Moroccans 
reached the Algerian border without meeting any significant resistance, and 
there built strong defence positions. In response to this step on 1st November 
1979, on the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the national liberation war 
the Algerian leadership held a military parade, an unprecedented event for 10 
years. The Moroccan Government understood the hidden warning of Algeria 
and military operations were ceased along the Algerian border. 
As a result of new clashes and the demands of several human rights 
organisations, Morocco was called on by the UN General Assembly on 21st 
November 1979 to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara.26
That was the time when the UN recognised the Polisario as representative 
of the people of Western Sahara and suggested that it should “participate as a 
full party in the search for a fair, lasting, and final political resolution of the 
Western Sahara issue.” 
The map depicts the locations of major battles between Moroccan, Mauritanian 
and Polisario troops: 
Source: http://www.esisc.org/documents/pdf/en/the-polisario-front.pdf
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Since military operations proved to be unsuccessful Hassan II launched 
a diplomatic offensive in January 1980. He sent his representatives to nearly 
25 African countries in order to interpret the Moroccan positions. Some of 
the representatives succeeded as long as some countries first suspended, later 
on broke off relations with the “shadow government” of the Saharawians. 
Encouraged by these, the king’s diplomats continued the ‘offensive’ until 
SADR was rather recognised only by third world or developing countries 
(mainly from Africa and South America), and the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (from Europe). Interestingly enough, the Soviet Union 
that—as leader of the socialist bloc—considered an important entity in its 
sphere of interest, as well as supported the Polisario with financial means and 
weapons via Algeria, never recognised the Sahrawi state.
On 13th February 1980 Polisario attacked the town of Boujdaor, then, 
between 1st and 11th March the fighting continued in the Ouarkziz Valley 
and the Tigzert Highlands.27 Although the Polisario did not win the battle 
its diplomatic campaign proved to be successful making the Morocco 
Government re-evaluate its political course. 
3rd March 1980 saw the first visit of Hassan II in occupied Western 
Sahara, where he promised those local people who were loyal to him to 
provide them with rights and opportunities equal to those of the Moroccans. 
The total integration of occupied and secured territories into Moroccan 
public administration started parallel with the settlement of poor Moroccans 
from Morocco into towns. The Government supported mass migration and 
settlement through various concessions in order to make settlement in the 
desert more lucrative.28 As there was no infrastructure or job opportunities, 
most of the settlers were provided with state aid and food supplies (and this 
has been the case ever since). 
In May 1980 Hassan II elaborated the “Strategy of Walls” on the Algerian 
and Mauritanian borders with the help of General Dlimi. Soon it proved 
to be efficient allowing the Royal Moroccan Army to control occupied 
Western Sahara.29 
The purpose of the newly-built chain of fortresses was to keep Polisario 
guerrillas away from occupied Sahara territories. First, barbed wire obstacles 
and ditches were built, then, sand and stone walls were erected.30 The first 
wall was accomplished in 1982. It started at the town of Smara and reached 
the Atlantic Ocean at the southern part of Boujdour.31 Since then further walls 
have been built and by now the overall length of the defensive system with 300 
reinforced watchtowers and observation posts has grown 2,400 kms long.32 
The chain of fortifications were manned by 120,000 soldiers.33
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At the same time the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic was officially 
recognised by the Organisation of African Unity which made Morocco 
suspend its participation in the work of the organisation. 
On 25th February 1982 the Organisation of African Unity recognised the 
Sahara Arab Democratic Republic as full member.34 However, this move triggered 
vehement protests from Morocco and although it did not return into the Organisation 
Morocco did not make any counteractions against the Organisation either. 
As a follow-up step, on 12 November 1984 the Organisation of African 
Unity approved Resolution AHG104 on the self-determination of the Saharawi 
people. Consequently, Morocco immediately left the Organisation.35
Meanwhile, in October 1987 the sixth section of the wall was accomplished 
built in Western Sahara by Morocco which immediately triggered a political 
and diplomatic crisis between Morocco and Mauritania, for a part of the wall 
is located in the territory of Mauritania. Thus, Morocco wantonly occupied a 
part of an independent state, violating international law.36
The map below shows the defensive system dividing the occupied territories 




Nevertheless, as a diplomatic success Morocco managed to restore its 
diplomatic relations with Algeria (10th May 1988), then, by early July all border-
crossing points between the two countries had been re-opened.37 Slowly though 
negotiations are in progress between Morocco and Algeria which sometimes 
makes Algeria-supported Polisario suspicious but it is unable even to protest 
due to its position.38 Once, for example, retired Chief of General Staff of he 
Algerian Armed Forces Khalid Nezzar happened to say at a press conference 
that Algeria did not need a new state on its borders.39 This announcement was 
food for thought for diplomats all over the world and for Polisario leaders, too. 
Then, as the Algerian Government did not officially confirm the statement of 
the ex-general it remained labelled as private opinion. 
According to some experts there may be a power struggle in the background 
between conflicting political groups supporting either an Algerian-USA or 
an Algerian-French alliance. In any case the question remains open: how 
Algerian home policy develops and how long Algerian politicians can play 
the “Polisario Card” against Morocco.
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Nomads in the desert
Polisario girl
129
Saharawian family at Guelb Char
Small miracle in the desert – water as gift
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The UN re-eNTers The NegoTiaTioNs oN The 
seTTlemeNT of The fUTUre of The regioN
On 7th June 1988 at the 4th Summit Meeting of Arab Countries King 
Hassan II did not attend the supper of Arab heads of state because of the 
presence of the delegate of the Sahara Republic. Instead he withdrew on 
board of cruiser Marrakesh on ancor in the port of Algiers. For observers 
it seemed that there would never be peace between the warring parties. 
Nevertheless, that very year both Morocco and the Polisario accepted the 
UN-brokered peace plan for Western Sahara.1
The referendum allowed the people of Western Sahara to freely 
decide whether they would live in an independent country or as one of the 
provinces of Morocco, with certain rights and liberties. 
In the early 1989 the King met with the leaders of the Polisario and 
had negotiations on the referendum and a possible union with Morocco. 
One year later the UN Security Council approved Resolutions 158/90 and 
160/90 on the settlement plans for Western Sahara and a free referendum.2 
In 1991 the UN established mission MINURSO (Mission des Nations 
Unies pour l’Organisation d’un Referendum au Sahara Occidental) whose 
objective was to supervise the ceasefire between the two parties.3
As a result of the ceasefire every party could keep the territories under 
their control and the border ran along the walls erected by Morocco (Berm). 
Source: MINURSO (1991)
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A 5-kilometre wide strip of the area on the Polisario side of the wall 
was declared a restricted area (Buffer Strip) where only UN observers were 
allowed to move. 
There are another 30-kilometre wide strip on the Moroccan side of the 
wall and a 25-kilometre wide zone on the Polisario side (areas with limited 
restrictions). In these areas any military exercise, maintanence of military 
posts or other installations were allowed with UN permission
Meanwhile the Moroccan King continued the relocation programme in the 
framework of which thousands of Moroccans were settled donw in the towns 
of Western Sahara in order to achieve a favourable outcome of the referendum.4 
The expectations were that new settlers given right to vote similar to those of 
people living in the region for ages would influence the referendum in favour 
of Morocco.5 To this end it was the Saharawians who insisted on a referendum 
based upon the data of the 1974 Spanish census, that is only those who were 
registered that time and their immediate descendants were participate in the 
voting. (73,497 people).6
Then Moroccan authorities tried to prove that Saharawians previously 
displaced from their lands had settled down in Morocco. In their opinion on 
the basis of their origin these people and their descendants (some 120,000 
persons) should be granted the right to vote at the referendum on the future of 
the area.7 Then UN representative Johannes manz objected of the measures 
which he labelled simply tactical moves. Then, UN Secretary General (UNSG) 
Javier Perez de Cuellar had the task to ease the tensions and broker a peace 
between Manz and the Moroccan authorities. However, Manz resigned as 
he felt the world organisation had fallen into discredit.8 Unfortunately, this 
seemed to be valid as the Moroccan authorities were working hard to make the 
peacekeeping forces tied themselves up in knots right at the beginning of the 
mission.9 Anyhow, the position of the Secretary General together with that of 
another UN Secretary General (former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Boutros Boutros-ghali, who maintained extremely good relations with the 
Moroccan leadership) favoured Morocco.10 Thus, the elections scheduled 
for 1992 were postponed because of the divisions over the rights to vote as, 
according to the Polisario, it was only the aborigines who had the right to make 
a decision on the future of the region and the newly-arrived Moroccans would 
not.11 Moroccan auhorities disputed this opinion and demanded equal rights 
for those Moroccans who immigrated into Western Sahara in the past years. 
The disputes almost led to the suspensioin of the UN-supported ceasefire and 
although the warring parties came to an agreement their relations remained 
rather cold for quite a while.12
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The collection of people entitled to vote and the registration of their data 
was started by UN emplyees on 28th August 1994.13 In spite of the fact that 
the office for registering voters data had almost accomplished its mission the 
process was suspended because of the objection of the Moroccan Government 
on 22nd December 1994. 
Between 12th and 25th March 1995 Hassan II went to the USA. Previously 
Polisario Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz had talks in Washington and 
accused the UN of allowing Morocco to bring 181,000 voters to participate in 
the referendum in Western Sahara.14
The relations between the UN and the Polisario went fairly chilly and 
the activities of military observers became nearly impossible due to various 
restrictions and limitations in the insurgent-controlled areas.15
The map below shows the situation in 1995: 
Source: MINURSO (1995)
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The situation in 1996 was further complicated by the fact that the UN 
personnel were unable to continue the registration of potential voters as both 
the Polisario and the Moroccan Government boycotted their activities.16 
Since the personnel of the world organisation could only work under very 
restricted circumstances, upon the recommendation of the Secretary General 
the mission had been cut back.17
Thus, the UN restarted brokering a peace agreement between the 
warring parties.18 In spite of the suspicions and the unfriendly atmosphere in 
Houston, Texas, new rounds of negotiations began on the future of the area 
in September 1997.19 The talks proved to be successful and resulted in the 
approval and publication of the Houston Agreement, a repeated confirmation 
of the 1991 UN Peace Plan. The agreement revitalised bilateral relations 
between the Moroccan Government and the Polisario. 
That very same year, not long before the conclusion of the agreement another 
important event took place with an impact on the course of negotiations. From 
that year further co-ordinations were done by former US Secretary of State 
James Baker, then as UNSG Special Envoy.20 The same year negotiations 
went on in London21 and the unexpected happened: after several decades of 
hatred and hostilities the delegates of the Moroccan Kingdom and those of the 
Polisario made a direct contact on 23rd June and, under UN umbrella though, 
launched talks in Lisbon, Portugal.22
Then, UN workers in the refugee camps could start the registration of 
potential voters and by August 1998 had shortlisted members with the right to 
vote of tribes acknowledged as of Saharawian origin. 
In November of the same year UNSG Kofi annan paid a visit to the 
area and through his personal presence tried to promote the settlement plan 
progressing very slowly. 
As a result of the meetings on 15th June 1999 MINURSO workers began to 
register the members of the three tribes whose origins were disputed. In UN 
registers they were marked as Groups H 41, H 61, and J51/52,23 while Morocco 
labelled them as A’it Usa, Aft Baamrane, Aft En-Nos, Azoafit, Cheraga, Aft 
Yarra, Beni Buvahl, Beni Zerual, Chenacla, Entifa, Rif, R’hamna, Seraghna, 
Ulad Settout, Ghomara, Zanti and Lamiar tribes.
Even in spite of the disputes between Morocco and the Polisario that year 
saw the accomplishment of the first public list comprising the names of 86,381 
potential voters. In fact 147,249 people applied for voting and their data were 
registered by the UN workers. Later on these people were cross-checked on 
the basis of pre-defined criteria (proven ethnic origin) and could be put on 
balloting lists.24
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According to Moroccan statistics, however, only 84,251 people were entitled 
to vote, grouped as follow: 
1. Saharawian descendants dwelling in Morocco: 46,255 
2. Saharawians eligible to vote, in refugee camps: 33,786 
3. Saharawian descendants dwelling in Mauritania:   4,210 
In any case, over 79,000 people applied for voting from tribes of disputed 
origin but only 51,220 people filled in the voter’s form and out of them just 
2,130 were accepted.25
The demand of the Moroccan Government that people of disputed origin 
should also be granted the right to vote was based on the fact that those are 
descendants of Saharawians who had fled to Moroccan territory. As evidences the 
following cases were disclosed to UN officials by the Moroccan authorities: 
1. In 1884 after the town of Dakhla was taken by the Spanish several hundreds 
of local people from the tribe of Oulad Slim fled to Moroccan territories. 
2. When the town of Tarfaya was occupied by Spanish troops led by Colonel 
Penez, most of the inhabitants of the region fled to Morocco. (1919) 
3. In the year when the Spanish established their first garrison in Layoune, 
several Saharawians moved to the areas under Moroccan rule. (1934) 
4. As a result of Operation “Ecouvillon” conducted by the French army a lot 
of Saharawians fought among Moroccan insurgents while their families 
lived in Moroccan territory. (1958) 
Due to the lack of evidence the Moroccan position was rejected by the UN 
representatives, therefore, the majority of disputed tribes did not get registered 
for voting. After the registration process was accomplished, in April 2000 
James Baker visited Algeria, Morocco and Polisario-controlled territories 
upon the request of the UNSG. Although he had talks with every party involved 
in the dispute he returned to New York without any concrete results. Then, 
in May and June the representatives of the Moroccan Government restarted 
the negotiations with Polisario officials in London but the negotiations were 
disrupted due to lasting and significant differences in the positions.26 
Later on another meeting was suggested by Baker in Geneva, where issues 
related to the future of the area, release of Moroccan POWs, and follow-up of 
the halted settlement were discussed.27 Unfortunately, there was no agreement 
achieved, therefore, Baker proposed a third version to Polisario leaders in 
August (framework agreement or Baker Plan).28 
In its framework the Moroccan Government offered a significantly 
increased autonomy to the Western Sahara region. Due to the postponed 
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referendum (which happened as many as 12 times to that date) the tensions 
grew so high that the Polisario was considering the restart of military activities 
and concentrated large forces along the Berm.29 
According to James Baker, the problem would be resolved if Saharawian 
people accepted a comprehensive autonomy under the rule of Morocco and the 
referendum of the future status of the area could be held later (after a 5-year-
long period of coexistence). Thus, all local people (including settlers) could 
have the right to vote if they have lived in Western Sahara for over one year.30 
After some hesitation Morocco accepted the proposal while the Polisario 
repeatedly rejected such kind of modification of previous UN resolutions.
Although Baker met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
supporting the Polisario and tried to convince him on the advantages of the 
new proposal the talks halted.31 Then, Mauritania, Algeria and the Polisario 
were invited to Pinedale, (Wyoming, USA) where promoting the settlement 
plan was discussed, without major progress though (27-29 August 2001).
During the negotiations Moroccan King Hassan II died (23 July 1999) and 
his son, hardly known to public, General of the Army Vi. sidi mohamed, 
follower of European fashion, got his throne.32 The initial measures of the 
new Monarch were popular as he sacked his father’s officials (including the 
Minister of the Interior)33 opposing peace with the Polisario, he gave political 
prisoners amnesty, thus, many people were grateful to him for their regained 
freedom. Alas, those hoping for a rapid peace process were discouraged as the 
new Monarch continued the Western Sahara policy of his father with the use 
of more peaceful and democratic methods though.34
Unfortunately, many of the Polisario leaders claimed that the UN was an 
impotent organisationthat is it does not work at allwhile others stated 
that the UN clearly supported Morocco, therefore, it would be sensible to 
enforce Polisario rights with the use of weapons. 
This comes partly from the frustration caused by the fact that Moroccan 
Government although the occupation was a huge burden for national economy 
was able to finance it (primarily from US and other aids).35 There was certain 
development in the occupied areas generating a solid living standard, thus, the 
majority of people accepted the occupation as such and ‘enjoyed’ its economic 
advantages.36
It is also important to understand that Morocco skilfully exploits the fact 
that it is the oldest, and one of the most valueable Arabic allies of the USA 
(since 1787) as due to its strategic location and as the second largest Arabic 
country (some 30 million people) it plays an important role in the Muslim 
World. Especially now when the majority of relatively reliable USA allies 
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proved to be false and their leadersunofficially thoughprovided support 
to or maintains close links with terrorist organisations opposing American 
interests.37 
In this light it is easy to undertand that Morocco has been provided one 
fifth of the US aids earmarked for Africa since 1950. It is only Egypt, which 
receives more American support.38 The total sum of military aid to Morocco 
was USD 1 billion while the economic aid was around 1.3 billion US dollars 
annually.39
Morocco’s importance as a reliable ally was especially highlighted during 
the Reagan era when the US armed forces were allowed to use Moroccan 
airspace, airfields and seaports without any limitation.40
France was another important ally to Morocco, from where 300 million 
Francs arrived between 1980 and 1984 (mainly as aid in French-made 
weapons).41
The tables below show the quantity and type of armament delivered to 
Morocco by the USA, France and other countries, either as aid, or at discount 
conditions between 1975 and 1997.
Between 1975-1988: 
Arms supplier Amount Type of armament 
Austria 121 Kürassier light battle tank 
France 24 F-1CH Mirage warplane
15 F-1EH Mirage warplane
24 Sa-341 Gazelle combat helicopter
24 Alphajet aircraft 
30 AMX-13 light battle tank
360 VAB armoured personnel carrier
100 AMX-F-3 155mm. field gun
Germany 70 UR-416 armoured personnel carrier
10 Do-28 transport aircraft
Italy 28 SF-260 training aircraft
South Africa 100 Eland és Ratel armoured personnel carrier
Switzerland 10 AS-202 training aircraft 
USA 100 M-48 Main battle tank
420 M-113 armoured personnel carrier
60 Vulcan type, 20 mm air defence gun
37 M-48 anti air artillery gun




6 OV-10 search and rescue aircraft
15 C-130 transport aircraft
2 KC-130 tanker aircraft 
Source: IISS, Military Balance 1979-1980, 96;  
IISS, Military Balance, 1987-1988,107-9; IISS, Military Balance, 1989-1990, 108-10; 
Dean, Air Force Role, 16, 42, 44-47, 59, 61-62. 
Between 1989-1997: 
Arms supplier Amount Type of armament 
France 15 VAB-VCI Armoured Personnel Career 
10 AMX-10 Armoured Personnel Career
35 FH-155 mm artillery piece 
Italy 2 Assad class cruiser 
Spain 7 CN-235 transport aircraft 
4 Lazaga Class frigate
USA 1 C-130 recconnaissance aircraft
2 UH-60 helicopter
300 M-60 Main Battle Tank
20 M-113 Armoured Personnel Career
20 M-44 155 mm. artillery piece
26 M-198 155 mm artillery piece artillery piece
Source: IISS, Military Balance, 1987-1988;  
IISS, Military Balance 1989-1990, 109-10; IISS, Military Balance, 1995-1996, 142-43;  
IISS, Military Balance, 1996-1997, 125, 128-29.
However, in Polisario-controlled areas there has been no significant 
development as the organisation has not received any significant help from 
other states except from Algeria. The majority of people are still living in 
refugee camps in Algeria including the families of soldiers serving in the 
(Liberated zone), where mostly Bedouins live, and apart from a few minor 
towns and villages there are no settlements.42
The Polisario is in difficult situation both in the field of the economy 
(close dependence from Algeria and some aid organisations) and diplomacy 
(resolutions on the future of the region are approved in the UN). This fact makes 
the Polisario and the SADR wait, providing Morocco further advantages and 
opportunities for strengthening its positions. After the Baker visit in January-
February 2003 the mandate of the MINURSO was extended for two more 
months (until 27th May 2003), then, to 31st April 2004. Since that time the UN 
continues extending the mandate of MINURSO. 
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However, it should be seen that after 11 years and after spending nearly 
500 million USA Dollars several UN Member States and senior officials 
wished to see some progress. They did not cover their disappointment, and 
in spite of the resistance of France a fine-tuned version of the Baker Plan was 
approved by the Security Council in 2003.43 Although the new plan contained 
concessions for both parties, according to independent political analsysts and 
other experts, it continued to favour Morocco. 
In accordance with the final plan a referendum should be held on the future 
of the area in four years or five at latest and until that time Western Sahara would 
have wide autonomy within the Moroccan Kingdom (settlement Plan).44
An organisation (Western sahara authority-Wsa) would be set up to 
prepare decisions related to the area, organise daily life and to be a liaison 
to Moroccan official organisations. During the transition period WSA would 
be responsible for local financing issues, local taxation, education, fishing, 
security issues, and other problems having an influence on the life in the 
area. However, foreign relations and the defence sector would remain under 
the supervision of Morocco. At the end of the transition period a referendum 
would be held in order to make a decision on the future of the disputed area. 
Meanwhile under UN supervision the repatriation of refugees would also start 
to Western Sahara. The local population would have the chance to choose 
whether they would prefer a fully independent new state, autonomy within 
Morocco, or a full integration into Morocco.45 In the referendum any person 
would be able to participate if they are over 18 years old, and have lived in 
Western Sahara since 1999 as a registered dweller, those who were UN-
registered and labelled entitled to voting, and those who live in refugee camps 
and are officially shortlisted as “to be repatriated” by the UNHCR. 
Although Moroccan authorities were unable to achieve those soldiers 
serving in the area (170,000 people) would be provided with the right to vote 
the outcome of the voting would be very close for either party because of the 
new settlers from Moroccan territories.46
This risk is signalled by the fact that the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs submitted a protest note to then UNSG Kofi Annan criticising the 
Baker Plan and the role of the Algerian Government in the elaboration of 
the plan. In the years past the Moroccan position became less rigid and it 
supports the plan if it concerns only the issue of autonomy and does not 
propose independence.47
While the Moroccan Government has not officially responded the Polisario 
surprised everyone involved with its official welcoming statements and the 
fact that the organisation accepted the new plan.48 In the opinion of several 
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experts the cause is that the Polisario is entirely exhausted and unable to 
conduct armed fighting and has also been weakened by internal conflicts as a 
large part of common people and leaders got tired of the nearly three-decade-
long conflict. Meanwhile, Morocco pursues a wait-and-see policy well aware 
of the fact that no power is able to make it withdraw from the occupied lands.49 
Although in the area the Polisario-supporters have grown stronger and are 
close to declare Intifada for gaining independence, due to the indifference of 
the global public or avoidance of conflict (it is easier to run a peacekeeping 
mission than to eliminate an armed conflict) the current situation seems to 
remain either through a referendum or without it.50
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MINURSO
In 1985 the Secretary General of the UN and the Organisation of 
African Unity decided to set up a mission aimed at the final settlement 
of the disputed territory. Both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario 
agreed on the purpose of the mission but the agreement was achieved as 
late as 30th August 1988.1
In 1990 the Secretary General of the UN submitted a report (S/21360) 
to the Security Council, which comprised a finalised plan offering 
a peaceful resolution for the armed conflict having been escalated for 
numerous years. The draft was approved by the Security Council on 29th 
April 1991 as ‘Resolution 690’ and thus a UN mission (United Nations 
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) tasked with resolving 
the future of and the rule over a territory was established.2 
This plan provided a transition period during which the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General, SRSG, had the responsibilities 
to prepare and implement all decisions and resolutions linked with a 
prospective referendum on the future of the area. The question was how 
the local inhabitants decide—would they wish to support the idea of 
an independent state or would prefer to live in an area integrated into 
Morocco. The SRSG was also tasked with directing civil employees, 
military personnel and police officers of the mission, and with the 
establishment and operation of the office of The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Originally, the MINURSO was planned to have 800–1,000 civil 
employees, 1,700 military observers and a 300-strong police unit.3
The mission was tasked with the following: 
 Controlling the ceasefire and verifying the decrease of strength of •	
Moroccan troops in Western Sahara; 
 Observing Moroccan and Polisario forces in certain regions with •	
special regard to troops concentrations or other military build-up; 
 Taking measures for releasing political prisoners from Moroccan •	
prisons; 
 Supervising the exchange of prisoners of war (POW); •	
 Accomplishment of repatriation encouraged by the UN. In the •	
framework of the action refugees would be freely returning to 
their previous homes; 
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 Identifying and registering those entitled to participate in the •	
referendum to be held on the future of the area; 
 Organising and ensuring free and fair elections then declaring its •	
official outcome.4
On 24th May 1991 an official proposal was submitted by the UN Secretary 
General regarding the starting day of the ceasefire between the warring 
parties (6th September). 
All involved parties agreed upon the date nevertheless it seemed that 
no ceasefire agreement could be achieved due to the conflict situations. In 
the region of Bir-Lahlou and Tifariti a general anti-Polisario offensive was 
launched by the Moroccan High Command in the month before the ceasefire 
was due. After initial success Moroccan troops withdrew behind the Berm.5
 
The map below shows the post-offensive situation and the military districts 
and sectors established by the opposing parties: 
Source: MINURSO (1991)
The diplomatic efforts of the UN proved successful and the official 
ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario was declared. After the 
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agreement 100 military observers were deployed to the region in order to 
control the compliance with ceasefire and soon this number increased to 228 
and some administrative and logistic elements.6
That time the MINURSO was tasked with observing the ceasefire 
agreement and prevention of potential clashes. The mission HQ was set up 
in the town of Laayoun and two sector commands were established in the 
controlled Sahara areas with their HQs in Dakhla (Sector South) and Smara 
(Sector North). Moreover, a Liaison Office was also established in Tinduf, 
Algeria, in order to ease the co-operation with Algerian authorities and the 
Polisario.7 The next step was taken in 1993 in the form of the establishment 
of an office for processing the data of people entitled to participate in the 
referendum and responsible for preparing the balloting lists. The preparation 
phase was accomplished in August 1994, which was followed by the collection 
and processing of the data of potential voters.8 This activity was significantly 
impeded by the fact that the opposing parties often complicated the work of 
the office workers and challenged the voters delegated by the other side.9
Organisation work was in progress not only in Morocco but also in 
Mauritania, and on 23rd October 1995 UNSG Representative Erik Jensen 
met with Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya. The 
purpose of the meeting was to set up an office in Mauritania, too, for the 
registration of Saharawian descendants dwelling in the country. As a result 
of the negotiations, the UN was allowed to open its office in the town of 
Nouadhibou, and the collection of data of potential voters’ belonging to 
ethnic Saharawians could be started. However, due to the multitude of 
problems the registration of potential voters was halted by the UNSG in May 
1996. Then, the number of office workers and police officers was reduced by 
20% (28th May 1996).10
The work in the office was re-started as late as December 1997 and was 
finally accomplished on 3rd September 1998. Then, mainly military aspects of 
the mission got in the focus, such as enforcement of the ceasefire, patrolling, 
inspection of military units, and demonstrating the presence of the UN. 
In accordance with the latest resolution on 31st October 2003 the entire 
Office and Police Section was “temporarily” disbanded and the material they 
collected and processed was transferred to the UN HQ in Geneva.11
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The sTrucTure of MINurso
MINURSO is subordinated to the United Nations Secretary General but 
the leadership rights are exercised by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG), who is the Head of Mission at the same time. 
Today, the Special Representative is Mr. Julian Harston from United 
Kingdom. 
The military commander of the mission is the Force Commander 
(FC), who is invited by the UN Secretary General and consented by the 
Security Council. The military counselor supervises his job in the UN 
Headquarters, New York, and informs the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General at the same time. 
The MINURSO HQ is located in Laayoune, in the centre of the 
territories occupied by Morocco. 231 military personnel serve in the 
mission, including the commanding General (currently, Major General 
Zhao Jingmin). There are 203 military observers, while 27 personnel 
serve in jobs connected to leadership, service and the security the mission 
(there is a medical group of Malasians and and an administrative group of 
7 Ghanian non-comissioned officers) and other 6 police officers.1
The following chart shows the structure of the mission:
Source: MINURSO (2008)
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The following states have delegated military observers to the mission: 
 Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, the Republic of Guinea, South Korea, 
Egypt, Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Croatia, Ireland, 
Kenya, China, Poland, Hungary, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Italy, 
Russian Federation, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay. 
Apart from them, 146 personnel from various countries all over the world 
and 113 local employees contribute to the work of the mission.2
The Department of Identification of the mission are closed down 
temporarily. The Civilian Police office was closed as well, but later it was 
opened and nowadays 6 police officers are working in the mission.
The area of the mission:
Source: MINURSO (2008)
The operating area of MINURSO had been divided into two sectors: the 
centre of the Northern sector was located in Smara city while the centre of the 
Southern sector was in Dakhla on the shore of the Atlantic Ocean. Later the 
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missions leaders terminate the sectors system and every peacekeeper under 
the direction of Layounne Headquater.3 In this chapter of the book I write 
about my experiences in Western Sahara. I know that some changes have 
happened lately, but my intention is to introduce the system (with sectors) I 
worked for.
The former sectors and their camps in the area of the mission:
Source: MINURSO (2005)
Team sites were established at the appropriate places of the sectors, where 
they were able to control a certain area due to their location. 
The officers selected for the military observer position and trained either 
by the UN or the delegating states serve in these team sites. MINURSO has an 
unwritten law, which states that two military observers from the same nation 
should not serve in one team site, if possible, unless in special situations. 
Naturally, this can only be applied effectively to soldiers from countries with 
small contigents. The same principle is to be applied to soldiers serving in 
the headquarters. Another chapter discusses the structure of the camps and 
the work carried out there. The present part will be elaborating on how the 
headquarters and its different departments function.4
In general, the staff serving at the headquarters are divided according to 
the current NATO organisational structure. The tasks of the Staff Officers 
is regulated by the standard operating Procedure for Peacekeeping 
operations (SOP).
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The main duties and obligations of the Staff Officers serving at the 
headquarters include:
 To prepare suggestions in professional matters for the Commander and •	
the Chief of Staff (COS).
 To co-operate with civilian organisations, to co-ordinate and manage •	
their professional work.
 To co-operate with other military departments (G1-Personnel, G3-•	
Operations, G4-Logistics service, etc).
 To prepare and check personnel serving in team sites and are •	
subordinated to them professionally.
 To prepare different documents for MINURSO and New York HQ.•	
 To provide up-to-date information on professional matters to the Chief •	
of Staff (COS). 
The personnel serving in the staff command:
chief of staff (cos)
Based on the agreement between the Malaysian government and the UN, the 
position (Colonel) can be filled by Malaysia. In case of the absence of the 
military commander, he controls the work of the military observers, monitors 
everyday affairs, organises and supervises the professional and military work 
done at the HQ. 
south sector commander (sscDr)
Based on the agreement between the Chinese government and the UN, the 
national position (Colonel) can be filled by the People’s Republic of China. 
The tasks include the co-ordination, command and control of human 
resources and other tasks, while informing and obtaining the approval of the 
military commander of the mission. He is entitled to represent the mission in all 
matters (disciplinary, military, human resources, etc) concerning the sector, to 
maintain contact with the Moroccan authorities and the local Polisario leaders. 
North sector commander (NscDr)
Based on the agreement between the French government and the UN, the 
national position (Colonel) can be filled by France. His position is equivalent 
to that of the South Sector Commander.
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senior Liaison officer (sLo)
Based on the agreement between the Russian government and the UN, the 
national position (Colonel) can be filled by the Russian Federation.
His tasks include the management of the military liaison office in Tinduf, 
controlling the work of the military observers serving here, maintaining 
contact with the Polisario leaders and the Algerian government.
chief operations officer (coPo)
Based on the agreement signed by the government of Ghana and the UN, 
the national position (Lieutenant Colonel) can be filled by Ghana. From the 
beginning of the mission until January 2003, the United States of America 
appointed the officer for the position and only after they had left the mission 
the position was transferred to Ghana. 
His primary tasks include the control of the operational level of the 
mission, the organisation and supervision of the military and patroling tasks. 
The advisor of the Chief of Staff is responsible for working out and applying 
different operational and service instructions of operational matters, and also 
for preparing and classifying mission reports (OPORDS, etc) and informing 
the control centre in New York. He is responsible for organising and holding 
training courses and meetings organised at the headquarters, preparing and 
controlling the services. He deals with the security matters of the headquarters, 
by involving the civilian security service (Service) and the Moroccan security 
and law enforcement agencies.
chief Military Personnel officer (cMPo)
The position can be applied for by officers of any nation, and generally officers 
from African countries are selected. (In 2003 and 2004 Lieutenant Colonels 
from Ghana, Egypt and Nigeria filled the position.)
His primary tasks include the organisation and control of personnel tasks 
(arranging leaves, reports, personal descriptions, preparing identification 
cards, orders, etc). He evaluates the reports of the military observers and 
prepares them for review by the commander. He represents the commander 
in disciplinary and other matters (accident, death, etc) concerning the 
military observers and organises and supervises the work of the Investigation 
Commission. He acts as the advisor in personal matters and prepares the roster 
for both duty officers and patrols at the headquarters. He maintains contact 
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with the Chief Medical officer, coordinates the round-trips of the military 
observers arriving for medical check-ups or treatment between the camps and 
the headquarters.
chief Logistics officer (cLo)
The position can be applied for by senior officers of any nation.His tasks 
are to provide full logistic service (food, pertrol oil and lubricant, drinking 
water, furniture, other equipment, etc.) to the mission and supply the military 
observations posts. He carries out his tasks in co-operation with the General 
Service Section-Integrated Support Services. He is responsible for the 
preparation and application of the logistics regulations and orders. He is to 
visit the team sites regularly in order to personally check the sectors and the 
logistic services there. 
senior co-ordination officer (sco)
Based on the implicit agreement within the mission, the position can be filled 
by South American (Salvador, Honduras, Chile, Uruguay) senior officers 
on a rotational basis. His main task is to supply goods to the staff canteen, 
organising and co-ordinating freetime activities. He is responsible for 
providing accommodation to military observers going on leave, or arriving 
to the headquarters for duty and to organise and co-ordinate various military 
holidays (national days, official events). Military protocol and maintaining 
contact with the representatives of electronic and printed media are also his 
responsibilities. 
force Training officer (fTo)
Senior officers of any nationality can apply for the position. All training 
matters belong to him (professional courses, organising Arabic, French and 
Spanish language courses, publishing journals and regulations). He prepares 
weekly and monthly reports, updates the military training programmes of the 
mission and checks the execution of the trainings (UNMO Mission Training 
Programme – MTP). 
He checks the training, the expertise of the personnel serving in the 
sectors and organises lectures and training courses for them if necessary. 
Besides his training tasks, he also fulfills the positions of the Sports Officer 
of the mission. 
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force Medical officer (fMo)
Based on the agreement between the Malaysian government and the UN, 
Malaysia can fill the national position (Lieutenant Colonel). His task is to 
co-ordinate the job of the Korean medical team and to manage and control 
the organisation of all health, medical and hygienical tasks related to the 
mission.
commander of the Malaysian Medical unit (cMMu)
In accordance with the current international agreements, the medical supply of 
the mission is provided by the military medical team of 20 members delegated 
by the Malasian Armed Forces under their own command. The commander 
of the unit is responsible for the work of the team and the providing medical 
care for the mission, in cooperation with the Moroccan military hospital 
(Casablanca) and the navy hospital of the Spanish Armed Forces (Las 
Palmas).
Aide-De-camp (ADc)
Due to the implicit agreement of the mission and the special requirements 
accompanying the agreement (command of the French language and contact 
with the Moroccan military organisations), the position is filled by the captain 
of the French contingent. He organises the trips, meetings of the commander 
within Morocco, maintains contact with the leaders of the local organisations, 
participates at official meetings and takes the minutes there. He organises the 
correspondence at Commander’s Office, participates in organising and co-
ordinating the administrative work and executes the commanders commands. 
Military Assistant of force commander
Generally, the position is filled by a captain from the same country as the 
commander. His tasks include organising the commander’s meetings, taking 
minutes at the meetings, doing the correspondence of the commander, going 
through and classifying the incoming daily mail, preparing the draft of the 
commander’s official speeches, copying it if necessary. He takes photos 
at official events, records and archives the events for later use (internal 
publications, press, etc). In case of the absence of the ADC, he takes over his 
tasks, but he in command. 
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Military Assistant to the chief of staff
The position is filled by a captain selected by the Chief of Staff, who is of 
the nationality of the commander. He fulfills administrative tasks for the 
Chief of Staff. He prepares and organises the programmes of the Chief of 
Staff, maintains contact with the different military organisations and sectors. 
Basically, his job description is identical to that of the Military Assistant.
force sergeant Major (fsM)
In accordance with the current agreement, the position can be filled by a non-
comissioned officer, sergeant-major or warrant officer from Ghana. He has 
significant role in organising various military events; he is responsible for 
observing the dress-code of military observers, and acts as the advisor to 
the commander of the mission in disciplinary matters. The FSM organises, 
controls and checks the work of non-commissioned officers subordinated to 
the office of the commander. He escorts the Commander on his official trips 
and helps the military assistants organise the programmes.
The following departments function at the Mission command:
Personnel Department
The tasks of the Personnel Department include all the personnel tasks 
(travelling, service trips, unexpected death, accidents, medical chechup or 
treatment, etc) related to military observers at the MINURSO Staff, including 
the preparation of identification cards, of various reports, reviews, providing 
help in religious and consicence matters, setting up and operating disciplinary 
committees. Besides the commander, two commissioned officers and two 
non-commissioned officers work for the department. 
The non-commissioned officers do registration, and administrative work 
under the DCMPO’s control but their superior is the Force Sergeant Major. 
Planning and operations Department
Reconnaisance (G2) and operations-planning department are integrated 
mainly due to the shortage of human resources. The work of the department 
is led by the Chief Operations Officer (COPO). Their tasks include all types 
of military planning, information gathering, the processing and evaluation of 
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information within the mission and the coordination of the work of military 
observers (patrolling and other service duties). 
Five officers serve in the departrment (the deputy of the Chief Operations 
Officer, the Air Liaison Officer and three other Staff officers.
Deputy chief operations officer (Dcoo)
He is responsible for organising the work of the officers working in the 
department, maintaining contact with the operational and intelligence officers 
of the sectors and the camps, checks the gathering, evaluation of information, 
and sending the reports to the Operations Centre in New York. 
Air Liaison officer (ALo)
He is responsible for organising and coordinating the air transport, air 
reconnaisance, trainings and rescue activities of the mission. His task is to 
ensure that military observers apply and do not violate air safety regulations. 
He prepares flight manifests and organises special flights in co-operation 
with the local military and civilian air traffic services.
staff operations officers (soo)
Their tasks include checking the daily operation of the team sites and 
preparing, controlling and checking the services, processing and evaluating 
the incoming intelligence (ORBAT) for the mission commander. They take 
part in working out different orders, controlling the observance of military 
and ceasefire agreements, and in case of violation start investigating the case. 
They prepare the daily, weekly, monthly and other periodical reports (SITREP, 
etc) for the leaders of the mission and the UN. Deputy of Chief Operational 
Officers,	Air	Liaison	Officers	and	Staff	Officers	must	be	senior	officers.	
Logistics Department 
Like anywhere else, this department has the most responsibilities and work 
load, as there is always need for fuel, food, drinking water and other logistic 
supply. The transport of the supply is done by three helicopters (MI-8) and 
three Antonov transport planes due to the large distances. This requires daily 
contact and continuous coordination with the other departments involved. 
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The planes are rented together with their crew from the Ukraine and 
Russia, generally for six-month time periods. 
The following picture shows the supply system of the mission: 
Source: MINURSO (2004)
The logistic supply of the mission is primarily done by the civilian part of 
the mission not the military. This is obvious as the military observers spend 
4-6 months in a position in the headquarters on average. Due to the special 
situation prevailing in team sites and sector commands, only the military 
observers do logistics work, while the civilian logistics service is based on 
the HQ (Laayoune). 
The civilian experts (in cooperation with the military personnel) provide 
the following services in the mission: repair and maintenance of the vehicles, 
transport, signals, finance and other administrative tasks.
The Logistics Department is headed by the chief Logistics officer and 
the following positions can be found within the department:
Deputy chief Logistics officer
He is responsible for the maintenance and operational tasks. He receives the 
supply necessary for running the team sites, he is responsible for executing 
fire-protection tasks, the repair and if necessary replacement of electric 
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generators and other technical equipment used in the team sites. He is entitled 
to assign any kind of task to the garages on behalf of the military organisation 
and he organises the temporary deployment of technicians to the team sites.
Transport and Plans officer 
He is responsible for the repair and maintenance of all vehicles used by the 
military observers, for fuel, lubricants and airplane fuel supply. His tasks also 
include finalising the reports of the Logistics Department and sending them 
to the consignees. 
supply officer 
He receives the requests for supplies from the team sites (except for food 
and fuel), which is provided dependent on the current needs and the stock 
available. He maintains daily contact with the Procurement department, 
civilian logistic personnel, the ones responsible for the store-houses and 
Receiving and Inspection.
food officer
All tasks connected to the food supply of military observers belong to him. 
He monitors the food supply tasks in the team site, the results of the weekly 
and daily reports, checks and approves requests for food supply. He controls 
the quality of food together with the Hygeinic officer, co-operates with the 
civilian logistic and supply companies. His tasks include checking of the 
invoices received and only he is entitled to authorise any payment to the 
companies suppling food for the mission. 
The positions of the Logisitics Department can be filled by senior officers, 
however, if a candidate is sutiable for the job, the military commander of the 
mission can authorize a captain to be selected for the position, as a professional 
position. 
Welfare and co-ordination
This is the smallest department of the mission and it is responsible for supplying 
the canteen with goods (cigarettes, alcohol, confectionery, etc) organising and 
co-ordinating freetime activities all over the area of the mission. Apart from the 
mission commander, there are two other officers serving at the headquarters.
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Welfare officer
He runs the shops of the mission, purchases goods, calculates the prices of 
the products and it is his duty and responsibility to transport the goods to the 
team sites. He is in charge of the money of the welfare fund of the military 
observers and if necessary purchases cultural items (DVDs, CDs, videos, 
cassettes, board games, etc) and sports equipment from the fund. He organises 
the sports and cultural programmes in co-operation with other departments. 
co-ordination officer
He is responsible for providing accommodation to the military observers 
arriving from the team sites to Laayoune, receiving the newcomers, organising 
and coordinating various military and official events (National days, awarding 
medals, etc). He maintains contact with Moroccan and Spanish hotels, travel 
agents and other tourist organisations to provide discount air tickets for 
officers travelling home for holiday. 
communication Department
Due to the fact that the mission is located in three countries and the 
insufficient infrastructure of the area, the communications experts developed 
their own communication system independent of the host nations the mission. 
The personnel serving in the communication department, in cooperation 
with the civilian experts (UN employees) operate the radio (long and short 
waves, VHF and HF) and telephone system, operate, maintain, repair the IT 
and telecommunication (facsimiles, computers, photocopy machines, etc) 
equipment.
Two senior officers serve in the department:
force communication officer (fco)
He co-operates with the leaders of the civilian communication department. 
They plan the purchase of the equipment together, co-ordinate the work of 
the military, civilian and repair departments. He receives the communication 
daily reports from the team sites and sectors, which he sends to the Chief Staff 
Officer after processing and evaluating them.
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Assistant force communication officer (Afco)
His primary task is to help the work of the Force Communication Officer, and 
to observe the deadline of the planning tasks. He supervises the operation of 
the communication systems between the headquarters, sectors and team sites 
and to troubleshoot (computer security, daily maintenance, etc) in cooperation 
with the civilian departments, if necessary. He maintains daily contact with 
the Force Communications Officers of the sectors and team sites and is also 
responsible for their professional training and control. 
Below you can read about the organisations co-operating with other military 
parts of the mission. I do not have an insight into the work of the administrative 
department as this is not a very important area for military observers, however, 
I have written about the police department, the identification and the refugee 
offices in detail, as their work influenced the events of the mission for years. 
Presently, two of these organisations have been suspended temporarily in the 
mission but can re-open anytime following a decision in the future (the police 
department already working). 
cIVPoL
When the UN in its Resolution 690 decided to establish MINURSO (29 April 
1991), it was clear that certain tasks cannot be accomplished by the military 
observers due to the lack of appropriate training, so the UN Secretary General 
recommended delegating police forces to the mission. 
In his report (S22464-46. paragraph – 19 April 1991), the Secretary 
General proposed to employ 100 police officers immediately to aid the work 
of the staff preparing the census. They would have increased the number of 
staff by 200 in order to secure the repatriation of refugees to the territories 
occupied by Morocco. 
The police force worked hand-in-hand with the staff of the Identification 
Commission and Registration Centres from the very beginning. The work started 
in July 1993 under the command of Police Colonel Jürgen Friedrich Reinman.5
The first police unit was composed of 19 personnel (4 Germans, 5 
Belgians, 5 Malaysians and 5 Togans), who also carried out the security tasks 
of the mission but their primary task was to escort and protect the employees 
of the Identification Centre during the preparation period for the census.6 
The moment the identification of eligible voters started the number of police 
officers increased proportionally with their tasks, thus the UN Secretary-
General authorised the employment of as many as 26 police officers in his 
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report (S/1991/819 – 12 July 1994), and by the end of the year 55 police officers 
had been in service (S61994/1257 – 5 November 1994). 
Resolution (973/1995) of the Security Council authorised the increase of 
police staff to 160 but it never manifested. There was a downsizing again 
followed by an increase in the number of staff. The highest number of the 
police staff was 91 in January 1996.7 At that time, there were 19 Identification 
Centres established in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, where police 
officers served together with the civilian staff. The task of the police officers 
included maintaining law and order in the identification centres and providing 
the possibility of uninterrupted work for the civilian employees.8
The UN established idetification centres in Laayoune, Dakhla, Boujdour, 
Smara, Tan-Tan, Goulimine, Assa, Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Sidi Kacem, 
Zagora, Taroudant, Tata, Zourat, Nouadhibou, Elkelaa, Meknes and Tinduf.
The primary tasks of the police force during the identification period were 
the following:
To provide registration and the opportunity to vote for anybody who •	
would like to participate at the referendum deciding about the future of 
the territory, after presenting their legal documents.
To take a photograph and fingerprints of the eligible voters in order to •	
simplify their identification later.
To escort tribal leaders and all people who supported the work of the •	
UN, preparing the referendum. 
To protect personnel and facilities. •	
To collect the documents processed during the identification process •	
and to transport them to Tinduf and Laayoun and finally to the UN 
centre in Genova (346,000 documents were transported to Genova by 
the end of December 2003). 
To provide escort for the finance officers transporting the salary of •	
the UN employees and the military observers and the security of the 
venues of payment. 
To organise joint patrols together with the military observers in the •	
region of Laayoune and Tinduf. 
To participate in military observer training (driving in the desert, •	
navigation- and GPS-training). 
To plan the establishement of the police forces of Western Sahara •	
having received autonomy, their training and checking they comply 
with the democratic norms. 
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To assist the work of the security service and to accomplish other tasks •	
requiring security technological experience and police expertise. 
To give advice in police and security policy issues for both the military •	
and civilian leadeship of the mission. 
To participate in the repatriation programme. •	
To conduct investigation of disciplinary and criminal cases in •	
MINURSO in co-operation with the local authorities. 
To co-operate with the UNHCR in refugee matters.•	
81 police officers (including Hungarians) served in Western Sahara and 
the neighbouring countries in the time period after the census. There were 
only 26 police officers in the mission in June 2003.9 The police unit was 
dismissed after the identification process and due to the suspension of the 
idetification centre for an idefinite time period. But as written previously, 
later 6 police officers arrived in the mission again, and today they are working 
in the Headquarters.
The police unit had an excellent disciplinary conduct, nevertheless, two 
police officers had to be sent home before completing their service due to 
causing road accidents and their poor command of English. 
Identification centre (preparing the census)
The Identification Centre or Census Preparation Office was established by 
Security Council Resolution 690 (April 1991), as one of the organisations of 
MINURSO. 
The employees of the office started the preparatory work immediately 
after the office was opened. They requested the Spanish government to issue 
the documents containing the data of the 1974 census (Spanish Census) and 
started the data-processing. The result of the census then was 74,343 people, 
although some Saharawians had been registered more than once as a member 
of different tribes.10 This could occur as the staff of the census were often 
confused about the fact that one person can be a member of several tribes and 
sub-tribes due to kinship. 
After processing all data of the Spanish Census, a database was ready for 
future activities.
The staff of the office started registering the eligible voters for the referendum 
about the future of the territory on 20 June 1993 on the basis of the data of the 
previous census. The first two identification centres were established in Laayoune 
(Western-Sahara) and Tindouf (Algeria). Due to the insufficient personnel and 
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financial background the registration work could only start on 3 November 1993. 
The Head of Office sent the registration documents together with the filling 
instructions to both the Moroccan and the Algerian governments. 
Due to political reasons, the work in the Mauritanian office could only 
start in late February 1994, despite the fact that the UN officially published 
the data of the Spanish census overviewed and corrected by its staff. There 
were only 72,370 people registered. This document was especially important 
as this provided the base of the census carried out in the future. According to 
the original plans, people or their descendants living in then Spanish Sahara 
in 1974 could vote about the future of the territory. 
Due to the pressure of the opposing parties, however, the UN changed 
its original plan concerning the requirements of eligible voters. Five pre-
conditions had to be met in order to be registered on the list:11
1. Being registered on the list prepared by the Spanish authorities in 1972.
2. Living in Spanish Sahara during the 1974 census but not being registered 
for some reason (this was very likely due to the migration periods of the 
nomadic tribes).12
3. The immediate kins were registered but the potential voter was not 
registered for some reason.
4. If the potential voter’s father was born and lived in Spanish Sahara.
5. If the potential voter lived in this area for six years continously from 1 
December 1974 or for 12 years with some interruptions. 
The official list was published on 29 November in both Laayone and 
Tinduf cities (including the refugee camps).
The representatives of both parties (Morocco and Algeria) handed over the 
registration documents (sent to them before hand) and their recommendations 
to the UN staff on 16 May 1994. The office staff started data-processing the 
incoming material and the identification process immediately. This meant that a 
person whose personal data was registered on the computer had to appear in the 
identification centre where their identification was confirmed and photographs 
and fingerprints were taken. This was necessary to prevent forging of votes or 
multiple registration of one person. The representatives of both opposing parties—
the Moroccans and the Polisario—intended to manipulate the office staff.13
On 28 August 1994, in Tinduf, the confirmation of data and the checking 
of voters registering to vote started in the refugee camps.14 However, due to the 
lack of data-processing staff, the work was very slow. The number of office staff 
reached its maximum capacity only in 1998, which speeded up the process. 
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By that time, the office had established 19 Identification Centres in 
Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, four of which were located in Western 
Sahara, four in refugee camps, two in Mauritania and nine in Morocco. 
The first phase of the identification process started on 28 August 1994 and 
finished on 23 December 1995. The gathered data could only be processed 
completely by 3 September 1998.15
Out of the 179,497 potential voters only 84,262 met the UN requirements, 
so they all were entitled to participate in elections to be held in the future.16
The non-contested tribes appearing in the first phase and the 1st Provisional 
List of Voters of Saharawians was published on 15 July 1999 and were made 
accesible for the Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian governments.17
In the second phase, the contested tribal groupings, 51,220 applicants were 
registered as potential voters in the identification centres but only 2,163 met 
the requirements and were put on the 2nd Provisional List of Voters. The second 
list was made public on 15 June 1999 and similarly to the first list this was also 
sent to the governments of the three countries and the Polisario leaders.18
The work of the Office is well illustrated by the following:
244,643 registration sheets were processed; •	
 243,625 invitations were sent out for the registrations in the identification •	
centres (179,437 in the first phase and 64,188 in the second phase); 
198,469 people completed the identification process (i.e. after •	
registration, went to the identification centres, had their photographs 
taken, confirmed their personal details with their fingerprints and 
signature); 
 86,425 people met the requirements of the UN and the Office organised •	
to inform them.
Then, in February 2000 the situation between the Moroccan government 
and the Polisario had become so tense that working in the identification centres 
became impossible and they were closed down. Afterwards the employees of 
the UN processed the results of the data-gathering phases and corrected the 
forms stored on the computer. As the opposing parties were not able to reach 
an agreement, on 15 January 2002 the UN decreased the number of employees 
in the office to 40. Due to the lack of other tasks, the UN workers continued to 
archive the materials, while other colleagues did research and conducted the 
analysis of the information gathered during long years and prepared studies 
for the UN. The final decision about the office was made in July 2003, when 
the leadership of MINURSO was informed that all ongoing tasks must be 
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completed by the end of October and the documents must be sent to the UN 
centre in Geneva. 
The transport of the processed documents started on 8 September and 
finished on 6 October. The staff left the territory of the mission at the end of 
the month.19
The following chart shows the countries where Saharawians live, and their 
proportions there in the lists prepared and verified by the UN: 
Source: IDC Centre, Layoune (2003)
refugee office (uNhcr – united Nations high commissioner for refugees)
The organisation started working in 1975-76 among the Saharawians fled 
from Western Sahara and living in the refugee camps established in Algeria. 
Although the office is not part of the structure of MINURSO and follows 
orders received from New York independently, there has been good and close 
co-operation between the organisations since the very beginning. One of the 
major tasks of the office would have been to organise the return of the Sahrawi 
refugees to Western Sahara—so far, this has not been achieved.20
The organisation had established and maintained good relationship with 
the opposing parties and very often acted as a mediator organisation to solve 
problems.21
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The office staff forwards the food offered by the non-governmental aid 
organisations to the camps where they hand it over to the local authorities 
supervising its distribution. Despite this fact, the food received as aid does not 
always reach the needy but ends up on the black market. 
I have personally seen food items (sugar, flour, etc) carrying the logo of 
the UN, originally from international aid being sold in shops in villages. 
This may be why the leader of the World Food Programme warned the 
UN representatives in the summer 2003 about the serious food shortage in 
the camps. Basic food items (sugar, flour, rice, semolina and canned fish) 
were already scarce at the beginning of spring and there were not enough 
vegetables and fruits for the refugees. 
According to the UN, in such a situation there is a great risk of an epidemic, 
so, on 16 October 2003, the Security Council in its Resolution S/2003/1016 
demanded that the international organisations get involved in the solution of the 
problems and help feed the refugees in the camps with every possible means.22
The organisation helped several times to maintain contact between the 
refugees in the camps and their relatives living on the territories occupied by 
Morocco. They organised and co-ordinated meetings between the relatives 
occassionally.23
Negotiations were initiated between the government of Morocco and 
the representatives of the Polisario to establish a regular postal service and 
telephone connection (confidence-building measures) between the refugee 
camps and the occupied territories.24 This was not so simple as the Moroccans 
demanded the right that the letters arriving from the refugee camps should be 
forwarded to the addressees by the Moroccan postal service, but this would 
not guarantee the intactness of the letters. Naturally, the UNCHR did not 
accept the proposal so the UN would continue to guarantee the intactness 
of the letters and their safe delivery. In March 2003, an agreeement was 
reached, which guaranteed the uniterrupted operation of the postal service, 
and not tapping the telephone conversations between the refugee camps and 
the relatives from the Sahara. On 15 April, the UNHCR announced that there 
were limited postal service and personal telephone calls available between 
the refugees in the camps and the occupied territories.25 The telephone line 
was shut down by Morocco after one day. It re-started only on 11 January 
2004. Until 2006, according to the report of the office, 60,000 calls were made 
between refugee camps and the occupied territories.26
The third important element of the programme was to provide constant 
contact and meeting opportunities between refugees in the camps and their 
relatives left behind in Western Sahara.27
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This may an even more delicate issue than the postal service and its 
operation. The first suggestion of the Polisario was that only people who 
were registered in the Spanish Census, or met the requirements of the UN to 
vote about the future of the territory should be allowed to attend family get-
togethers. Morocco would provide opportunity to meet other family members 
to anybody with a relative living in Western Sahara. In 2004 the UNHCR 
organised the first encounters between relatives. In the first round 1,200 
people attended these meetings, mainly coming from refugee camps. In 2005 
19,000 people registered for the programme, and with the mediation of the 
office 1,476 people could meet up with their relatives.28 The action had to be 
halted for a while as the required financial means were missing. Later on it 
was re-launched, and ever since it has been smoothly running.
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Tea with Polisario fighters
Guelb Char patrol
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Loading a car in Mijek
Mreira well
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Life in the Refugee Camps
In the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 the first refugees arrived 
near the town of Tindouf, which is located 30 kilometres from the 
Algerian-Moroccan border. Since then four large refugee camps have been 
established where there are 140,000 or 160,000 persons living now.1
The following figure illustrates the location of the camps:
Source: http://www.esisc.org/documents/pdf/en/the-polisario-front.pdf
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The camps were named after the towns located in the territory occupied 
by the Moroccan army to express that the refugees do not lose the hope of 
their return. The camps were given the following names: El-Aaiun (centre of 
the Saharan territories), Smara (the second biggest city, a sort of religious and 
spiritual centre), Dakhla (formerly Villa Crisneros, which functioned as an 
administrative centre during the Spanish period) and Asward (a town located 
in the interior of the country).2
The natural environment on this landscape is rather hostile; in summer the 
daily average temperature exceeds 50°C in shadows while the winter period 
is extremely windy and cold. 
The camps were built near wells, despite this there is no established water 
supply, and portable water is transported by tanker trucks. Apart from this 
there are catchments built to safely contain and preserve water. 
The camps are called wilaya in Arabic which means province or region. 
These are divided into districts (daira)—there are usually 6-7 districts in one 
camp—and these districts are divided further into neighbourhoods (hay).3
The camps were established far from each other taking into consideration 
the possibility of a successful Moroccan airstrike which would destroy the main 
leadership and other targets, had the camps been built close to each other.4
In the camps every unit has an elected leader (or chosen by the Polisario) who 
is responsible for the organisation of the every day life. Many of the important 
positions are taken by women since most men are serving in the so-called 
“liberated territory”.5 Thus, women are fulfilling key roles which support the 
development of a system different from the traditional Arab “family model”.6
In every camp gardens are created where the refugees try to establish and 
promote fruit and vegetable production with more or less success. A “national 
garden”—independent from the camps—was also created.7 Despite the salty and 
sandy soil they managed to cultivate several vegetables successfully. However, 
the inhabitants of the camps are not capable of self-sufficiency and significantly 
depend on the donations of the UN and other organisations.8 Nevertheless, the 
garden project fulfilled the aim set by the Sahrawi leadership, to acquaint the 
population leading a nomadic lifestyle with gardening which supports their 
permanent settlement. There was also a chicken farm created next to the national 
garden though it does not have a significant role in feeding the camps.
In the camps every family has its own tent though as time has passed 
many built houses of sand bricks, which include kitchen, storage room and 
sometimes bathroom, too. There are little gardens created around the houses 
and many are pondering on settling down permanently.9 However, there are 
certain obstacles, namely that there are no available jobs in the camps or even 
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in the neighbouring territories, thus, that there is no hope for the population 
and they are condemned to poverty. The other problem is that even though 
Algeria uses the refugee issue as a weapon against Morocco it does not support 
the settlement of the refugees in Algeria and does not allow the refugees to 
leave their camps.10 This is why the majority of the refugees feels the situation 
hopeless and would like to emigrate abroad, away from poverty to find work 
and live far from their homes. 
Naturally, the Saharan government tries to keep the hope for their return 
home alive in the people with all possible means which is complicated by the 
fact that most of the youth living in the camps has never been on the territories 
occupied by Morocco, thus they try the thrive in other countries. 
Compared with the state of health care in the Arab states the camps have 
developed and well-functioning medical organisation even in these conditions. 
Before the 1980s child death and chronic diseases were frequent and in many 
cases there were epidemics in the overcrowded camps, taking many lives.11 
Diseases are eliminated now and prevention is more emphasised. Although 
the rate of child death has been reduced, still 134 babies die out of 1,000 
newborns. Life expectancy still does not exceed 50 years. There are small 
hospitals operating in every district—run by local doctors and nurses—where 
emergency cases are taken care of. There are central hospitals built in the 
camps where the more serious cases are dealt with. The National Hospital 
created in Camp Dakhla possesses the most advanced equipment and staff of 
experts, mainly foreign doctors (most of them are Spanish and Cuban).12 From 
our perspective these institutes are poor and they are equipped deficiently. 
The HQ of the camps and the Saharawi Government are located in nearby 
town of Rabouni. Parliament, the Government, the Office of the MINURSO, 
the “Saharawi Red Crescent”, the National Women’s Society and other 
organisations dealing with donations and co-ordinating the society’s life 
moved there, in that town. 
The first school (it is called “The 27th of February”) where emphasis is 
placed on the education of women was founded there. The name of the school 
is a memorial of the declaration of the nation-state on 27th February 1976.
The development of the school system has not been over yet but there 
are kindergartens, elementary schools in every camp and two boarding high 
schools. The two schools are named after 9th June and 12th of October as a 
memento of the Martyr’s Day and the Day of National Unity. The schools are 
great help in the elimination of illiteracy which reached 95% in the 1970s but 
by now almost 90% of the camp-dwellers have acquired the skill of reading 
and writing.13
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Women have a prominent role in the field of education since they form 
the bigger part of the adult population.14 Women’s education is managed 
and controlled by the National Union of Saharawi Women (NUSW).15 This 
organisation was founded in 1979 and it has more than 10,000 members 
among Saharawi women living in refugee camps and foreign countries. There 
are schools founded just for women where they can master useful expertise 
like household skills and carpet-making. 
Every year 300 women take medical, household and other courses organised 
for them. The organisation places emphasis on the mental care of those women 
who were in Moroccan prisons or victims of sexual harassment and violence 
during the battles. The Union of Women is led by a council of 57 persons who 
are elected every five years by the Congress. The leader of the Council is 
also member of the Polisario leadership. The Union established good relations 
with other international organisations defending the rights of women. In many 
cases members of the Union are invited to give lectures abroad on the situation 
in Western Sahara and on the life in the refugee camps.
Apart from the education of women, medical programmes also have a 
great importance, for that reason some talented students can have a chance 
to study abroad (Cuba, Spain, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) every year to 
become doctors or nurses. Naturally, they get opportunities to study in other 
universities too though in very limited numbers. Education is important in 
the camps too because the aim of the SADRas they are preparing for their 
returnis to raise a leading, technical, and intellectual middle-class which 
will be capable of organising and managing the life of a future state.16
The Ministry of Culture of the SADR started collecting folk tales, folk songs 
and other pieces of art (pipes, wood-sculptures, carpets etc.) partly to prove that 
the Saharawian people are not Moroccan and partly to preserve their national 
culture. There are some talented artists living in the camps who can present 
their works on exhibitions mostly organised with the help of foreigners.17
The Polisario recognised the importance of press in an early stage. Not 
only did they take journalists to the occupied territories but also created their 
own news agency called Sahara Press Service.18 Parallel to this operates the El 
Karama which deals with the Saharawian rights of freedom on the territories 
occupied by Morocco.19
The capabilities of the internet are also exploited, many home pages are in 
operation like the Arso,20 the SADR’s official page or blogs as Sahara Libre, 
presenting the life of occupied territories and refugee camps, and there is 
information on other pages of foreign organisations dealing with Western 
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Sahara issues (norwegian support Committee for Western sahara, 
Western sahara Campaign uK, Western sahara by Khatry Beirou, etc.). 
A significant part of the information posted on these pages is false, 
especially the one concerning the size of the population living in the refugee 
camps. Even the most optimistic guesses estimate this number at most 
to 140,000 persons.21 A UNHCR egyik becslése szerint 165 000 fő élhet a 
táborokban, de a menekültek pontos számát ők sem tudják.22 However, the 
International Red Cross and other non-governmental organisations supply 
food provisions for 155,000 persons. There have not been any complaints 
from the camps about the amount of the aid so far.
Unfortunately, the aids do not necessarily reach the indigent but the black 
market. Food packages with the symbols of the donating country can be found 
at local dealers even though these must not be sold since they are donations. In 
this perspective it seems strange that the Polisario and other web pages related 
to it report 180,000-200,000 refugees. The notion of using propaganda to get 
more aid is not unknown among the Polisario.23 In 2003, when a commander 
of the MINURSO visited a refugee camp he was presented a garage and its 
workers. However, the shop was cleaner than a chemist’s and there was no 
sign of oil spots typical to these places or any other sign of car repairing. A 
similar thing happened in a lab of computer education where the computers in 
their factory wrapping were presented as device of education used regularly. 
But tricks like these are used by the Moroccans, too, in order to manipulate 
the UN and other international organisations. 
A separate and independent organisation was founded in Tinduf by the 
relatives of the people who went missing in the war or during the Moroccan 
occupation.
The organisation of the AFAPREDESA (Association of Families of 
Prisoners and Disappeared Saharawi People Refugee Camps) was founded 
in the refugee camps on 20th August 1989.24 The organisation opened and 
managed offices in Paris and later in Madrid as early as 1996. Their main 
profile is gaining intelligence on perished Saharawians and providing mental 
and financial support to the people who were held captive in Moroccan 
prisons since the majority of them are victims of mental and physical diseases 
because of the maltreatment suffered in the prisons.25 There are still hundreds 
Saharawians registered as lost since their families have no information about 
their relatives.26 The AFAPREDESA has good relations with the Amnesty 
International which called off its conference scheduled to be held in Morocco 
(1999) alluding to the constant violation of human rights which was partly 
based on the information received from AFAPREDESA.27
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It must be admitted, however, that in the refugee camps the Polisario kept 
in custody several thousands of Moroccan POWs who had been captured back 
in the 1970s.28 Most of the prisoners were old and weak with different illnesses. 
Although the Moroccan government first denied that these people had ever 
existed, and later demanded their release at various forums, the Polisario did 
not agree either to exchange prisoners, or to ransom, or to make them free 
immediately.29 Back in the days when the 1991 ceasefire agreement was signed, 
the settlement plan contained that after the referendum that decided upon the 
future of the territory all prisoners would be released unconditionally.30 The 
referendum has not taken place for 12 years now, thus, the prisoners could 
not return to their families. Those Moroccan soldiers in custody were visited 
by the International Red Cross, which was monitoring the conditions in the 
camps, twice a year. In their reports, Red Cross staff pointed out that most of 
the prisoners had become washed-out; were ill and were not provided with 
proper medical attendance and other life conditions. From reliable sources it 
was leaked that they were even forced to work, as opposed to international 
regulations.31 To show mercy and goodwill, the Polisario released some of 
them from time to time—mostly the elder and the ill.32
For instance, at the end of October 2003 with the mediation of the 
International Red Cross 300 POWs were released (at this time I myself was 
at the spot). The prisoners were then transported to the Moroccan airbase, 
Chahid El Hafed, by a special plane provided by the Red Cross. This move 
was welcomed by many countries and the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan 
himself in numerous communiqués.
Although the release of the prisoners was seen by human rights 
organisations and the United Nations as a positive action, sharp criticism was 
directed towards the Polisario because of those still kept in custody. Former 
French President François Mitterand’s wife, Daniella Mitterand and her NGO, 
the Fondation France Liberte heavily criticised the Polisario as it had kept old 
and ill people under horrific circumstances in its camps. In their statement 
they called upon the Polisario to immediately and unconditionally release all 
POWs.33 Finally, due to the intensified pressure coming from the international 
community, on 18 August 2006 the Polisario released the last group of 404 
Moroccan prisoners.34
Unfortunately, similarly to the Moroccan POWs, the Saharawian prisoners’ 
case remains unsolved, too, since there are still 151 POWs and hundreds of 
civilian prisoners in Moroccan prisons without any hope for gaining freedom.35 
The Moroccan Government does not wish to enter into negotiations about this 
issue though they closed some of the most infamous prisons (Qualatt Mgouna) 
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and started supporting the enforcement of human rights.36 At the same time 
they divert the international forums from the violation of basic human rights 
(for example, if Saharawi children do not wish to study Moroccan history they 
are “regulated” using police force) by stressing the ill fate of the Moroccan 
prisoners. Anyhow, maybe there is a chance of mutual prisoner exchange with 
the supervision of the UN or the Red Cross.
Various relief organisations operate in the camps collecting and distributing 
food, cloth, money and other donations. The English War on Want was the first 
organisation that appeared in 1984 and has been operating in the refugee camps 
ever since.37 First it helped with stabilising the health care and restraining the 
diseases, then, the organisation took part in the development of the gardening 
programme and in the creation of the National Garden. Later stores were built 
with the help of fire departments from Lancashire for the safe storage of aids. 
Its “Toys Make Children Happy” programme is also successful in collecting 
and providing toys for the children living in the camps.
The programme of the Norwegian People’s Aid organisation is slightly 
different from the usual charity work.38 They organised training courses on 
recognising landmines and other unexploded shells and avoiding accidents.39 
Many people who were wounded or lost a limb by stepping on a landmine 
were involved in the programmes. The number of the accidents has been 
significantly reduced since the organisation started its preventive work 
in 1998 but there are still many victims mainly because of the landmines 
deployed by the Moroccan army and the unexploded shells fired during the 
battles.40 When I served as peacekeeper in MINURSO an accident happened 
in a few kilometres from the UN compound (Mehaires) where I was serving 
as a military observant. The result of the accident was that a Bedouin boy was 
seriously wounded on his leg and he lost one of his hands because of touching 
an unexploded shell unwarily. Unfortunately, there are many landmines which 
can be triggered by the vibration of a car passing nearby or just by the heat in 
a 10-km radius around the Berm and in those parts of the desert where battles 
had been fought (almost everywhere).
There are Hungarian relief organisations working in Western Sahara 
and the most significant among them is the Hungarian Baptist Church 
Charity Service. Minister Sándor Szenci and his wife are dealing with 
mentally and physically disabled children in the camps and many of them 
make spectacular progress after the training courses. The Szenci couple 
also started an adoption programme which allows the financial help of 
a child’s medical treatment or education for one year through a certain 
monthly sum.41
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Another organisation operating here is the Sahara Foundation which 
organises educational opportunities for talented Sahrawi children and took up 
the responsibility of cultural good will mission.42
Unfortunately there are fewer and fewer relief organisations trying to 
help the refugees, consequently the situation in the camps is catastrophic 
again. The reason can be that the food sent by the International Red Cross 
and other organisations (World Food Programme, etc.) is not enough anymore 
to feed refugees. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) submitted its report 
(Anthropometric and Micronutrient Nutrition Survey-Saharawi Refugee 
Camps, Tindouf, Algeria, 2002) to several countries and international 
organisations and requested immediate help.43
When I visited the UN’s base in Tindouf (23rd-26th July 2004) I met the 
representatives of organisations which tried to find a solution to the food 
problems in the camps. The activists of various organisations arriving 
in Tindouf were invited by the UNHCR and apart from taking part in a 
conference they also visited the refugee camps. On one of these occasions I 
had the opportunity of escorting them to the refugee camp of Aswaard.
It is hard to describe the life of these people but I think that even Gypsy 
people living in Hungary’s slums have better living conditions than these 
people. In my opinion the best solution would be to abolish these camps and 
to guarantee the inhabitants their resettlement to the territories of Western 
Sahara possibly with some financial support.
Morocco established a programme for this and houses were built for the 
repatriated refugees in the cities of the occupied territories. However, most 
of the houses are empty since the Polisario does not let the inhabitants of the 
refugee camps to resettle in territories governed by Moroccan authorities and 
many of them are forced to stay in the camps.44 In this manner the Polisario 
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